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This thesis integrates employment policies at the sub-national level in the study on the transfer of pay 
and training policies and practices from multinationals’ headquarters to Belgian subsidiaries. Contrary 
to existing studies, it focuses on employment policies at multiple sub-national levels rather than on one 
sub-national level only. Specifically, it deals with how regional and inter-firm employment policies, 
like training initiatives foreseen by the regional government or pension funds on the sector level, affect 
the subsidiary’s decision-making role with regard to pay and training policies and practices. To study 
this topic, the first preliminary chapter will describe the research context and formulate the research 
question. Thereafter it will describe how investigating the research question adds to existing studies on 
the transfer. This is followed by the outline of the thesis. The chapter ends by a brief report on the 
findings. 
 
 
0.1 The context 
 
There is no doubt that multinational companies (further referred to as MNCs) are of great importance 
for employment in Belgium. In 2011, foreign MNCs employed 500.000 employees in their Belgian 
operations. This is 11 per cent of the total active population in Belgium, which means that at least one 
out of ten employees is employed within a MNC (Verbond van Belgische Ondernemingen [VBO], 
2013). This direct effect on employment is also illustrated when MNCs decide to close or restructure 
Belgian operations. Recent cases – Ford Genk, Arcelor Mittal or Caterpillar – show that not only the 
employees working in the restructured Belgian operations are affected. Also suppliers undergo 
simultaneous or subsequent restructuring. So the international integration of production has major 
implications on how employment is organised because of the way it contributes to workforce 
development. Specifically, new investments directly create employment. Mergers or acquisitions, on 
the contrary, lead to employees being relocated or dismissed. Besides this direct effect on the number 
of jobs created or relocated, MNCs have an indirect influence on employment. Particularly, by their 
presence, MNCs influence employment policies and practices within suppliers, clients and services 
companies (Crouch, Schröder, & Voelzkow, 2009; Zeitlin, 2004; 2008). Furthermore MNCs are able 
to transfer or disseminate employment policies and practices to foreign subsidiaries, like pay and 
performance, training and organisational learning, employee involvement and communication and 
employee representation (Almond et al., 2005; Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010). For example 
MNCs’ headquarters develop a system of job classification and implement it in all subsidiaries 
worldwide. 
 
Figures on the direct influence of MNCs’ presence on employment rates are hard to find. Therefore, 
the number of financial flows is most frequently used as a proxy for the number of jobs created 
(Aharoni & Brock, 2010; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Based on the most recently available figures, 
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Belgium shows to have a relative high per centage of foreign direct investment stocks (FDI) in gross 
domestic product (GDP). These figures reflect Belgium’s open economy and its dependence on 
foreign investors (figure 1) (Organisation for Economic Coordination and Development [OECD], 
2013). This attractiveness should not come as a surprise when the literature on FDI is taken into 
account. Specifically, institutional and economic resources have been identified to inhibit or contribute 
to FDI (Almond et al., 2014; Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). The former refers to country specific 
institutions such as systems of industrial relations and labour markets. The latter refers to the nature of 
products, services or knowledge, research and development, the share of professional and technical 
workers and the level of innovation and specialisation (Jensen, 2003).  
 
Figure 1 FDI as a per centage of GDP 
 
OECD (2013), FDI stocks (Inward FDI minus Outward FDI) 
 
In line with this literature, three factors seem to be important for MNCs investing in Belgium: the 
special competencies and skills of the workforce, the role of senior managers in the Belgian operations 
and the innovative capabilities of the Belgian subsidiaries. The system of industrial relations and 
collective bargaining causes a slightly inhibiting effect (figure 2) (Pulignano & Dekocker, 2014). It is, 
however, remarkable that attracting factors (skill and education system and industrial policy fostering 
innovation), are regionalised policy domains. This means that within countries, the policies at sub-
national levels can compete for inward investment by offering a more favourable institutional 
framework or competitive resources (Almond et al., 2014; Meyer et al., 2011). In this regard, policies 
at multiple sub-national levels allow MNCs to differentiate, specialise and fragment their subsidiaries’ 
(employment) policies as opposed to competitors (Zeitlin, 2004). Furthermore, the Belgian system of 
collective bargaining tends to have a strong focus on the sector level like in many other OECD 
countries (Rubery & Grimshaw, 2003). Based on this, it is concluded that FDI and the number of jobs 
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relate to the sub-national Belgian context. This is in line with the observation that for employment 
within MNCs, policies at multiple sub-national levels have become increasingly important. 
Specifically, national labour markets are internally heterogeneous because of other skill preferences, 
systems of training or the presence of specific employers’ and trade organisations (Almond, 2011; 
Almond et al., 2005; Muller, 1998). The importance of these policies at sub-national levels for 
employment is further reinforced by its nature. Contrary to finance, human capital is more sub-
nationally bounded as employees are far less mobile. Even in the case of the European Union, where 
barriers and borders have been opened, only a number of employees became mobile. Language issues 
or the strong link with the regional and local community are explanatory in this regard (Meyer et al., 
2011).  
 
Figure 2 Factors influencing new investments or mandates 
 
 
Pulignano and Dekocker (2014) 
 
More generally, the importance of policies at sub-national levels for MNCs has increased because they 
encompass supportive rules, norms, organisational forms and institutions for the global accumulation 
process (Almond et al, 2014; Brenner, 2001; Goodwin, 2001; Valler & Wood, 2010). Particularly, 
decreasing regulatory barriers at the national level, decreasing transportation costs and increasing 
communication facilities provide for a globalised economy. In addition, the use of these facilities is 
not equal, causing the emergence of unequal regions (capital and labour intensive regions) or the 
reinforcement of (under) developed regions. Moreover, there is a tendency towards specialisation and 
differentiation. Ideal typical regions focusing on manufacturing and services, and regions with 
specialisation in finance and retail have been observed (Feenstra, 1998; Gibbon, Bair, & Ponte, 2008). 
3,84 
2,94 
2,64 
3,71 3,72 
3,18 
3,39 3,46 
Special
competencies
or skills
Labour
relations
climate
Cost structure The capacity
to innovate
Senior
managers
defending
Belgian
operations
The
availability
and quality of
the local
suppliers
The ability to
achieve labour
flexibility
Financial
incentives
Factors influencing new investments or 
mandates (mean values)  
15 
 
Accordingly, regulation is no longer imposed by a centralised coordinated state level alone. Rather, 
alternative policy levels like policies at the level of the regional governments and inter-firm levels 
come forward (Amin, 1999). Some authors even state that the policies at sub-national levels have 
become the key territorial units in an era of neo-liberal globalisation (Burroni, 2014; Cumbers, 
MacKinnon, & McMaster, 2003; Hudson, 2007). Based on this, it is surprising that policies at sub-
national levels have only marginally been considered for the indirect effect of MNCs on employment. 
The indirect effect refers to the way employment policies and practices have been transferred within 
MNCs and how MNCs influence employment policies and practices within different operational 
contexts (Almond, 2011; Morgan, 2007). As such there is a scope to enlarge knowledge on the transfer 
of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries by incorporating the employment policies 
at multiple sub-national levels and MNCs as active social actors. To integrate policies at sub-national 
levels and social actors into the study on the transfer, the next paragraph will formulate the research 
question and review existing studies on the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ 
subsidiaries to contextualise the research question. 
 
 
0.2 What is the research question? 
 
To date, studies on the transfer from headquarters to subsidiaries reflect MNCs’ balance between 
converging (internal consistency) and diverging (local adaptation) employment policies and practices 
(Almond et al., 2005; Edwards, Marginson, & Ferner, 2013). Against this backdrop, it is important to 
understand how national regulatory frameworks can limit MNCs’ choice and how local competition 
can push MNCs to prefer one employment practice above the other (Rozenzweig & Nohria, 1994). 
Similarly important are organisational variables, like subsidiaries’ resources or active trade unions to 
explain local adaptation and limited convergence (Edwards & Kuruvilla, 2005; Pulignano, 2006).  
 
Since employment policies and practices have been observed to be similar within -or vary across- 
countries (Almond et al., 2005; Edwards et al., 2013), much of the available research has focused on 
this global-local dimension and the convergence-divergence debate. Indeed, within empirical studies, 
the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries has been found to converge 
based on isomorphic forces (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Pudelko & Harzing, 2007) and equal transaction 
costs between companies (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995; Ghoshal & Nohria, 189). Divergence, on the 
contrary, has been observed based on national business systems (Ferner et al., 2004; Edwards et al., 
2013) and subsidiaries’ resources (Malnight, 2001; Rugman, Verbeke, & Yuan, 2011). What empirical 
studies on the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs to date do not integrate 
sufficiently, is the presence of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels. This is surprising 
because of the amount of literature devoted to the importance of employment policies at different sub-
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national levels for the transfer within MNCs (Almond, 2011; Heidenreich, 2012; Lane & Wood, 2009; 
Meyer et al., 2011). In addition, studies found social actors in MNCs as actively engaging in 
employment policies at sub-national levels (Cantwell et al., 2010; Crouch & Farrell, 2004; Kristensen 
& Morgan, 2007; Saka-Helmout & Geppert, 2011). 
 
A more comprehensive study on the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ 
subsidiaries would include employment policies at multiple sub-national levels and the active role of 
social actors within MNCs. Some studies already integrated employment policies at sub-national 
levels into the study of the transfer; it has, however, only partially been done (one sub-national level) 
(Bélanger, Lévesque, Jalette, & Murray, 2013) or has indirectly been integrated (not main research 
focus) (Muller, 1998). The study of Bélanger et al. (2013) for example, focused on the value chain and 
the level of subsidiaries’ discretion on subsidiaries’ employment policies and practices. They found 
that being part of local employers’ federations affects subsidiaries’ discretion, as membership in these 
federations allows having knowledge on innovative practices or accessing shared employment policies 
at sub-national levels. Similarly, studies so far focused on social actors’ engagement at sub-national 
levels (Almond et al., 2014; Crouch et al., 2009; Kristensen & Morgan, 2007). The study of Almond et 
al. (2014) found MNCs not merely operating in isolation from countries where investments are made: 
investments are made based on potential engagement to construct more favourable policies at multiple 
sub-national levels for the MNCs themselves. Furthermore, the relevant sub-national levels for the 
study of the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries have been 
theoretically distinguished but have not been empirically investigated (Almond, 2011). This means 
that, until recently, there has not been any reliable evidence on how subsidiaries’ social actors 
(employees and employers and their representative organisations) shape employment policies at 
multiple sub-national levels and at the same time influence the transfer of employment policies and 
practices within MNCs. Therefore this study addresses the following general research question: Do 
subsidiaries’ social actors mediate the transfer of employment policies and practices within MNCs’ 
subsidiaries by shaping employment policies at multiple sub-national levels? How this research 
question will be answered will be explained in the next paragraph. 
 
 
0.3 How has the research question been answered? 
 
This thesis will address the integration of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels into the 
study on the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Specifically, it will 
investigate whether social actors mediate the transfer of employment policies and practices by shaping 
employment policies at sub-national levels. To investigate this, the general research question will be 
split up into two research questions. The first one will examine how subsidiaries’ social actors 
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(employees and employers and their representative organisations) shape employment policies at sub-
national levels. The second one examines how employment policies at sub-national levels mediate the 
transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries.  
 
In order to investigate these two research questions, four multinationals with at least 2 subsidiaries in 
Belgium have been selected. Belgium, as a research context, is used to investigate these two questions 
because of its highly sub-national character (Boschma, 1999; Witte, 2009). Specifically, in Belgium, 
the sub-national level encompasses the level of the regional government, the sector level and the level 
of the web of inter-firm relations. In order to integrate these levels into the study on the transfer of 
employment policies and practices within MNCs’ subsidiaries, trade union representatives, local 
managers, employers’ federations and sector representatives have been interviewed. During these 
interviews, a distinction has been made between two dimensions of the transfer: 1) discretion, 
centralisation and headquarters’ control and 2) the headquarters-subsidiary configuration. The 
distinction between these two dimensions is investigated like this, since previous studies have shown 
its relevance (Ferner, Almond, &, Colling, 2005; Marginson, Edwards, Edwards, Ferner, & Tregaskis, 
2010; Quintanilla, Susaeta, & Sanchez-Mangas, 2008). Subsidiaries’ employment policies and 
practices are understood as pay and training policies. Accordingly, the thesis will focus on 
employment policies at sub-national levels fostering or inhibiting pay and training policies and 
practices. Pay policies and practices refer to formal systems of appraisal (a system for setting 
individuals’ performance objectives and monitoring performance against past objectives carried out 
annually or more frequently), variable pay (merit pay, performance-related pay, performance-related 
bonuses or payment by results) or job classification (difference in added value of different functions 
within the company). Training refers to vocational training, defined as training sessions offered by 
internal or external organisations to employees in order to adjust and adapt employees’ skills to meet 
changing demands and remain competitive (Cappelli, 2012; Colbert, 2004). This vocational training 
composes both general and job specific training. By general training, the study refers to training for 
personal development (e.g. presentation skills, negotiation skills); by specific training the study refers 
to training for the job (e.g. statistical software for researchers). 
 
Pay and training are focused on because of several reasons. First of all, training policies have been 
identified as a relevant policy domain for the integration of employment policies at multiple sub-
national levels into the study of transfer within MNCs (Almond, 2011). Specifically, training has been 
observed to become increasingly subjected to sub-national legislation or regulation (Cognard, 2011). 
Also in Belgium, regional governments and sectors foresee in training institutes. In this respect, if the 
study expects employment policies at multiple sub-nationals to be influential and shaped by 
subsidiaries’ social actors, it is expected for training policies. Secondly, the focus is on training 
policies because a lot of European countries have been confronted with a shortage of employees for 
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particular jobs and as such, training, from a strategic point of view, allows companies to execute their 
main activity (Noe, 2003). This is further reinforced by the ageing population that is faced by many 
developed countries. To compensate for the expected war for talent, investments in training and the 
presence of training policies are indeed expected to increase. However, training policies are also 
sensitive for negative forecasts of companies. This means that companies that are being restructured 
and profit-losing companies tend to invest less in training. In this respect, the research must guarantee 
an employment policy and therefore added the pay policy since this is, although not always well 
developed, present in companies. Besides this, in Belgium pay is negotiated collectively on the 
national and sector level, with an increasing importance for the sector level. Finally, both training and 
pay policies have been observed to be the most frequently studied employment policies and practices 
in empirical studies (Ferner et al., 2005; Marginson et al., 2010; Quintanilla et al., 2008). Although 
studies do not always make a distinction between the transfer of pay and training policies and 
practices, they are most frequently combined in the concept of employment policies and practices.  
 
To investigate how employment policies at sub-national levels are shaped by subsidiaries’ social 
actors to mediate the transfer of pay and training policies and practices, the remainder of the thesis is 
divided in four parts. Part I is the literature review and composes chapter I and II. Chapter I defines the 
main concepts in our research and formulates propositions regarding the expected relations among 
them. It focuses on theoretical frameworks and empirical studies on employment policies and practices 
without emphasising pay and training policies and practices. Chapter II describes the research context. 
Specifically, it illustrates the nature of pay and training policies and the differences among them. In 
addition, the second chapter portrays the relevant employment policies at sub-national levels in 
Belgium. These chapters are followed by the second part, the methodology. In the second part, chapter 
III illustrates the way the MNC population has been set up and the way cases have been selected. 
Chapter IV explains how the data has been collected and Chapter V describes the case studies used. 
The third part includes four chapters and describes the findings. Chapter VI is the first empirical 
chapter and examines how subsidiaries’ social actors shape employment policies at sub-national 
levels. The outcome of this chapter is then used to investigate how employment policies at sub-
national levels mediate the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. 
Therefore, the study makes a distinction, as mentioned previously, between centralisation, discretion 
and headquarters’ control on the one hand (Chapter VII) and the headquarter-subsidiary configuration 
on the other hand (Chapter VIII). The last chapter of the finding section synthesises chapters VI till 
VIII.  
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The empirical part will thus explore four (part) research questions:  
 
 Chapter VI: How do subsidiaries’ social actors shape employment policies at multiple sub-national 
levels? 
 Chapter VII: How do employment policies at multiple sub-national levels affect centralisation, 
headquarters’ control and subsidiaries’ discretion? 
 Chapter VIII: How do employment policies at multiple sub-national levels affect headquarters-
subsidiary configurations and subsidiaries’ roles? 
 Chapter IX: Do subsidiaries’ social actors mediate the transfer of pay and training policies and 
practices by shaping employment policies at multiple sub-national levels?  
 
The thesis ends with a fourth part formulating a conclusion and some implications. Before the four 
parts will be described, the final section of this introduction will briefly report on the question’s 
relevance and the results found. 
 
Figure 3 PhD outline 
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0.4 Why is this question relevant? 
 
By answering the main research question, the thesis generally contributes to existing studies on the 
transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. As Ferner, Edwards and Tempel 
(2012) stated, integrating the influence of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels in 
empirical studies would be a conceptual step forward as theoretically relevant levels and spheres have 
been identified (Almond, 2011; Whitley, 2000). Therefore, the study innovatively integrates two 
streams of literature on MNCs into the study on the transfer of employment policies and practices in 
MNCs’ subsidiaries: studies on active subsidiaries’ social actors (employees and employers and their 
representative organisations) within MNCs and the literature on policies at sub-national levels.  
 
Besides this general contribution, the thesis more specifically contributes on a conceptual, 
methodological and empirical level. The conceptual contribution results from the idea that 
employment policies at multiple sub-national levels are not merely constraining MNCs. Rather, 
subsidiaries’ social actors are seen as actively engaging in these policies at multiple sub-national levels 
to align these policies with their employment strategy. This means that employers, employees and 
their representative organisations are expected to use their seats on boards of directors or joint 
committees to emphasise a policy aim like job security, or implement a particular practice like meal 
vouchers. In this vein, subsidiaries co-evolve with employment policies at multiple sub-national levels 
as there is a reciprocal relation between these policies and subsidiaries’ social actors (Heidenreich, 
2012). Furthermore, by integrating employment policies at multiple sub-national levels, it elaborates 
on the theoretical perspectives, the business system approach and the resource-based view, in order to 
explain diverging subsidiaries’ employment policies and practices. Specifically, in line with the initial 
conceptualisation of the business system approach, other levels and policy domains besides the 
national level were taken into account. Indeed, not only business systems were considered as specific 
configurations of state, financial sphere, skill development and relations between companies and 
actors on the national level, but Whitley (2000) also identified additional variation like policies at the 
level of the regional government and at the level of the web of inter-firm relations. The national level 
is in the business system approach still considered as being important, as country specificities shape 
the sub-national architecture. However, the thesis uses literature on within country variation and 
institutional variance to show the relevance of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels to 
explain the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries (Burroni, 2014). 
Moreover, combining employment policies at multiple sub-national levels with the resource-based 
view results in the presence of sub-national location advantages besides the national level. Differences 
between employment policies at regional governments and their regional agencies can indeed cause 
different location advantages for companies. Also the employment policies at the inter-firm level 
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foresees in different location advantages based on the extent of shared information, shared knowledge 
and participation in institutions (Molina-Moralez & Martinez-Fernandez, 2008; Zeitlin, 2004).  
 
The methodological contribution of the study is a result of the first representative dataset of MNCs 
operating in Belgium, studying the transfer of pay and training policies and practices within MNCs. At 
the start of the study, a representative dataset of MNCs was not available, and as such a representative 
dataset had to be set up. The creation of this dataset, based on secondary datasets of Amadeus, Belfirst 
and Trendstop, was part of a quantitative research on employment policies and practices in Belgium
1
. 
By carefully identifying and defining the MNC population, the study contributes to studies on MNCs 
on the one hand, and studies on employment on the other hand through the development of a 
representative dataset based on country of origin, ownership structure and employment size. Previous 
studies (table 18 in appendix) indeed showed problems regarding the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of the MNC that has business in Belgium. Specifically, the majority of the empirical 
studies on Belgium lack a clear description or well-defined criteria on how the investigated MNCs 
have been selected. Even studies that do define the MNC or selection criteria show some drawbacks. 
Firstly, the link between the conceptual definition of the MNC and the way it is operationalised is 
often missing. (Du, Deloof & Jorissen (2011). Moreover, the selected MNCs only reflect particular 
sectors or countries of origin (Van Beveren, 2011) though data are used to draw generalising 
conclusions on the MNC population in Belgium. And secondly, the validity of the available secondary 
sources (Amadeus, Belfirst and Trendstop) is not sufficiently questioned. 
 
Finally the study on the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries also 
contributes on an empirical level since only indirect (Muller, 1998) or partial measurements of 
employment policies at sub-national levels (Bélanger et al., 2013; Crouch et al., 2009) have been 
found to influence the transfer on employment policies and practices. Case study research conducted 
by Muller (1998) on US MNCs operating in Germany, indicates that training is organised in a variety 
of ways within the country. In some cases, a local institution (the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry) helped the MNCs’ subsidiary to develop training. While some interviewees referred to a lack 
of support from headquarters for vocational training because of doubts concerning its value for some 
subsidiaries, policies at sub-national levels can facilitate the organisation of training (Almond et al., 
2005; Muller, 1998). Moreover, studies on US MNCs operating in Britain illustrate that decision-
making on training differs as a consequence of specific regional labour market requirements (Almond 
et al., 2005; Ferner et al., 2005). More recently Bélanger et al. (2013) identified policies at the sub-
                                                          
1 The construction of the MNC population has been set up as part of a quantitative study on the transfer of 
employment policies and practices in Belgium. This project is part of international inter-university research 
(INTREPID research network). The research project in Belgium had Prof dr Valeria Pulignano (KUL) and Prof 
dr Evelyne Léonard (UCL) as promotors. 
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national level to be important and tested this level on the transfer of employment policies and practices 
in MNCs’ subsidiaries. More specifically, Bélanger et al. (2013) found that local embeddedness 
increases the extent of discretion regarding employment practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries in Canada. If 
subsidiaries have a solid local integration, i.e. that they are part of local industry forums and take part 
in local employer associations' activities, discretion is higher. Within these studies, researchers 
however did not conceptually distinguish between different employment policies at multiple sub-
national levels in order to be able to examine them afterwards as this study did. Specifically, studies 
on the transfer of employment policies and practices did not integrate employment policies at multiple 
sub-national levels to study the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. 
Put differently, so far no study empirically investigated how employment policies at multiple sub-
national levels shaped by social actors, mediate the transfer of employment policies and practices in 
MNCs. This way, the thesis provides an important opportunity to advance the understanding on the 
transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs (Delbridge, Hauptmeier, & Sengupta, 2011; 
Ferner, Edwards, & Tempel, 2012; Morgan, 2007). 
 
 
0.5 What do the research results tell us? 
 
Based on the analysis of the interviews, four main findings are put forward to explain whether 
subsidiaries’ social actors use employment policies at multiple sub-national levels to mediate the 
transfer: 1) the availability of different types of resources provided by employment policies at multiple 
sub-national levels to engage in these policies, 2) the needed presence of employment policies at 
multiple sub-national levels, 3) the way employment policies at sub-national levels are in accordance 
with subsidiaries’ social actors’ aims and headquarters’ aims, and 4) the nature of pay and training 
policies and practices. For the former, the study has observed a wide range of available resources that 
subsidiaries’ social actors can make use of to shape employment policies at sub-national levels. In line 
with the literature (Meyer et al., 2011) institutional resources like the board of directors and 
committees based on parity (regional development agencies and sector) were found to be used by both 
employers and employees and their representative organisations to shape employment policies at sub-
national levels. In addition, more economic resources like inter-firm relations or a dense network 
between organisations supported by innovation policies are used by social actors to foster 
collaboration between companies. The latter results in alternative policies at the inter-firm level. 
However, the study also found additional resources like informal relations between subsidiary social 
actors and politicians, and competitive policies set up by former SME directors to be used by 
subsidiaries’ social actors. Specifically, in these cases, other employment policies arise because social 
actors’ aims are indirectly put forward, or existing site or subsidiaries’ policies still contribute, even 
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after mergers or take-overs, to the competitive advantage of the MNC. As a consequence, these 
policies remain instead of the worldwide or national employment policy. 
 
A second result is related to the presence of policies at multiple sub-national levels. Put differently, 
one level does not necessarily suffice. Additionally, the absence of one policy does not directly result 
in no engagement or no mediation. Instead it is the compensating or reinforcing effect between 
policies at sub-national levels (e.g. regional government and sector) that explains social actors’ 
engagement or the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Therefore the 
concept of complementarity between policies at different sub-national levels is found to be central to 
the explanation of subsidiaries’ social actors’ engagement and transfer. Applied to our two part 
research questions, this means that social actors’ engagement is only expected if resources at multiple 
reinforcing or compensating levels are present. Moreover, policies at multiple sub-national levels will 
only be used by social actors to mediate the transfer if policies on multiple levels are present. 
However, the presence of multiple resources does not suffice for shaping employment policies, nor for 
mediating the transfer. A second dimension of complementarity is the (in)congruence with social 
actors’ aims. For the shaping of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels, this means that 
subsidiaries’ social actors will only engage if these resources allow the social actors to shape these 
employment policies at sub-national levels in line with social actors’ aims. If this is not the case, social 
actors will not express an intention for shaping these policies. For the mediation of the transfer of pay 
and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries, headquarters’ aims are put forward. Put 
differently, to mediate the transfer, employment policies at sub-national levels (e.g. training institutes) 
shaped by subsidiaries’ social actors, should be seen as competitive from the headquarters’ point of 
view. Only then headquarters will benefit from discretion or changing subsidiaries’ roles. 
Headquarters’ aims are, however, not always similar to subsidiaries’ social actors’ aims as some 
resources are based on parity, and conflicts can occur between headquarters and subsidiaries (Ferner et 
al., 2004; Ferner et al., 2012). 
 
Finally, the results also depend on the nature of the employment policy or practice studied. In line with 
Storey (1989), the easier to measure and the more strategic the employment policy or practice, the 
more an employment policy or practice will be controlled. Based on our cases, pay policies were 
indeed much more controlled than training policies. However, when employment policies at sub-
national levels, though less present for pay policies, were seen as competitive by headquarters, less 
control was executed. To conclude, the study found the presence of resources on employment policies 
at multiple sub-national levels and the alignment with social actors’ aims to be core in explaining the 
shaping of employment policies at sub-national levels and in explaining their use to mediate the 
transfer. In order to give an insight in how the study came to these results, the following part 
theoretically embeds the research question. Thereafter, the second part describes the methodology 
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used. The third part reports on the findings based on the interviews. The final part discusses the 
theoretical, methodological and policy implications. 
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Chapter I: State of the Art
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1.1 Introduction 
  
This chapter provides a multidisciplinary state of the art describing three streams within the literature 
on MNCs in order to contextualise the central research question: do subsidiaries’ social actors mediate 
the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries by shaping employment 
policies at multiple sub-national levels. These three streams are 1) the transfer of employment 
practices and policies within MNCs, 2) subsidiaries’ social actors engaging in policies at sub-national 
levels and 3) the role of policies at sub-national levels for studying employment in MNCs. It illustrates 
how the presented thesis innovatively combines these three streams of literature to investigate how 
subsidiaries’ social actors (employees, employers and their representative organisations) are expected 
to mediate this transfer by shaping employment policies at multiple sub-national levels, regional 
employment policies and inter-firm employment policies. Therefore it will first of all define the core 
concepts: the transfer, employment policies and practices and the MNC. Thereafter it will describe the 
theoretical frameworks used to explain the transfer in previous studies and the gaps in knowledge on 
the topic. Regarding this, chapter 1 will focus on the literature on employment policies and practices in 
MNCs in general, without focusing on pay and training policies and practices specifically. The chapter 
ends with a description of employment policies at sub-national levels and the role of social actors. In 
doing so, the thesis more generally adds to the understanding of the convergence-divergence debate 
and global-local tension. By specifically studying multiple sub-national levels, it aims at elaborating 
on the explanations of divergent or locally adapted employment policies within MNCs’ subsidiaries. 
 
 
1.2 The transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs 
 
1.2.1 Defining the transfer 
 
Inherent to the concept of transfer from headquarters to subsidiaries, is the presence of systems of 
control and coordination. These systems aim at regulating activities and encouraging behaviour or 
processes that are in accordance with business goals, aims and targets (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984). 
Although control and coordination have been used interchangeably, the concepts represent different 
assumptions regarding the relation between headquarters and subsidiaries. Accordingly, the way the 
transfer is made possible, differs. More specifically, direct report mechanisms are used to obtain 
control. Coordination on the contrary, refers to coordination among widely dispersed subsidiaries each 
having their own responsibilities (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989). In addition, in the case of control, 
different interest groups are considered to be prevalent within MNCs. When using the concept of 
coordination, common aims and means between headquarters and subsidiaries are presumed. The 
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concept of control is used, as previous studies have indicated conflicting interests to exist between 
MNCs’ headquarters and their subsidiaries (Ferner et al., 2004; Ferner et al., 2012). 
 
Organisational scholars differentiate between three types of control: bureaucratic control, personal 
control and control by socialisation (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984; Ferner, 2000; Martinez & Jarillo, 1989). 
The first group of control is reflected by the amount of written documents, policies, planning and 
systems set up to measure output and behaviour. In MNCs, this can refer to shared services (services 
used by all or the majority of the subsidiaries) and information systems (systems gaining access to 
information of all subsidiaries worldwide) (Edwards & Kuruvilla, 2005; Gamble, 2003). The second 
type of control includes personal relations among managers or close direct supervision. The presence 
of this personal contact within MNCs can be obtained by bringing managers together on a regional or 
global basis, and by the presence of expats in foreign subsidiaries (Ferner et al., 2004). The final type 
of control is the result of socialisation, referring to values and attitudes that are considered to be 
legitimate (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984; Martinez & Jarillo, 1989). Organisational learning policies and a 
common corporate culture are instruments put forward to foster this socialisation process in MNCs 
(Vora & Kostova, 2007). The research will initially focus on bureaucratic control as previous studies 
have indicated that systems and procedures to spread these policies and practices among widely 
disseminated subsidiaries are common practice (Edwards, Tregaskis, Edwards, Ferner, & Marginson, 
2007; McDonell, Lavelle, & Gunnigle, 2007; Minbaeva & Navrbjerg, 2011). In addition, informal 
mechanisms like personal control and control by socialisation are added to and not substituted by 
bureaucratic control, as they are more costly to implement (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989). Consequently, 
bureaucratic control is most likely to be observed. 
 
Investigating the presence of control however, would be too limited to be able to investigate the 
transfer of employment policies and practices since other formal mechanisms have been observed as 
well (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989). Indeed, other dimensions of transfer, like centralisation and 
discretion, are of particular interest for MNCs because of their structure. Specifically MNCs’ structure 
has been known to include international product, service -or brand divisions, regional headquarters 
and global business functions (Edwards et al., 2007b; McDonell et al., 2007; Minbaeva & Navrbjerg, 
2011). Because of these different levels in MNCs, the locus of decision-making next to control is 
relevant as well. Centralisation can thus be defined as a decision making process between headquarters 
and subsidiaries, in which control is to a particular extent hierarchically organised (Ghoshal & Nohria, 
1989; Martinez & Jarillo, 1989). Put differently, centralisation is inversely related to the extent of 
subsidiary’s discretion: depending on whether the subsidiary is forced to implement a policy or 
practice set by a higher level, whether the subsidiary can develop a policy or practice within the 
guidelines/framework set by a higher organisational level or whether the subsidiary can set its own 
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policy and practices (Edwards et al., 2007b; McDonell et al., 2007; Minbaeva & Navrbjerg, 2011). A 
higher organisational level can hereby refer to the global, regional or national headquarters (figure 4). 
 
Table 1 Ideal types of transfer 
 
Formal Mechanisms Control Span of control Headquarters-
subsidiary 
configurations 
Bureaucratic control Centralisation Hierarchy 
 Discretion  
Informal mechanisms Personal control   
Control by 
socialisation 
  
 Decentralisation Heterarchy 
Source: own processing based on Martinez and Jarillo (1989) 
 
The final dimension of transfer is related to the way the employment policies and practices have been 
more generally set up between headquarters and subsidiaries. This headquarters-subsidiary 
configuration is defined as a tight constellation of mutually supportive elements, a set of formal and 
informal employment tools (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995). An ideal typical distinction is made 
between hierarchy and heterarchy. The former is described as a number of subsidiaries where relations 
are centralised and horizontal linkages are rather limited to keep the coordination cost low (Bird, 
Taylor, & Beechler, 1998; Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995). The latter refers to subsidiaries that are 
connected based on a high number of horizontal linkages. Accordingly, other roles are foreseen for 
subsidiaries with regard to employment. What is core to ideal types however, is that configurations of 
employment policies and practices are somewhere between the two ideal types. This means that 
characteristics of hierarchic and heterarchic companies are combined. In addition, it is expected that 
the nature of the policy or practice (e.g. variable pay, profit sharing or training) and the role of the 
subsidiary will be influential as well (Porter, 1985). This means that a particular headquarters-
subsidiary configuration can be organised in another way as well, depending on the subsidiary or 
employment policy studied (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Rubery & Grimshaw, 2003). A similar 
reasoning is followed for the other dimensions of transfer, control, centralisation and discretion. For 
example, whether control is executed or not depends on the measurement possibilities and the strategic 
importance for MNCs’ competitive advantage of a particular practice or policy (Storey, 1990). Finally, 
these mechanisms are connected (figure 4 and table 1) (Alonso, Dessein, & Matouschek; 2008; 
Whisler, Meyer, Baum, & Sorensen, 1967). Specifically, where bureaucratic control is much more 
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related to centralisation and a hierarchic headquarters-subsidiary configuration, informal integrative 
mechanisms like personal control and control by socialisation, are more related to decentralisation. 
 
Figure 4 Dimensions of transfer 
 
Hierarchy 
 
 
Heterarchy 
 
Bureaucratic Control: number of control systems on each of these levels 
Centralisation 
Discretion 
Headquarters-subsidiary configuration-striped 
 
Global 
headquarters 
Regional 
headquarters 
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1.2.2 Defining the transfer of employment policies and practices 
 
A second concept that needs to be defined is the concept of employment policies and practices. Within 
the concept of employment, the study distinguishes between employment policies and employment 
practices as two separate dimensions within a company’s employment system (Arthur & Boyles, 2007; 
Colbert, 2004). Specifically, an employment policy is based on a general employment goal of the 
company for which a number of initiatives are set up. Put differently, the employment policy reflects a 
more practical level of the employment goals of the company (e.g. continuous learning). For executing 
this policy, headquarters propose an elaborated list of instruments to be used to obtain this goal. In 
reality however, not all initiatives are implemented. This means that headquarters and subsidiaries 
select specific employment practices from a list of instruments in order to execute the policies (Arthur 
& Boyles, 2007; Colbert, 2004). Accordingly, a transfer of an employment policy not necessarily 
implies a transfer of all proposed practices. 
 
Moreover the study uses the concept of employment policies and practices to combine elements of 
industrial relations (IR) and human resource management (HRM), as both have been widely 
investigated within the literature on the transfer (Quintanilla et al., 2008; Marginson et al., 2010). The 
study of industrial relations is hereby defined as both the study of indirect forms of representation by 
trade unions and less regulated or more direct forms of representation like joint consultation 
arrangements. Indeed, the study of industrial relations has evolved towards a more inclusive approach 
(Meardi, in press). Specifically, IR studies integrate non-collective aspects of labour on the company 
level and go beyond the original research focus of institutions of employment only (Blyton & 
Turnbull, 2003; Meardi, in press). In this way, the study of IR incorporates aspects of HRM. The latter 
is described as the way individuals are managed to enhance the achievement of organisational 
objectives. Therefore, organisations use HR tools like performance management, rewarding, 
communication and training to enhance employees’ commitment (Heery, Bacon, Blyton, & Fiorito, 
2008; Farnham & Pilmott, 1997). Similar to IR, current studies on HRM consider HRM and IR as 
more and more complementary rather than as substitutes (Boxall, in press). This complementarity is 
confirmed in empirical studies. For example, McDonald, Tüsselman, & Heise (2003) found that 
collective labour relations still remain in the presence of direct employee involvement mechanisms. 
Therefore, by using the concept of employment, it encompasses both IR and HRM dimensions for the 
transfer within MNCs (Townsend & Wilkinson, 2014, Williams & Derek, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
1.2.3 Defining the transfer of employment policies and practices in multinational 
companies 
 
A final core concept is the concept of a MNC. A general accepted definition of what a multinational 
should look like in order to be able to study the transfer of employment policies and practices is 
lacking (Aharoni and Brock, 2010; Hoos, 2000). Foreign direct investment (FDI), referring to firms 
from one country buying and controlling an investment, or setting up a branch or subsidiary in another 
country, is therefore often used as a starting point (OECD, 2013). However, FDI as a key indicator is 
insufficient to study the transfer within MNCs. More specifically, MNCs can be operational in several 
host countries without having investments from the home country or without having enough 
employees to set up employment policies (Hennart, 2009; Kalleberg & Van Buren, 1997). This is the 
case when using practices like sub-contracting, licensing or setting up sales offices. Consequently, FDI 
merely focuses on the financial exchange between countries. Therefore it does not take into account 
the MNC as a specific type of organisation for studying employment policies and practices. This 
means that, besides the financial flows between countries, interdependencies between subsidiaries and 
headquarters and between subsidiaries in more than one country need to be added to select MNCs for 
investigating the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1990).  
 
Several researchers have classified interdependencies or interlink ages between subsidiaries and 
headquarters (for an overview, see Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) are worth 
mentioning in this respect. They assume that the relation between headquarters and subsidiaries is 
characterised by both independence and interdependence, the latter being a core characteristic of 
MNCs. More specifically, interdependency can occur between headquarters and subsidiaries, but also 
between subsidiaries, i.e. if a particular subsidiary supplies another one. The nature of these 
interdependencies relates to a company’s internal (e.g. performance, available resources) and external 
factors (e.g. location, competitors). Accordingly, an MNC for our study on employment policies and 
practices will be described as an organisation in which employment policies and practices are 
transferred between economically interlinked activities. The latter refers to the multiple sources of 
authority with which MNCs are confronted (Aharoni & Brock, 2010; Hoos, 2000). This applies to the 
number of countries in which the MNC is operational, the variance between the different national 
contexts and the interaction between these contexts. Summarising, this means that this multi-country 
organisational presence and the interlink ages between operations in different countries define the 
MNC for the study of employment policies and practices (Westney & Zaheer, 2013).  
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1.3 Explaining the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs: 
Theoretical approaches  
 
After having defined the core concepts, this section will give an overview of the theoretical 
frameworks used to explain the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. 
Most attempts to explain the transfer of employment policies and practices incorporate some ideas of 
the neo-institutional approach, or integrate company specific features. In doing so, they focus on one 
particular dimension of the transfer: the neo-institutionalist approach most frequently focuses on 
control, centralisation and discretion. Organisational characteristics merely study headquarters-
subsidiary configurations (for an overview, see table 17 in appendix). The most frequently applied 
theoretical frameworks are the isomorphic forces of institutions, the transaction cost economics, the 
business system approach and the resource-based approach (table 2). The use of these theoretical 
frameworks for the study on transfer is described in the next paragraphs. 
 
Table 2 Overview of theoretical perspectives 
 
 Neo-institutionalism-
control/centralisation/discretion 
Organisational- headquarters-
subsidiary configuration 
Convergence Isomorphism (1) Dominance effect Transaction cost economics 
 Isomorphism (2) Best practices  
Divergence Business system approach Resource-based view 
Source own processing 
 
1.3.1 Pressure for convergence and global integration  
 
Within theoretical frameworks explaining convergence, isomorphic forces and the transaction cost 
economics are most frequently used. Core to the idea of isomorphism, is that institutional 
environments structure companies’ behaviour. The way these isomorphic forces shape companies’ 
behaviour, is described by referring to the notion of the organisational field of Di Maggio and Powell 
(Tempel & Walgenbach, 2007). Specifically, an organisational field is defined as an area in which a 
particular institutional domain like employment is reproduced by social actors through three types of 
isomorphism: coercive (resulting from pressure of other social actors within the field), mimetic (in 
case of uncertainty, resulting in copying other social actors) and normative isomorphism (resulting 
from common patterns of thought). Accordingly, for studies on the transfer, it is expected that MNCs 
operating in the same environment, adopt similar employment policies and practices (Edwards et al., 
2013; Ferner & Quintanilla, 1998; Kostova & Roth, 2002). 
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Based on this idea of the organisational field, two perspectives have been developed to explain the 
transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. The dominance perspective first 
of all states that dominant or hegemonic countries exert employment policies that are adopted across 
countries. In other words, companies compare themselves with a set of companies of a particular home 
country, and borrow or learn from these countries (Almond et al., 2005; Pudelko & Harzing, 2007). 
Important in this regard is that what is considered as dominant, changes over time (Almond et al., 
2005). Furthermore, the national level is not the only level found to represent a dominance effect. 
Royle and Ortiz (2009) observed sector and firm specific dominance effects to exist as well. A second 
approach based on isomorphic forces, is the universalist or system approach (Edwards et al., 2013; 
Geppert & Williams, 2006). This perspective assumes some employment policies and practices to be 
transferred to all subsidiaries worldwide independent of the industry, size or country (Lerxtundi & 
Landeta, 2012). Put differently, there are methods and approaches considered to be the best to adopt, 
across different home and host countries. However, best practices are only applicable from an actor’s 
point of view. This means that, what is put forward as best practice, depends on the strategy of the 
MNCs, for example the extent of internationalisation (Tüsselman, Allen, Barrett, & McDonald, 2008). 
Accordingly, it might be expected that MNCs looking for local legitimation (low degree of 
internationalisation) or MNCs looking for global integration (more internationalised industries) 
respectively go along with different types of isomorphism (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995; Tüsselman 
et al., 2008). 
 
The pressure to converge worldwide has been found to relate to the asset specificity, the frequency and 
the uncertainty to set up employment policies and practices as well (Teece, 1986; Williamson, 1992; 
2010). Particularly, if an MNC headquarters has made a lot of investments to develop a particular 
employment practice or policy, it will be likely to distribute it among its subsidiaries (Edwards, 2011). 
Furthermore when there is frequent contact between headquarters and subsidiaries, and a high 
uncertainty regarding subsidiary’s efficacy in setting up the employment policies and practices, it is 
likely that the headquarters will maintain control (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989). Thus, generally, 
transaction cost economics predict that the higher the transaction cost, the more MNCs tend to develop 
employment policies and practices at the headquarters’ level and tend to transfer them to the 
subsidiaries (Kirca et al., 2011). These interpretations of subsidiaries’ role however, have been found 
too narrow within previous studies based on the idea of isomorphism or transaction costs. Particularly, 
these approaches do not consider the specific local environment subsidiaries are operating in (Barney, 
2001). In addition, it cannot explain why employment policies and practices are organised differently 
in subsidiaries with similar transaction costs (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; 1990). This is where the 
business system and the resource-based view come into play. 
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1.3.2 Pressure for divergence and local adaptation 
 
1.3.2.1 Pressure for divergence and local adaptation: Cross-national differences 
 
Contrary to the dominant and universalist perspective, the business system approach (in the remainder 
referred to as BS) explains the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs by focusing on 
differences in institutional contexts. In order to capture the full diversity in institutional settings, the 
BS approach goes beyond the ideal typical varieties of capitalism (Hall & Thelen, 2009) and the 
cultural approach
2
 (Liu, 2004; Tempel & Welgenbach, 2007) because of their rather static character 
(McGraw, 2004; Saka, 2002). Specifically, the BS approach opposes the idea of increasing 
convergence, as differences between national systems are observed to cause different employment 
policies and practices (Pudelko & Harzing, 2007). 
 
Central to the BS approach is the idea that home countries, where headquarters are located, and host 
countries, where subsidiaries are operational, reflect different forms of capitalism that influence 
MNCs’ behaviour. These different forms of capitalism shape strategies and competitiveness of the 
firms through particular systems of ownership, skill and training institutes, the organisation of the state 
and industrial relations (Almond & Ferner, 2006; Ferner et al., 2004; Quintanilla et al., 2008; 
Marginson et al., 2010). Looking at the relation between MNCs and these institutions, two 
assumptions are central in this approach: first, the behaviour of companies is shaped by the economic 
rules of the institutional contexts in which they are located and by the interactions between companies 
and these institutions (Morgan, 2007). Second, these contexts compose of different complementary 
institutions that favour the competitive advantage of companies. As a consequence, specific dynamic 
ways of organising the economic activity arise and companies’ behaviour is embedded in social, 
economic and political institutions (Almond et al., 2005; Edwards & Kuruvila, 2005). Based on the 
differences in social, economic and political institutions, UK, Irish and US home and host countries 
are considered as having more individual employment policies like individual performance related pay 
and training focusing on human capital accumulation (Parry, Dickmann, & Morley, 2008). Countries 
like Belgium and the Scandinavian countries leave less room for organisational autonomy because 
vocational training and the collaborative relationship between actors in the private sector are highly 
regulated by stable and secure positions of employment institutions and governments (Muller, 1998; 
Wever, 1995).  
 
                                                          
2
 The VoC approach clusters companies based on a dichotomy between liberal and coordinated countries. The 
cultural approach labels countries based on the 6D-model of Hofstedes (pragmatism, indulgence, power distance, 
individualism, masculinity and uncertainty distance). The 6D- model clusters countries at one moment without 
integrating changes on these dimensions.  
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The above mentioned theoretical perspectives are reflected in hypotheses formulated. Specifically, 
empirical studies using the BS approach agree on three propositions regarding the influence of 
national business systems. First of all, a considerable amount of literature has found a home country or 
country of origin effect on the transfer to be mediated by the host country effect (for an overview see 
table 17 in appendix). Muller (1998) for example investigated the way HR and IR are organised in UK 
and US MNCs and found evidence for the country of origin. Specifically, US companies tried to go 
beyond the system of collective bargaining, because this allows more flexibility (home country effect): 
pay and performance schemes, not guaranteeing a minimum increase in wage were implemented, 
particularly within the absence of works councils (host country effect). Next to this, a number of 
researchers have reported a complementary effect between home and host countries. Tüsselmann et al. 
(2002) found that German MNCs transferred the idea of works councils and employee information and 
consultation to the UK subsidiaries. MNCs however, complement this by engaging in direct forms of 
participation. Similarly, McDonald et al. (2003) showed that subsidiaries of more regulated home 
countries integrate more progressive practices of Anglo-Saxon headquarters in a flexible collective 
approach (McDonald et al., 2003). Finally, the home and host country effect and their interaction 
depends on the employment practice studied. Parry et al. (2008) for example, showed that the host 
country effect is present for trade union recognition and consultation contrary to other policies like 
diversity management. 
 
 
1.3.2.2 Pressure for divergence and local adaptation: within company variation 
 
The country specific context as described above can also indirectly increase divergence between 
companies by offering location advantages or specific regulations on the company level (Meyer et al., 
2011). The former refers, for example, to the presence of development agencies giving financial 
advice and support or training infrastructure (external resources). The latter refers, for example, to the 
required presence of a works council or union representative at the subsidiary level (internal resources) 
as part of the system of industrial relations. Based on this, the transfer of employment policies and 
practices is expected to vary according to subsidiaries’ actors making use of external and internal 
resources to inhibit the transfer. Both will be described in the next paragraphs. 
 
 
1.3.2.2.1 Within company variation: External resources - Location advantages 
 
The idea of varying external location advantages or resources is built on the observation that MNCs 
are operational in different local contexts. In addition, MNCs are not merely considered as vertically 
integrated companies. MNCs can also be seen as a network of dispersed subsidiaries, each having 
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access to specific resources (Malnight, 2001; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). Furthermore, not all 
subsidiaries carry out all the value adding activities of the MNC. As such subsidiaries have other 
competences and resource configurations (Holtbrügge & Möhr, 2011). The concept of resources, 
following the literature, refers to valuable (used to exploit opportunities and neutralise threats in the 
environment), rare (limited in supply and not equally distributed among firms), inimitable (cannot be 
replicated by other companies due to social embeddedness or path dependency) and non-substitutable 
sources (cannot be replaced by another) that are of importance for companies’ competitive advantage 
(Lockett, Thompson, & Morgenstern, 2009; Newbert, 2008; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
 
For the transfer in MNCs, the resource-based view expects the transfer of employment policies and 
practices in MNCs to be the result of resources subsidiaries have access to (for an overview see table 
17 in appendix). Isolating or resource position barriers take a central position in explaining the transfer 
(Tallman, 1992). Specifically, local subsidiary’s role can change because the subsidiary has the 
potential to interpret the needs of the local market or can overcome barriers to access competitive 
resources (Ferner, 2000). Put differently, headquarters change subsidiary’s role or give subsidiary 
discretion in order to access important resources. However, the position of a particular subsidiary will 
not only be determined by the level of resources available to the subsidiary but also by the nature of 
the resource. Rugman and Verbeke (2001) distinguish between location and non-location bound 
resources. Depending hereon, resources are respectively (not) easily transferable between subsidiaries 
and to the headquarters. The location bound resource are indicated by Castellani and Zanfei (2002) as 
listening post because subsidiaries can accumulate knowledge in foreign markets. On the contrary, if 
local resources have the potential to be reverse diffused (non-location bound), more control is assumed 
to be observed (Edwards & Tempel, 2010).  
 
 
1.3.2.2.2 Within company variation: Internal resources 
 
Similar to external resources, internal resources can also inhibit the transfer when subsidiaries’ actors 
rely on them. An illustrative example in this regard is the competitive position of the subsidiary within 
the overall MNC. This competitive position refers to the strategic role of the subsidiary: do 
subsidiaries serve local or global markets (Fenton O-Creevy, Gooderham, & Nordhaug, 2008)? The 
subsidiaries’ relative performance, compared to other subsidiaries of the same MNCs or within the 
same business division (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2006) should be taken into account as well. 
Specifically, greater subsidiary performance within the MNC provides trade unions and managers at 
the subsidiary level with higher bargaining even in the situation where the headquarters’ aim is to set 
up a centralised employment policy (Geppert & Williams, 2006; Liu, 2004). In addition, the presence 
of union representatives and high union density on the work floor affects the transfer. Empirical 
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studies indeed found union density or representation causing MNCs to take into consideration unions’ 
interests. Consequently, the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs was inhibited 
(Fenton O-Greevy et al., 2008). So internal and external resources offer subsidiaries possibilities to 
inhibit the transfer. 
 
Some researchers, however, point at the weak position of the influence of internal and external 
resources on the transfer, as headquarters will easily counterbalance this bargaining position 
(Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2011). In this regard, Ferner et al. (2004) found some indication of 
the limited role of local managers as interpreters of the institutional environment. By having access or 
information that was not available for headquarters, local managers opposed centrally organised 
employment policies and practices. However, headquarters could find a counterstrategy in installing 
expats on the subsidiary level in order to block local managers’ resistance (Edwards, Rees, & Coller, 
1999). In addition, the position of the subsidiary within the value chain cannot always be used in terms 
of bargaining. After all, in the majority of cases, the structure of the value chain has been set up by the 
headquarters, or other subsidiaries execute similar tasks (Anderson, Forgsgren & Holm, 2007). What 
remains important for the subsidiary’s bargaining position however, are factors like market access, 
market knowledge and membership in innovative networks. Put differently, factors contributing to the 
performance of the company can make the headquarters dependent on the subsidiaries. This way, the 
subsidiary and the social actors within it, strengthen their position because local subsidiaries are 
considered to be interpreters of the local market (Ferner et al., 2004).  
 
 
1.4 Explaining the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs: 
Gaps in knowledge  
 
Based on the theoretical frameworks presented above, it can be stated that current empirical studies 
consider the institutional environment and resources as structuring the transfer of employment policies 
and practices in MNCs (for an overview see table 17 in appendix). However, independent of the 
framework used, a first criticism in a lot of the literature on the transfer, is the focus on the national 
level only (Almond, 2011; Morgan, 2007). This focus is argued because of following reasons: 1) the 
state is responsible for public order, 2) it sets up rules regarding private ownership and the financial 
system, 3) the state organises different interest groups and 4) it is responsible for skill development 
(Morgan, 2007; Whitley, 2000). Accordingly, less attention has been devoted to the policies at sub-
national levels. In addition, it has been observed that subsidiaries’ social actors (employees and 
employers and their representative organisations) use different external and internal resources to foster 
or inhibit the transfer (Geppert & Williams, 2006; Saka-Helmout & Geppert, 2011). Conceptualising 
the way social actors within MNCs use these resources however, is missing (Morgan, 2007).  
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Specifically, within the business system approach, the national level is seen as creating alternative 
paths for organising business (Geppert & Williams, 2006). So if other systems are observed, like 
regional governments, sectors or webs of inter-firm relations, national specific systems cause them to 
do so (Whitley, 2000). Considering the national level as the most important one is not a problem. 
However, empirical studies using the BS approach have neglected differences at the regional and inter-
firm level, causing other employment policies to emerge. Studies to date do not allow capturing 
policies at sub-national levels as they have focused on the host country as internally homogenous 
(Morgan, 2007). In addition, according to Whitley, the role and the action of the actors result from 
variation in the conventions and rules of the game established by dominant institutions (capital and 
labour) (Whitley, 2000). From this standpoint, companies and other actors are considered as over-
determined by their institutional environment, leaving little scope for local autonomy. This strong 
determinism is confirmed in Whitley’s notion of institutional complementarities. By this, Whitley 
suggests that over time, relationships between firms and their institutional context, that do not have the 
complementary effect, gradually fade away. This because these companies cannot compete against 
firms benefitting from this advantage (Morgan, 2007). In doing so, this functionalist notion of 
complementarity only considers employment policies at reinforcing sub-national levels. It hereby 
neglects the possibility that one level can also make up for the deficiencies of another one. In addition, 
what is seen as complementary varies among different social actors (employees, employers and their 
representative organisations) as well (Deeg, 2009; Deeg & Jackson, 2007). This means that there are 
two forms of complementarity that need to be taken into account for every social actor: 1) 
supplementary in which a particular level compensates for the deficiencies of another one and 2) 
synergy referring to the mutually reinforcing effect of compatible levels (Deeg, 2009; Deeg & 
Jackson, 2007). The current use of the BS approach in empirical studies fails to consider and 
conceptualise firms as dynamic actors that pursue their goals within and across compensating or 
reinforcing settings (Amable, 2000; Amable & Palombarini, 2009; Dunning & Lundan, 2010). 
 
Similar comments have been addressed to the use of the dominant and universalist perspective and the 
resource-based view. For the former, coercive, mimetic or normative pressure, causing companies to 
adopt common practices or structures, are expected to increase their legitimacy (Cantwell et al., 2010; 
Saka-Helmout & Geppert, 2011). However, when considering these different effects, it should be 
noted that the pressure for international integration reflects to a great extent the agency of some 
powerful actors. Specifically, a global managerial elite, as Ferner et al. (2012) state, set the standards 
for global institution building. In this process of institutional building, MNCs have been key players 
by shaping an international economic activity. In addition, as described earlier, what is considered as 
best practice depends on the actors’ strategy (Tüsselman et al., 2008). The second perspective, the 
resource-based view, considers host country advantages without addressing differences in location 
advantages within the country. Crouch et al. (2009) however, found that national countries are no 
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longer the main distinctive borders for location advantages. Rather, intermediate structures like the 
web of inter-firm relations and the regional governments and their supporting regional development 
agencies gain importance. Particularly, these levels foresee in location advantages like initiatives 
facilitating learning between companies, collective goods like qualified employees, cooperative labour 
relations with employees and a reliable infrastructure (Heidenreich, 2012). 
 
To conclude, empirical studies on the transfer of employment practices and policies in MNCs’ 
subsidiaries have too often overlooked the ability of subsidiaries’ social actors (employees and 
employers and their representative organisations) to shape policies at different levels (Ferner et al., 
2012). Specifically, a systematic integration of all relevant employment policies at sub-national levels 
and a clear conceptualisation of subsidiaries’ social actors as active agents is missing. This limited 
attention devoted to the integration of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels and social 
actors is surprising, as some studies found evidence for a dual track approach (Cantwell et al., 2010; 
Marginson et al., 2010): subsidiaries were found to copy the practices from their country of origin, but 
only use the ones that fit within the sub-national environment and adapt the host country by integrating 
particular types of employment. This active role of social actors within MNCs and the increasing 
relevance of policies at sub-national levels are furthermore reinforced by MNCs’ nature. That is, 
MNCs’ operations are indeed less influenced or bounded by norms and values of one specific 
environment. A more likely key to their nature are the fragmented circumstances with which they are 
confronted (Koene & Ansari, 2011; Léonard, Pulignano, Lamare, & Edwards, 2014;). These different 
settings can be contradicting or conflicting (Saka-Helmout & Geppert, 2011). This way, MNCs are 
key players in making linkages between rules, norms and values between policy levels, rather than 
assuming that there is a functionalist fit between them. In addition, other social actors, like SMEs, 
expect subsidiaries’ social actors to engage in constructing the environment. Indeed MNCs’ 
subsidiaries are valued for their capacity to show experimental behaviour and not for engaging in 
conforming existing policies (Cantwell et al., 2010). In doing so, subsidiaries are key actors not only 
able to transfer from one environment to another one but also to shape or construct new employment 
policies (Koene & Ansari, 2011; Kristensen & Morgan, 2007 ). Based on this, social actors and 
policies at multiple sub-national levels are integrated in the study. With regard to this, the central 
research proposition will be formulated in the next paragraph. After that, the relevant employment 
policies at sub-national levels will be described and propositions regarding the role of social actors and 
these policies will be formulated. 
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1.5 Filling the gaps: research focus 
 
Based on the gaps in knowledge identified above, employment policies at multiple sub-national levels 
and the active role of MNCs’ social actors (employees and employers and their representative 
organisations) are of particular interest to integrate into the study on the transfer of employment 
policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Some previous studies have considered employment 
policies at sub-national levels, although indirectly (not main research focus), partially (employment 
policy at one sub-national level) or the dimensions of employment policies at multiple sub-national 
levels for the study of the transfer have only been theoretically identified. Regarding the former, case 
study research on US MNCs for example, found that an organisation active at sub-national levels 
contributed to subsidiaries’ discretion because they foresaw in external vocational training (the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry) (Almond et al., 2005; Muller, 1998;). Similarly, Tayeb (1998) 
found Scottish regional governments to be responsible for local adaptation. For the partial 
investigation of the sub-national level, Bélanger et al.(2013) focussed on the inter-firm level. They 
found that if subsidiaries are strongly locally integrated, meaning that they are part of local industry 
forums and take part in local employer associations' activities, discretion is higher. Considering the 
role of subsidiaries’ social actors, Crouch et al. (2009) found employment policies on the inter-firm 
level to deviate from national ones because of the interventions of social actors. Specifically, 
alternative policies were obtained by bypassing rigid national German regulations through contacts 
with universities or other R&D institutes. Consequently, other polices arise by compensating one level 
by the other. Similar cases reveal an innovative combination between national and sub-national levels 
because of the strongly networked sub-national policies (Crouch et al., 2009). This appears to be the 
case where national policies cannot provide in specific resources for a group of companies. Within 
these limited studies on the transfer and active involvement of social actors, researchers did however 
not distinguish between different relevant sub-national policies like regional employment policies and 
inter-firm employment policies to study the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ 
subsidiaries (Lane & Wood, 2009). Only Almond (2011) theoretically distinguished four relevant 
spheres (sphere of the state, financial sphere, skill system and trust relations) to be studied when 
integrating employment policies at multiple sub-national levels into the study on the transfer. 
Therefore, when combining these pieces of literature, it can be concluded that subsidiaries’ social 
actors contribute to employment policies at multiple sub-national levels, that these employment 
policies at sub-national levels influence the transfer and that there is more than one relevant policy at 
sub-national levels when studying employment policies and practices in MNCs. Therefore, the 
following main proposition is formulated:  
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Main proposition: Subsidiaries’ social actors mediate the transfer of employment policies and 
practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries by shaping employment policies at multiple sub-national levels  
 
This proposition fits with the idea of the duality of structure in which subsidiaries’ social actors 
(employees and employers and their representative organisations) on the one hand contribute to 
employment policies at sub-national levels, and on the other hand use these policies at sub-national 
levels to mediate the transfer of employment policies and practices within MNCs’ subsidiaries 
(Edwards & Kuruvilla, 2005) (figure 5). This way, as Crouch et al. (2009) states, trade unions and 
managers within MNCs’ subsidiaries are not only rule takers from national levels but also rule makers 
of policies at the sub-national levels; as such, creative coherences appear.  
 
Figure 5 Illustration of the conceptual framework 
 
 
Employment policies at sub-national levels inherited from history 
  + resources   - constraints     
 
Social actors shaping employment policies at sub-national levels 
  
  
 
Transfer of employment policies and practices 
 
Source own processing based on Amable (2000) 
 
To investigate the above mentioned proposition, the following paragraphs will first of all distinguish 
between relevant employment policies at sub-national levels and how these policies evolve over time 
(gap 1). Thereafter, two propositions will be formulated regarding how social actors are expected to 
shape employment policies at sub-national levels and how these employment policies at sub-national 
levels are expected to mediate the transfer (gap 2). In doing so, existing literature on the role of social 
actors and on employment policies at sub-national levels will be integrated into the literature on the 
transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs. 
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1.6 Filling the gap (1): what are the relevant employment policies at 
multiple sub-national levels for the study on the transfer of employment 
policies and practices in MNCs 
 
Taken the central proposition into account, the study focuses on employment policies at sub-national 
levels that can fulfil two criteria. First of all, they potentially offer resources to subsidiaries’ social 
actors to shape these policies (Ferner et al., 2012). Second, these policies can be used as resources by 
subsidiaries’ social actors to foster or inhibit the transfer of employment policies and practices in 
MNCs’ subsidiaries.   
 
 
1.6.1 Defining employment policies at sub-national levels 
 
A generally accepted definition of employment policies at sub-national levels in the literature on 
within country variation is missing. Two types of employment policies at the sub-national level 
however, are often distinguished: the regional employment policy and inter-firm level employment 
policy (Amable, 2000; Lane & Wood, 2009). Almond (2011) interprets four policy domains or spheres 
on these levels as possibly relevant when studying the sub-national levels and employment policies 
(Almond, 2011). First of all, he distinguishes between the sphere of the state, where the increasing 
importance of multi-level governance as well as the prevalence of regional development agencies is 
highlighted. Thereafter, he emphasises the financial system, focusing on differences in the way 
companies are supported financially or by other means like infrastructure or R&D. Thirdly, the way 
skill development is organised, should be considered as well, since this sphere is assumed to be much 
more sensitive to regional or local market demands. Finally, trust relations are also central to the 
analysis of employment policies at sub-national levels. This is because the way trust relations are set 
up and maintained, mainly take place at sub-national levels. Merging employment policies at the 
regional and inter-firm level with these spheres results in two types of policies: regional employment 
policies and inter-firm employment policies. These respectively encompass the sphere of the state, a 
skill system and a financial system, and the sphere of trust relations and a skill system (table 3). 
Following paragraphs will explain both types of policies. 
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Table 3 Employment policies at sub-national levels 
 
 Sphere of the state Financial sphere Skill development Trust relations 
Regional level x x x  
Inter-firm level   x x 
 
Regional employment policies. Regional employment policies are defined as formal constitutions or a 
number of regulations applicable in a particular area or territory (Lane & Wood, 2009). Quite 
frequently these policies are considered as part of a political construction which is closely connected to 
national politics (Trigilia, 1991). Particularly, it refers to an intermediate regulatory level between the 
national (e.g. federal state) and the local level (e.g. provinces and municipalities). In this regard, 
regional employment policies add to the national level as they aim to fund a particular level of 
economic development for a single region. In addition, regional employment policies support regional 
labour markets and specific systems of skill development (Halkier & Danson, 1997). Different 
regional employment policies are then distinguished based on the demarcation of regional boundaries 
(Hudson, 2007). After all, if policies are part of a political construction, the territory over which 
government is executed, should be defined (Hudson, 2007). Furthermore, as regional policies have 
been set up differently between regions, the socio-economic profile is expected to diverge because 
other regional coalitions put other priorities. This is particularly the case when regional policies 
represent regional interest groups or identities like employers (organisations) or trade unions (Trigilia, 
1991). Consequently, supportive regional employment policies like training and education programs 
and research and development policies can increase an uneven development between regions (Lane & 
Wood, 2009; Phelps, 2002; Trigilia,1991).  
 
Employment policies at the inter-firm level. Employment policies at the inter-firm level are understood 
as specific employment policies for an informal constitution. Among regional scholars, this informal 
constitution was initially labelled as policies in industrial districts. In its original form, they were 
referred to as ‘sector specialised agglomerations of small and medium-sized enterprises’ (Pyke & 
Sengenbenger, 1992; Zeitlin, 2008). Similar concepts pointing to the same configurations are local 
production systems, regional economies or territorial clusters (Asheim & Coenen, 2006; Crouch et al., 
2009). Growth and development within these configurations are obtained internally by employment 
policies fostering differentiation and specialisation (You & Wilkinson, 1994). This is made possible 
through the combination of coordination and competition between local firms. To sustain this 
combination, cooperation and trust were installed based on tacit knowledge and informal social norms 
(Chetty & Agndal, 2008). As a result a high level of innovation as well as an adaptive capacity to 
changing environments were noticed, anticipated by the human capital and skill specialisation of 
employees (Del Ottati, 2002).  
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1.6.2 Changing employment policies at sub-national levels 
 
The regional employment policies as well as the inter-firm employment policies did, however, evolve 
over time. Particularly, regional employment policies have become more and more distinctive forms 
next to the national level. They foresee in initiatives for economic development, but also in a wide 
range of services like labour skills, infrastructure and information (Cognard, 2011; Phelps, 2000; Pyke 
& Sengenberger, 1992). According to Phelps, MacKinnon, Stone, and Braidford (2003), regional 
employment policies are nowadays particular governmental institutions aiming to expand economic 
possibilities. Moreover, these policies seek new employment opportunities for existing or newly 
arising clusters of firms. In practice, this not only refers to policies (legal and regulatory framework) 
supporting growth, but also to bringing different interest groups together (Trigilia, 1991; Huggings, 
1997). These regional policies are furthermore sustained by regional development agencies. The latter 
are semi-autonomous regional bodies that set up initiatives like giving advice, from which companies 
can benefit (Halkier & Danson, 1997; Phelps et al., 2003). 
 
Employment policies at the inter-firm level as defined in its original form, were also challenged 
because more open and dynamic configurations have been observed (Beccatini, 2002; Zeitlin, 2008). 
In addition, the composition has changed as MNCs are also gaining access to this inter-firm level 
(Chiavesio, Di Maria, & Micelli, 2010). Central to these employment policies on the inter-firm level 
remain, however, the prevalence of trust and cooperation and the proximity of other companies. Trust 
is hereby no longer obtained by informal social norms and local tacit knowledge (Chetty & Agndal, 
2008; Zeitlin, 2004). Rather, collective services for training or finance, that go beyond the interests of 
the individual firm, are able to install trust and cooperation (Huggins, 1997; Ter Wal & Boschma, 
2009; Zeitlin, 2008). Secondly, proximity continues to be important for companies because it 
decreases companies’ access costs to local resources. Specifically, although interactions on the inter-
firm level are nowadays more formalised, based on current ICT possibilities, the diffusion of 
interesting employment policies and practices most frequently happens when entrepreneurs are near 
(Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez, 2004, 2008). In addition, access to sub-national services is 
important since they function as intermediary agents. Particularly, close access reduces the cost of 
looking for new ideas, knowledge or other relevant information (Coro & Grandinetti, 2001; Molina-
Morales & Martinez-Fernandez, 2004, 2008; Pyke &Sengenberger, 1992). As a consequence, insider 
companies still benefit from the competitive advantage provided by policies at sub-national levels 
whereas this is not the case for outsider companies (Steiner & Ploder, 2008). These supportive inter-
firm policies are particularly important for employment, as this is the least mobile production factor 
within companies (Meyer et al., 2011; Ter Wal & Boschma, 2009).  
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The next question that logically arises, is how the above mentioned changes in employment policies at 
sub-national levels have occurred. Following the literature as described above, subsidiaries’ social 
actors are key actors in shaping these levels because of their presence in different contexts. Put 
differently, subsidiaries’ social actors are used to align multiple settings (Koene & Ansari, 2011; Saka-
Helmout & Geppert, 2011). In this respect, current employment policies at sub-national levels do not 
merely exist because of a functionalist fit, but are brought together by social actors (employers and 
employees and their representative organisations). Accordingly, the evolution of employment policies 
at sub-national levels can occur for all policies simultaneously, because MNCs’ subsidiary can be 
nested at a range of levels (Lane & Wood, 2009) as they are operating in a given regional government 
and belong to a particular inter-firm level. The following step is to conceptualise when subsidiaries’ 
social actors (employees and employers and their representative organisations) shape both regional 
and inter-firm employment policies. 
 
 
1.7 Filling the gap (2): the role of social actors 
 
1.7.1 How social actors are expected to shape employment policies at sub-national levels 
 
The theoretical starting point to answer this question is the implicit use of neo-institutionalist analysis 
that embodies the abstract underlying principles of social structure and action. A significant discussion 
in mainstream social science is that change can be produced by endogenous social actors operating 
within different path-dependent systems (Crouch & Farrell, 2004; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). In 
particular, contributing to this stream of literature, Crouch (2005) argues that actors at the subsidiary 
level respond to pressures for change from the external environment by engaging in experimental 
behaviour. This leads to several combinations of employment policies, rather than to the mere 
adaptation of a single logic that macro-level structures usually aim to dictate. Crouch uses the term 
‘institutional entrepreneurship’ to describe this process of combination rather than adaptation to the 
national logic (Crouch, 2005). Accordingly, employment policies at sub-national levels and actors are 
seen as active and dynamic agents of change. Moreover, subsidiaries’ social actors are considered as 
central in explaining reform and transformation in the policies shaped by their contribution. As Lange 
(2009) clearly points out, this opposes traditional assumptions claiming that comparative advantages 
are the result of the operation of national policies only. By contrast, she argues that the high level of 
strategic leeway for companies should be considered crucial in explaining national economic 
performance. Thus, other policies should be in place, which would help to explain the different levels 
of competitive advantage among (and within) national economies.  
Assuming social actors to engage in their environment when the latter is not in accordance with their 
goals however, is not sufficient to capture social actors’ engagement (Ferner et al., 2012; Saka-
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Helmout & Geppert, 2011). Resources are needed to engage in these policies and can be present in- 
and external to subsidiaries’ social actors (Ferner et al., 2012). Specifically, local governance 
networks, or more generally, sub-national involvement can make resources available for shaping 
employment policies at sub-national levels. Moreover, having influence on sub-national authorities or 
development agencies allows social actors to shape these employment policies at sub-national levels 
(Edwards & Kuruvilla, 2005; Ferner et al., 2012). However, these resources are not necessarily equally 
divided among social actors (in our case employees and employers) (Dörrenbächer & Becker-
Ritterspäch, 2008; Edwards & Kuruvilla, 2005; Pulignano & Keune, in press). Consequently, social 
actors’ bargaining positions might differ and a micro-political space is being created (Léonard et al., 
2014). This means that not only social actors shape policies at sub-national levels that are not in line 
with their aims. The division of resources among social actors also needs to be added. Put differently, 
the resources to engage in policies divide how the bargaining space among social actors is divided 
(Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013).  
 
Both the regional and the inter-firm level have been observed to consist of resources for social actors’ 
engagement (Almond et al., 2014; Ferner et al.,2012). These resources can be institutional resources, 
like systems of consultation and codetermination, or firm specific resources like lobbying possibilities 
or resources from local production networks (Ferner et al., 2012; Pulignano & Keune, in press). The 
availability of these resources on different levels (national, sub-national or company level) or within 
different domains (state, finance, skill development and trust relations) (Dörrenbächer & Becker-
Ritterspach, 2008; Ferner et al.,2013) is what Saka-Helmout and Geppert (2011) call supportive 
structures. These structures enable social actors to shape or engage in experimental behaviour 
(Kristensen & Morgan 2007). Accordingly, subsidiaries’ social actors are expected to intervene in the 
processes of setting up employment policies at sub-national levels if they have the resources to do so 
(Kristensen & Morgan, 2012). As such, the more key resources social actors obtain and the more they 
have the ability to shape employment policies at sub-national levels, the more their interests are 
reflected in these policies (Dörrenbächer & Becker-Ritterspach, 2008). 
 
As the study focuses on employment policies at sub-national levels, it claims that the absence of 
resources at one level not necessarily results in a limited engagement of social actors. Specifically, by 
moving beyond the functionalist notion of complementarity as stated before, resources foreseen by one 
employment policy, can be reinforcing and compensating for another level (Deeg & Jackson, 2007; 
Deeg, 2009). Furthermore, complementarity should be considered from an actor’s perspective, 
meaning that whether employment policies at sub-national levels contribute to or complement actors’ 
aims will vary between social actors. Sub-national engagement for social actors within MNCs is also 
considered as a strategic option. It does not necessarily occur for every social actor within the MNC 
(Crouch et al., 2009; Heidenreich, 2012). Therefore, different objectives or strategies of subsidiaries’ 
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social actors need to be taken into account. Michelsons (1989) indeed found that social actors will 
only engage in inter-firm levels if core values like innovation can be introduced within the web of 
inter-firm relations. Similarly Kristensen and Morgan (2007) found engagement to depend on the 
presence of a fit between resources (strong and weak institutions) and the orientation (long or short 
term) of subsidiaries. Based on this, the following proposition is formulated: 
 
Sub - proposition 1: Social actors shape employment policies at multiple sub-national levels if there 
are resources to shape these policies in line with their aims 
 
Different degrees of engagement or entrepreneurship then are the result of available resources at more 
than one level. Cantwell et al. (2010) distinguishes between institutional avoidance, institutional 
adaptation and institutional co-evolution or institutional entrepreneurship. The first two forms are here 
not considered as variants of institutional entrepreneurship because of the lack of active involvement 
of social actors within MNCs. After all, in the case of co-evolution of institutional entrepreneurship, 
social actors engage in standard-setting processes, forms and content of political processes on different 
levels or within different domains. Co-evolution, however, also occurs in two dimensions. Saka-
Helmout and Geppert (2011) distinguish between transformation (radical change) and 
deinstitutionalisation (gradual change). Processes underlying the degree of co-evolution or 
institutional entrepreneurship can accordingly be described as challenging policies or complementing 
existing ones. In the former subsidiaries’ social actors change the employment policies by addressing a 
different interpretation of rules and practices, briefly described as a process of reinterpretation (Hall & 
Thelen, 2009). For the latter, incremental change is expected to be much more present than punctuated 
change. This type of change is expected to occur over longer periods of time with some changes at 
specific reference points in time (Kristensen & Morgan, 2012).  
 
The result of both types of co-evolution or institutional entrepreneurship is the same: adapted or newly 
created employment policies. The latter are once again considered as resources, but in two different 
ways. First of all, these policies on the regional and inter-firm level in turn are expected to deliver 
resources to engage in employment policies at sub-national levels. As a consequence, a close 
interaction between these policies and social actors takes place over time. Second, these policies are 
expected to be used as resources to mediate the transfer of employment policies and practices within 
MNCs’ subsidiaries. Specifically, social actors use employment policies at sub-national levels shaped 
in line with their aims, in order to inhibit the transfer. The mediating effect is expected to occur by 
institutional and firm-specific resources. First of all, institutional resources like codetermination rights 
contribute to employment policies that need to be implemented at the subsidiary level and in this way, 
the transfer of employment policies and practices is mediated. Second, firm-specific resources like 
access to local production networks, will mediate the transfer since subsidiaries’ social actors 
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guarantee the access to these policies (Bélanger et al., 2013). Mediation through these two resources 
will particularly be the case when employment policies at these sub-national levels contribute to the 
competitive advantage of MNCs (Deeg, 2009). However, contributing to MNCs’ aims for the 
subsidiary under study is not guaranteed, since the goals might differ between subsidiaries’ social 
actors and headquarters. This can happen because trade unions try to align these policies to their goals 
by using a system of collective bargaining based on parity. In addition, former studies have found 
conflictual aims between headquarters and subsidiaries (Ferner et al., 2004; Ferner et al., 2012). In 
other words, subsidiaries’ social actors shape employment policies at sub-national levels in line with 
their aims but these policies are not automatically in line with the goals of the headquarters. Therefore, 
the next paragraph will deal with how employment policies at sub-national levels are expected to 
affect the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. 
 
 
1.7.2 How employment policies at sub-national levels are expected to affect the transfer 
within MNCs 
 
Regional employment policies and employment policies at the inter-firm level have indeed been 
observed as resources for subsidiaries’ social actors to mediate the transfer because of their 
competitive advantage. Particularly for the regional government, a delegation of employment related 
responsibilities to the regional government has come about in the last decennium (Cognard, 2011). In 
addition, regional development agencies have become real governance mechanisms next to the 
national level. This means that regional employment policies should not only be considered as 
supportive mechanisms for economic development. They rather offer a wide range of services and 
infrastructure for companies within the field of employment (Phelps et al., 2003). Accordingly, 
differences between regional agencies can result in different advantages for MNCs. This is particularly 
the case when regional agencies are funded by regional governments in a federal state. In this case, 
these agencies represent the interests of the regional coalition and potentially emphasise different 
priorities than other regional governments (Halkier & Danson, 1997). Headquarters can then access 
these competitive different resources and advantages through the local subsidiary. Specifically, as 
earlier stated, the role of the subsidiary potentially changes when they have access to valuable 
resources like the market and innovative networks (Bélanger et al., 2013; Ferner et al., 2004). 
Therefore, when integrating these findings in the literature on institutional entrepreneurship, regional 
government policies are expected to mediate the transfer of employment policies and practices within 
MNCs’ subsidiaries if they are seen as competitive by the headquarters and when subsidiaries’ social 
actors know how to benefit from the policies they shaped. 
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Similarly, employment policies at the inter-firm level can provide with location advantages like shared 
information, shared knowledge and participation in institutions (Molina-Moralez & Martinez-
Fernandez, 2008 Zeitlin, 2004). Shared information relates to information regarding products and 
processes as well as to human or technological resources. The second form refers to the availability of 
a skilled or specialised workforce. As most of the companies’ activities are interrelated (suppliers), 
knowledge sharing is highly important for companies’ competitive advantage (Jun & Shuai, 2012). 
This knowledge sharing is made feasible particularly when there is a high extent of HR mobility 
between companies. This means that employees, managers and technicians are employed by several 
companies during a given period of time (Hervas-Oliver & Albors-Garrigos 2007). The last location 
advantage has to do with the participation in local institutions. Formal networks like representative 
organisations (chambers of commerce and universities) can offer a number of initiatives or give 
support according to the company’s needs. Furthermore, as these inter-firm institutions are in contact 
with a large number of companies, the services delivered can be organised at a low cost. It is hereby 
assumed that, if MNCs’ subsidiary uses these collective resources, it may affect the company’s 
strategy because it can take advantage of this and non-members cannot do this (Molina-Moralez & 
Martinez-Fernandez, 2008; Zeitlin, 2004). Therefore, it is expected that the transfer will be mediated 
as subsidiaries’ social actors have access or can overcome resource barriers for competitive inter-firm 
employment policies they contributed too (Ferner, 2000). 
 
Furthermore, complementarity between employment policies at sub-national levels is also expected to 
explain the transfer. Holmes et al. (2013) for example, illustrates the way different policies at sub-
national levels are nested by referring to its importance for competitive advantages. Specifically, 
different policies reinforce or compensate one another within the political, financial and economic 
sphere in attracting MNCs. In addition, Holmes et al. (2013) point to the complementary effect 
between formal institutions and less formal institutions on sub-national levels, like research institutes, 
government agencies and universities. Following this line of thought, the study expects 
complementarity between employment policies at sub-national levels for the transfer as well. 
Therefore the second proposition is formulated as follows: 
 
Sub-proposition 2: Employment policies at multiple sub-national levels affect the transfer of 
employment policies and practices within MNCs’ subsidiaries 
 
Before investigating these propositions, the second chapter of this first part will describe the research 
context of the thesis. Specifically, the second chapter will briefly report on the transfer of pay and 
training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. In addition, it will illustrate Belgium to be an 
interesting research context to investigate the transfer within MNCs, while integrating the employment 
policies at multiple sub-national levels. Thereafter, the second part addresses the methodology 
51 
 
followed. Specifically, as no list of MNCs was available in Belgium, a first step was to construct a 
representative MNC population for our research goals (Chapter III). Cases could accordingly be 
selected based on a representative list of MNCs in Belgium. This chapter also describes the way the 
data collection has occurred. The analysis and reflection on the research are discussed in the second 
chapter of the methodology section (Chapter IV). Chapter V describes the main characteristics of the 
case studies. Based on this, the third part will investigate the propositions. Chapter VI will focus on 
how subsidiaries’ social actors shape employment policies at sub-national levels. Chapter VII and VIII 
will investigate how employment policies at sub-national levels mediate the transfer of pay and 
training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries in Belgium. A distinction between different 
dimensions of the transfer according to previous studies, is made (control, centralisation and discretion 
on the one hand and headquarters-subsidiary configuration on the other hand).  
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Chapter II: The research context 
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2.1 Introduction  
 
The first chapter of the literature review has described the general perspectives on diverging 
employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Specifically, it has distinguished between 
theoretical perspectives focusing on the level of control, discretion and centralisation, and the ones 
explaining the headquarters-subsidiary configuration. For the former, the business system approach 
has been applied whereas the resource-based view has frequently been used to explain the latter. 
Independent of the dimension of the transfer studied, both dimensions of transfer are expected to 
depend on the nature of the employment policy or practice (Storey, 1989). Therefore, the nature of the 
employment policy or practice is briefly considered in this chapter. Specifically, this chapter gives 
more insight into how the transfer of pay and training policies and practices can differ from one 
another.  
 
In addition, as the study integrates employment policies at multiple sub-national levels, this chapter 
will further address how these policies can support pay and training policies at subsidiary levels by 
using the Belgian context. Specifically, it describes employment policies beyond national borders. 
Furthermore, it illustrates resources at these levels that can be used by social actors in order to set up 
these employment policies (Crouch & Farrell, 2005). The second topic addressed in this chapter is the 
presence of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels in Belgium and the resources they 
offer social actors. In doing so, Belgium is portrayed to be an analytical context where it is possible to 
embed 1) macro-level studies focused on grasping the nature of sub-national variety and 2) micro-
level research referring to understanding the dynamics producing specific outcomes. To discuss the 
nature of pay and training policies and practices and the resources in the Belgian context, the chapter 
will firstly describe some findings on pay and training policies and practices. Thereafter, the chapter 
illustrates how institutional entrepreneurship is expected to be observed in Belgium by referring to its 
employment policies at multiple sub-national levels and the resources available at these levels .  
 
 
2.2 Pay and training policies and practices 
 
The first section of this chapter discusses the nature of pay and training policies and practices in 
MNCs’ subsidiaries. In doing so, it will become clear that this nature not only differs, but that the 
sensitiveness of pay and training policies and practices to employment policies at sub-national levels 
differs as well. Therefore, studies focusing specifically on pay and training policies and practices at the 
subsidiary level will briefly be described. These studies, making a distinction between different 
policies and practices instead of general employment policies, are, however, rather limited. Next to 
that, they merely focused on US companies in different host countries. The latter is not a problem as it 
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allows to keep one effect (country of origin or home country effect) constant. This way, the nature of 
policies and practices and the extent of local adaptation can be compared. 
 
 
2.2.1 Pay policies and practices 
 
Generally, a high level of control and centralisation have been observed for different components of a 
pay policy, like job grading, performance appraisals and merit pay (Almond et al., 2005). However, 
these tendencies, although initially intended to be formalised, need to be apt to the system of industrial 
relations and collective bargaining (host country effect) in most host countries. For example, in the 
study of Almond et al. (2005), a uniform system of job classification, performance appraisal, merit pay 
and forced distribution with an obligatory number of employees in the underperforming category were 
implemented in all subsidiaries of US MNCs. Different results however, were found in UK and 
German operations. In the former, a refusal to implement systems of forced distribution could only be 
found in small operations where site directors were not willing to label some of their employees as 
underperforming. In the German operations, the system needed to be fit to the host country’s system of 
industrial relations. As a consequence, the local management set up a wage matrix for variable pay in 
close collaboration with the works council. Similarly, Ferner et al. (2007) found US MNCs to push 
strongly to control pay and to introduce performance related pay in its domestic and overseas 
subsidiaries. Performance related pay bound to an obligatory per centage of underperformers and 
leading to potential dismissal, was, however, contested by UK managers as this would eventually 
mean that well-performing employees were affected. In addition it could affect the UK employment 
law. Although US headquarters could not be convinced to adapt forced distribution, UK managers 
customised it during the implementing of the system. UK managers consulted HR academics to talk to 
managers or made use of a number of employees in the operations. The latter refer to operations with 
small numbers of employees, where it is harder to categorise underperformers because of the limited 
workforce.  
 
In conclusion, the interpretation of pay policies by host countries and the use of their institutions by 
subsidiaries is important as well (Pulignano, 2006). This is more explicitly illustrated by referring to 
the study of Ferner and Quintanilla (2002). They found that the use of performance related pay indeed 
increased, but that, opposed to American operations, the criteria for performance related pay were 
linked to medium- or long-term profitability of the German operations as opposed to the short-term 
focus in US operations. Moreover, the tendency towards cost cutting, based on good or weak 
performance was not implemented in this way. Rather, a German way, guaranteeing job security, came 
up. Finally, social responsibility remained in terms of a good relation with trade unions and employee 
representatives.  
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2.2.2 Training policies and practices 
 
Training policies (most of the time studied as part of recruitment policies) have also been found to be 
controlled (table 17 in appendix) when investigating the home country effect within US MNCs in 
other European countries. Particularly, a strong focus on standardisation and control is found for 
specific types of training policies or practices. That means that in other empirical studies, other 
dimensions of training besides vocational training have been studied (organisational learning or 
succession planning). For example, succession policies and programs for leadership competences have 
been found to be highly centralised within US MNCs (Ferner et al., 2004; Ferner et al., 2011). The 
way control has been obtained, however, differs from pay policies. Based on the study of McDonnell 
et al.(2009) specifically, it was found that, contrary to pay policies, organisational learning policies are 
less guided by formal policies. In addition, the effect of US country of origin has been more 
moderated by the host country than for pay policies. Pulignano (2006) found, for example, that the 
skills needed for particular positions, are monitored centrally. However, training policies have been 
observed to be adapted to local labour markets requirements as well. Moreover, the financial coverage 
of training sessions or decisions for hourly paid employees are taken at the local level. The latter 
should, however, be approved by headquarters, but the initiative is left to the local subsidiary. This is 
particularly the case when trade unions within the subsidiary make use of the strategic position of the 
subsidiary. Similarly, Muller (1998) found that the presence of supportive initiatives like training 
sessions provided by the Chamber of Commerce, could affect the transfer of training policies. 
 
To conclude, the nature of training and pay policies clearly differ in two ways. First of all, even when 
the home country is kept invariable, less centralised programs are being observed for training policies. 
Moreover , formalisation is less prevalent as opposed to pay policies. Second, pay policies are far less 
adapted to local markets than training policies. Although pay policies are frequently adapted to host 
country institutions, the objective of the headquarters is to limit adaptation as much as possible. For 
training policies, local market requirements or training provision could affect the transfer of training 
policies, or the registration of training was sometimes the responsibility of the subsidiary. A final 
remark relates to the observation that subsidiaries’ social actors make use of host countries’ policies or 
sub-national labour markets to affect the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ 
subsidiaries. The different employment policies and how these policies can affect pay and training 
policies at the subsidiary level, will be described in the next paragraphs. In addition, these paragraphs 
will discuss resources for social actors to shape employment policies at sub-national levels. They will 
hereby focus on employment policies at different sub-national levels within the research context 
‘Belgium’. 
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2.3 Articulating between institutions and local actors at different levels  
 
As previously described, social actors are not only expected to engage in policies at sub-national levels 
when these policies are not in line with their objectives, but also when there are resources to do so. 
Scholars focusing on within country variation (Crouch et al., 2009; Lane & Wood, 2009) identify 
these sub-national policies as taking place at the regional and inter-firm level. At the regional level, 
different policies can occur as a result of the way in which a country is politically organised. 
Accordingly, the regional level is linked to the notion that national states consist of regional 
governments that have an exclusive responsibility for particular policy domains. As described before, 
studies define a regional policy as a comprising set of regularised practices. These practices are part of 
a given geographical territory that is inherent to a particular political construction (Lane & Wood, 
2009; Reid & Musyck, 2000; Trigilia, 1991). One of the best illustrations is a federal state. In a federal 
state, different regions and regional agencies have a responsibility for different policy domains, like 
tax concessions, education programmes and research and development policies. These regional 
governments have been set up as a consequence of two scenarios. First and most frequently, former 
regional governments are clustered in one entity. Second and applicable for Belgium, regionalisation 
can occur because social actors state that this would lead to a better alignment between, for example, 
regional training centres and labour market needs (Witte, 2011). In other words, social actors do not 
just adapt the national logic but can transform it in accordance with regional needs.  
 
Secondly, at the inter-firm level, alternative employment policies are enacted via organised clusters, 
webs of companies or inter-company relationships. Socio-economic literature often labels inter-
company relationships as ‘clusters of firms’ or ‘industrial districts’. The main characteristic of 
industrial districts is the combination of co-operation and competition. The fact that companies within 
this network may deliver similar goods or products, has led some commentators to talk about them as 
‘institutionalised co-operations’. This results from the idea that they are embedded in formalised inter-
company co-operative networks (Del Ottati, 2002; You & Wilkinson, 1994). This formalisation is 
illustrated by referring to local institutions supporting the web of inter-firm relations. Funding 
organisations or training centres have been set up since companies are confronted with a particular 
context that is not completely in line with the companies’ objectives. Therefore, a set of companies 
collectively agrees on engaging in additional policies.  
Thirdly, alternative employment policies can also occur at company level. Theoretically, this level was 
not initially distinguished as it has not been defined as a sub-national level. It is, however, integrated 
as a research context for Belgium, since this level also offers resources to social actors. Furthermore, it 
represents another mechanism than the sub-national level, in the sense that it can be complementary to 
the cluster the subsidiary is part of, as well as to the region in which it is located. However, subsidiary 
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specific policies do not always differ from the national or regional ones, as they can also reinforce 
these mechanisms. A good example is the prevalence of internal training centres along regional 
training policies and industry-specific training institutes. Regional governments can provide financial 
support to companies in order to organise their own training, at a different level than the one used 
nationally. Moreover, companies can individually add to industry-specific training programmes.  
From an analytical perspective, by emphasising the regional, inter-firm and firm level as different 
levels, the concept of ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ will be useful in helping to identify the dynamics 
and processes explaining MNC behaviour within a particular national context like Belgium. Based on 
this, policies at sub-national levels will be presented as the result of the interaction with social actors. 
In other words, the employment policies at multiple sub-national levels are not necessarily set up 
within a top-down approach. They arise because of the need for social actors like subsidiaries, 
employers’ federations or trade unions and the resources available for these social actors. Put 
differently, employment policies do not unilaterally structure actors’ behaviour; they are, in fact, also 
subject to the objectives of the actors. The following paragraphs describe resources at different levels 
and analyse whether they are equally accessible for social actors within MNCs in Belgium 
(employees, employers and their representative organisations). 
  
 
2.4 The Belgian institutional setting: the presence of resources 
 
In Belgium, social actors can shape policies at sub-national levels: regional, inter-firm and firm level. 
Next to these levels, as identified in literature on within country variation, Almond (2011) 
theoretically conceptualised relevant spheres to be included when integrating employment policies at 
multiple sub-national levels. Specifically, he distinguished between the sphere of the state, the 
financial sphere, the training system and the way relations are set up between countries. Combining 
these levels and spheres results in four supportive structures offering resources to social actors in 
Belgium (Saka-Helmout & Geppert, 2011). Following paragraphs illustrate the Belgian institutional 
context to be particular in offering resources to social actors. As such, multiple possibilities are created 
where institutional entrepreneurship can be expected. The following paragraphs will illustrate 
institutional entrepreneurship based on concrete examples where possible. 
 
 
2.4.1 Resources at the level of regional governments-skill and training system 
 
The way Belgium as a country has evolved during the last decennia, results in a first type of resources. 
Specifically, the Belgian federal state resulted from federalisation by disaggregation (for an overview 
of state reforms see Swenden & Jans, 2006). A such, it should be considered as result from an attempt 
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to solve national conflicts by means of successive steps towards decentralisation to regional structures 
(contrary to Germany and Spain, for example). Policy domains became decentralised because no 
consensus could be reached between the parties involved at the national level (Witte, 2011). 
Decentralisation (as part of state reforms) results in the lessening of conflicts at the national or federal 
level (Swenden, Brans & De Winter, 2006). As a result of these state reforms, economic 
responsibilities were given to the regions and policy domains based on the citizens’ language were 
given to the communities. Not only were policy domains transferred to regions and communities, 
development agencies were also set up on these levels. 
The reform of the Belgian State as described in the previous paragraph, had profound implications for 
the regulation of employment and labour relations. Training and education were most affected. In 
Belgium, adult education was regionalised during institutional reform. As a consequence, placement 
as a tool of employment policies depends on the three regions (Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia), 
while initial education depends on the three linguistic communities (Dutch speaking, French speaking 
and German speaking) (Witte, 2011). The regions and the linguistic communities are in charge of most 
initiatives related to continuous vocational training
3
. This results in several involved organisations for 
vocational training in Belgium like FOREM (emploi formation en Wallonie) in the Walloon region, 
VDAB (Vlaamse dienst voor arbeidsbemiddeling en beroepsopleiding) in the Flemish region, 
Bruxelles Formation in the Brussels-Capital Region and ADG (Arbeidsambt der DG) for the German 
speaking community. 
These reforms result in the creation of regional training bodies (both public and private), regional 
incentives to promote vocational training for specific target groups, or regional training cheques for 
companies. The main difference between the regional governments relates to the value of the training 
cheques as well as to the scope of the training policies. In Flanders on the one hand, some sectors have 
a ‘convenant’; this is a specific agreement between a particular sector and the Flemish government. 
Concretely, it specifies the employability and training initiatives for a sector. Wallonia on the other 
hand focused, as part of the Marshall plan, on fast growing sectors to invest in. These differences in 
regional employment policies lead to other regional agencies. However, in both regions and 
communities, the board of directors and advisory boards of these agencies are based on parity. This 
means that resources are equally divided between employers and employees on a formal basis. In 
addition, the number of agencies, committees and advisory boards has increased with each state 
reform. Consequently, more resources have been given to trade unions and managers.  
 
 
                                                          
3
 Education is a responsability of the communities but agreements have been set up between the Brussels-Capital 
region and the Flemish and French speaking community and between the German-speaking and the French 
speaking community to organise education 
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2.4.2 Resources at the inter-firm level-sphere of the state/(skill and training system) 
 
A first interpretation of the inter-firm level entails collective bargained employment policies at the 
sector level. The sphere of the state is referred to because the regulative nature of the system of 
collective bargaining and industrial relations. Indeed, the institutions involved set up legally binding 
agreements for all employees and employers involved (sometimes indirectly because they are a 
member of the organisation involved in the bargaining). Furthermore, collective agreements can be 
declared generally binding for all involved employers and employees, which means that deviations are 
not possible. The sphere of skill and training system is mentioned between brackets because the sector 
level does also provide for resources for pay policies on the sector level.  
Specifically, in each sector, guidelines for pay and training (bi-annually negotiated between social 
partners across professions) are further aligned with particular needs for the sector. The number of 
resources offered to social actors is explained by the presence of sector specific institutions based on 
parity. Particularly, differences in resources for shaping training policies result from the presence of 
training centres within boards based on parity, and the distinction made between white-collar and 
blue-collar workers regarding vocational training
4
. As for the former, some but not all joint 
committees have a training centre financed by collective means aimed at a better alignment of training 
needs and sector demands. In addition, vocational training for white-collar workers, as opposed to that 
of blue-collar workers, is usually organised across joint committees. However, in some joint 
committees additional training for white-collar employees is being planned. As such, an additional 
resource is created. Differences in resources for pay policies are the result of negotiations between 
employers and employees. Specifically, each joint committee bargains on other remuneration 
instruments, such as pension schemes or variable pay. Furthermore, many joint committees have a 
social fund employers contribute to as part of their employee compensation. All these sector 
institutions have a board of directors based on parity, meaning that representatives from both trade 
unions and employers’ federations are installed. Social actors can shape this level if they are the sector 
representatives on the advisory boards of training centres and social (pension) funds. 
 
 
2.4.3 Resources at the inter-firm level-financial sphere-sphere of the state  
 
A second form of inter-firm employment policies results from clusters around locations of shared 
economic interest (in the remainder referred to as a web of inter-firm relations). Examples of these 
                                                          
4
 During the period of data collection, the distinction between blue- and white-collar workers was still in place. 
Within one sector, seperate joint committees bargain on labour conditions for blue– and white-collar workers. In 
the remainder of this thesis, sector will be used to refer to the joint committees of blue-and white collar workers 
of the same sectors; joint committee will be used for blue- or white-collar workers specifically. 
60 
 
clusters are the port in Antwerp and Ghent or the biotechnology cluster in Mons. Quite often these 
clusters contain one central company (usually an MNC) surrounded by SMEs. Within Belgium, these 
clusters of companies can rely on industrial policies, a regionalised responsibility to support sub-
national clustering. These supporting initiatives encompass venture capital, human capital centres or 
R&D. Contrary to the previous two levels, at the web of inter-firm relations, there are no resources 
available based on parity to shape these employment policies. Rather, the regionalised policy domain 
has several regional development agencies webs of inter-firm relations can rely on. Whether webs of 
inter-firm relations access these resources, depends heavily on the presence of a leading firm. The 
latter is often in charge of dividing the resources for what concerns finance and human capital among 
its suppliers and other companies. This is especially the case when the survival of these webs of inter-
firm relations depends on internationalisation (Gibbon et al., 2008).  
For example, the Flanders Language Valley was set up during the 1990s in the Ieper region (Flemish 
region) at the request of local companies and their representative organisations.
5
 This happened 
primarily because the region of Ieper benefited from several years of government and European 
Community aid (Musyck, 1995). In addition, there was an intense concentration of SMEs located 
close to the French border. At the centre of this network was a strong pilot firm working on speech 
technology. This company was in control of the funds. The web of inter-company relationships in 
which the central company took a leading role, pushed regional development agencies and the 
European Community to support its existence. It requested support such like ensuring continual 
investments and the prevalence of required skills by setting up contacts with universities. After a 
couple of years, the result was the Flanders Language Valley. Innovative employment measures 
emerged as a collaboration was set up with the University of Kortrijk. A course in computer linguistics 
and an artificial intelligence department was created in order to solve the shortage of skilled 
employees.  
A similar example can be found in the Walloon region. With the rise of biotechnology in Europe, 
Wallonia as a region decided to focus on this particular sector.
6
 Therefore, it developed supporting 
policies to boost the level of economic competition. Specifically, three agencies were created to 
respectively deal with 1) monitoring rapid changes in the biotechnology sector (and financing pioneers 
in specific domains), 2) supporting international expansion by facilitating international joint ventures 
and 3) providing long term investment in the region by creating financial instruments like loans and 
guarantees (Biotech report, 2008). In addition, what is known as the 2005 Marshall Plan for Wallonia, 
set up supportive measures to create new clusters of inter-company links. The ‘Competitiveness Hubs 
Policy’ can be considered as an excellent example of this policy. It aimed at organising companies (or 
a sector) into one web of inter-firm relations. In doing so, it facilitated the web of inter-firm relations 
                                                          
5
 Based on Wintjes 1999 
6
 Based on PlanMarshall2.Vert 
61 
 
in becoming the world leader in a particular niche. This occurred by favouring and attracting the 
necessary human resources and setting up an intensive partnership between commercial actors and 
academics. As in the case of Flanders Language Valley, the policies developed in the Walloon region 
were supportive of the creation of biotechnology clusters. In addition, some leading companies such as 
GlaxoSmithKline and UCB, surrounded by SMEs, played a key role together with universities in 
enhancing the innovative capacity of the Walloon region.  
These cases illustrate the relevance of the institutional entrepreneurship perspective as they did not 
arise in a vacuum. The interplay between multiple levels and actors generated employment policies at 
the inter-firm level (or reinforces existing clusters) as illustrated by the examples above. More 
specifically, leading companies requested local institutions to set up support initiatives. In the Flanders 
Valley case, universities were contacted to formalise educational training in required IT skills in order 
to meet local labour market demands. In the Walloon region, research and development within 
universities happened in close collaboration with local companies. In addition, policy levels were 
responsive as well. In the first case, two levels were contacted (regional and European) to attract 
financial resources and to offer additional services. In the case of the 2005 Marshall Plan for Wallonia, 
three institutions were set up to boost the biotechnology cluster.  
 
 
2.4.4 Resources at the company level-sphere of the state 
 
On the company level, eventually, three mechanisms can be used in companies in Belgium: the works 
council, the union representatives and the committee for prevention and protection. In this regard, the 
Belgian system of collective bargaining is far less deregulated than the one in Germany for example, 
and still offers many resources to social actors (Holst, 2013). The first mechanism is the work council 
that is obligatory when a company has more than 100 employees. The councils’ aim is to share 
information related to the financial situation of the company, the implementation of new technologies, 
employment, labour conditions or other topics that affect the employees (e.g. restructuring processes). 
The main role of the council is advisory ; the decision making role is limited. In reality, the council 
comes up with advices and proposals related to labour organisation and labour conditions. A second 
mechanism on the firm level refers to the union representative. The role of the representative is to set 
up collective agreements, to consider the compliance with social law, the labour regulation and the 
individual contracts within the company. When a works council is not present, the union 
representative takes up the role of the council. The third mechanism is the committee for prevention 
and protection at work which should be installed when a company has more than 50 employees. This 
advisory committee formulates proposals that concern health, safety and prevention in order to 
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optimise labour conditions. The first and third mechanism are based on parity and offer resources to 
social actors. 
These resources, however, are not always used to shape employment policies at sub-national levels. 
They can be bypassed as well. At Inbev in Belgium for example, local managers used local resources 
outside the domain of employment to shape employment policies at the company level. Capron (2007) 
talks about judicial interference by management in labour disputes. Specifically, the management 
attempted to challenge the right to strike by appealing on the grounds of other laws, such as 
commercial law. The latter refers to the right to protect private property, the right to maintain 
economic activity and the right to work for non-strikers. However, it should be noted that management 
returned to the formal procedure for conflict resolution through the works council. Moreover, efforts 
have been made by the management to inform workers’ representatives with regard to the plan, and 
have asked trade unions to formulate a counterproposal. Nevertheless, the case of AB Inbev clearly 
shows how subsidiary’s managers were looking for alternative opportunities beyond employment 
policies in order to break the strike. Laws concerning private property were used by the employer. In 
this regard, management used a resource from another policy domain (commercial law protecting 
property and economic rights) in an attempt to bypass employment policies.  
The different levels and domains described are not independent from one another. Specifically, each 
state reform has led to a further decentralisation of decision-making to communities and regions. 
Accordingly, regional consultative institutions with trade unions, employers and public authorities 
have grown. Furthermore, the regionalisation also impacted the system of industrial relations. 
Specifically, the close connection between social dialogue on the one hand and political decision 
making on the other hand, has caused regionalisation of industrial relations. This resulted in 
consultative committees, trade unions and employers’ federations having each a French and Dutch 
speaking part. In general, it can be stated that the more responsibilities were delegated to the regional 
governments, the more both the formal and informal structures of industrial relations were 
regionalised. Furthermore, the employment policies at sub-national levels relate to one another as 
reinforcement has been observed (Deeg, 2009; Deeg & Jackson, 2007). For example, in the case of the 
sector convenant, the regional employment policy invented the initiative to encourage employability 
and continuous vocational training. The sector specified this to set up targets for employability and 
vocational training among its members. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
The above chapter first of all shows that the nature of pay and training policies and practices differ, as 
well as their adaptation to host countries. Specifically, pay policies are far more controlled by formal 
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systems than training policies. In addition, training policies were more sensitive to local labour 
markets requirements and as such more adapted to the local context. Secondly, the chapter showed the 
institutional entrepreneurship perspective to be an interesting starting point for researchers to 
understand how dynamics and processes occur for employment policies at sub-national levels. This 
chapter also illustrates, however, the need to integrate the idea of available resources. By using both, 
this thesis will deal with two shortcomings in grasping the nature and the transfer of employment 
practices within MNCs: the weak attention to within country diversity and the limited 
conceptualisation of the role of actors. Moreover, it allows examining how employment policies 
operating at the sub-national (regional, inter-company) and company level in Belgium are shaped by 
social actors.  
The first employment policy arose as part of the political construction particular for Belgium. 
Vocational training is a regionalised policy domain where advisory boards are based on parity. The 
second form reflects the level of the sector with specific training and social and pension funds of 
which the board of directors is also based on parity. The third possibility (second dimension of the 
inter-firm level) derives from the regionalised policy domain, industrial policy supporting 
collaboration between companies (in the remainder referred to as the web of inter-firm relations). 
Shaping employment policies on the web of inter-firm relations depends on a leading company using 
and dividing resources offered by the industrial policy. The company level is relevant to take into 
account as well. Specifically, the company specific employment policy does not merely emerge based 
on resources on the company rather by bypassing them. Inbev illustrated the use of these resources. 
Decisions from AB Inbev resulted in social conflicts and strikes; AB Inbev’s management tried to 
break union actions by using other resources.  
This chapter so has clearly illustrated Belgium to be a relevant research context for examining 
processes and dynamics at sub-national levels, because the scope of this analytical perspective leads to 
examining the interactions between social actors and policies at multiple levels. As far as the Belgian 
case is concerned, it meant to explore the action of local players within employment policies at 
multiple sub-national levels such as regions, inter-firm levels and firm levels. The use of the 
institutional entrepreneurship and the division of resources among social actors will allow to use a 
comprehensive framework of analysis which does not disentangle structures from actions, but 
integrates both. By doing this, the study will be able to investigate how social actors mediate the 
transfer by shaping employment policies at sub-national levels in Belgium.  
Moreover, it can be concluded that Belgium offers a lot of resources to social actors. Because a lot of 
resources are based on parity, a rather equal division of resources to trade unions and managers can be 
observed. Specifically, except for the web of inter-firm relations, the board of directors and the 
advisory committee are based on parity. Important to state in this regard is the number of trade unions 
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(Christian, Socialist and Liberal) versus the number of employers’ federations (one employers’ 
federation per sector) present in Belgium. Accordingly, the bargaining space of trade unions is divided 
between three representative trade unions as opposed to one employers’ federation. As a result, equal 
resources (as a consequence of parity) between trade unions and employers (the notion of parity) are 
only obtained if the former agree on a common strategy. However, similar reasoning can be made 
when looking at employers. Although employers are member of the same employers’ federation, 
different objectives can be observed between SMEs and MNCs. As such, resources can be used for 
other purposes. How resources as described in this chapter, are used and divided among social actors, 
is the topic of the first empirical chapter below (part III, chapter VI). Before this, the following part 
describes the methodology used. 
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Part II: Methodology  
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Chapter III: Research Set-Up 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The part on construction of the MNC population is based on: 
 
Research question, Research Design and Methodology, In V. Pulignano & V. Dekocker. The 
Employment Practices in Multinationals in Belgium (pp.35-40). Leuven: Acco. 
 
Dekocker, V., Doerflinger, N. & Pulignano, V. Promises and Pitfalls in quantitative studies in MNCs. 
Critical Perspectives on International Business (submitted, under review) 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate how subsidiaries’ social actors (employees and employers and 
their representative organisations) mediate the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in 
MNCs by shaping employment policies at multiple sub-national levels. To examine this, an 
appropriate research set up needs to fulfil following conditions (Lewis, 2003; Mason, 2002). First of 
all, the above mentioned proposition requires a method which enable to examine how social actors 
shape employment policies and how these policies are used by subsidiaries’ actors to influence MNCs’ 
behaviour (the transfer). In addition, the MNC population and sample should compose of a specific 
type of MNCs in order to capture the transfer between MNCs and subsidiaries. Moreover, the selected 
MNCs must allow the examination of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels 
simultaneously. Finally, the research set up should select respondents that can give information on 
how pay and training policies and practices are transferred within MNCs’ subsidiaries. The first 
chapter of this methodological part will therefore touch upon each of the abovementioned points in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
 
3.2 The choice for qualitative case study research 
 
A first point that is being dealt with, is why a case study is chosen as the most appropriate method of 
data collection and analysis. In order to understand this, the link between the propositions and the 
possibilities of case study research methods should be explained. Specifically, based on the literature, 
the thesis aims to investigate how social actors mediate the transfer of pay and training policies and 
practices by shaping employment policies at multiple sub-national levels. In doing so, it focuses first 
of all on how they shape employment policies at sub-national levels. Thereafter it focuses on how 
these policies are used by trade unions and managers to mediate the transfer. Put differently, feedback 
loops between employment policies at different sub-national levels and social actors are expected to be 
observed (Bennett & Elman, 2006). 
 
As such, a research method giving insights on different (combinations of) resources on sub-national 
levels and on how social actors can use them to shape employment policies, is required,. Therefore, 
survey research does not suffice in exploring different combinations of employment policies at sub-
national levels to explain the transfer of pay and training policies and practices within MNCs. Rather, 
one mean line is to be observed in most quantitative research, reflected in for example a particular 
regression equation. Moreover, the research method chosen needs to give an insight in the strategy of 
social actors. After all, entrepreneurship is assumed to be a strategic choice (Crouch et al., 2009; 
Heidenreich, 2012). So, in order to reconstruct the way social actors mediate the transfer, both social 
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actors would be investigated ideally. Although quantitative research could opt for a multi-respondent 
approach, the way the bargaining space between trade unions and managers is divided, could be hard 
to capture quantitatively. The choice for qualitative research was furthermore related to the limited 
attention devoted to employment policies at sub-national levels. As Ferner et al. (2012) stated, 
grasping the sub-national level for the study on the transfer of employment policies and practices in 
MNCs, would mean a conceptual step forward. Although the relevant spheres or policy levels have 
been theoretically distinguished or derived from related literature on within country variation, there is 
no consensus on what employment policies and sub-national levels encompass. Put differently, there is 
no agreement on what employment policies at sub-national levels look like and on the resources they 
offer to social actors to engage in shaping these policies. This means that the research method chosen 
has to leave space to capture possible other relevant spheres or domains that can offer resources to 
social actors and mediate the transfer. Against this background, case study research based on social 
actors’ description of the transfer is chosen instead of one single measurement or point of reference 
(Bennett & Elman, 2006).  
 
Following Gerring (2004), our case studies compose of different dimensions of which one or more 
observations can be made. Accordingly, a case in our study is a particular way of social actors 
mediating the transfer of pay and training policies and practices within MNCs’ subsidiaries by shaping 
employment policies at sub-national levels. Taken the above mentioned ideas into account, the aim is 
to observe this transfer from different observations from trade unions and HR managers (see 3.5.2). 
Moreover, no single measurement of transfer is integrated. Instead, the study focuses on control, 
centralisation and discretion on the one hand, and headquarters-subsidiary structure on the other hand 
(Bennett & Elman, 2006). In doing so, a case is considered as a configuration. Specifically, the focus 
is on the co-evolvement of social actors, employment policies at sub-national levels and the transfer, 
rather than on the frequency of a particular transfer. In the study of MNCs’ subsidiaries, the idea of 
configurations is especially of interest given the path dependency of some subsidiaries, the 
interconnectedness between subsidiaries of the same MNC and the way employment policies at sub-
national levels can be nested (Bennett & Elman, 2006).  
 
A typical case study design or homogenous sample was opted for, as this design aims to explore 
patterns between employment policies at sub-national levels, social actors and the transfer of pay and 
training policies and practices within MNCs. This means that the focus is on whether there is a cross-
case relation between these factors (Ritchie, Lewis, & Elam, 2003; Seawright & Gerring, 2008). 
Accordingly our target population and sample require MNCs and subsidiaries where a transfer can 
occur. In addition the presence of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels (regional, sector 
and web of inter-firm relations) and variation among them is needed to capture different patterns of 
employment policies at sub-national levels, social actors and the transfer of pay and training policies 
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and practices within MNCs. Therefore, the following paragraph will first of all construct a 
representative MNCs’ population to study the transfer. Based on this, the required criteria, like 
presence of subsidiaries in two regions and presence of joint committees, will be added to select the 
MNCs for our study.  
 
 
3.3 Selecting MNCs to study employment policies at sub-national levels and 
the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries 
 
A second point to pay attention to is the selection of MNCs and subsidiaries that fulfil the criteria to 
study the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. An MNC for the 
study on transfer of pay and training policies and practices has been described as an organisation in 
which policies and practices are transferred between economically interlinked activities in more than 
one country (chapter I, p.32). The latter refers to the multiple sources of authority with which MNCs 
are confronted (Aharoni & Brock, 2010; Hoos, 2000). This applies to the number of countries in 
which the MNC is operational, the variance between the respective different national contexts and the 
interaction between these contexts. The interaction between these different systems creates a 
distinctive feature between MNCs and non-MNCs. 
 
The next steps then need to operationalise the MNC as an organisation in which pay and training 
policies and practices are transferred between economically interlinked activities (table 4). Although 
interdependency can have different faces (e.g. resources and knowledge), the starting point for 
interdependency is formally acknowledging the ownership structure to be a source of interdependency 
(Madhok, 2006). More specifically and similar to previous studies on the topic, a dependent 
relationship between the headquarters and a subsidiary means that the former, as global ultimate owner 
(in the remainder referred to as GUO), has at least 50.01 per cent of the subsidiaries’ shares. 
Therefore, other types of ownership structures like joint ventures are not taken into account. 
Specifically, when no party involved owns at least 50.01 per cent, there is no formal interdependency. 
In addition, the terms of ‘subsidiary’ and ‘headquarters’ need to be distinguished from other types of 
organisations like sites. According to Belgian company law, the headquarters is a company having 
control on another company, while the subsidiary is the subordinated company (Justitie, 1999). It is 
important to differentiate the latter from other kinds of sites because the study wants to ensure the 
presence of employees in the light of the research topic. The Belgian Company Law defines a site as a 
place that is identified geographically, and where at least one of the activities of the company takes 
place. It refers to units where employees are employed or where capital has been invested to develop 
products or services. However, by using this definition, warehouses are also taken into account. This, 
however, would include companies not aimed to be in the study. The presence of a number of 
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employees guaranteeing the presence of employment policies needs to be added (Kalleberg & Van 
Buren, 1997; Kotey & Slade, 2005) . Therefore, it was necessary to use the European Works Council 
Directive (94/95/EC) as an additional source to specify our definition (Edwards et al., 2007b, 
McDonell et al., 2007). This directive defines an MNC as employing a minimum of 1.000 employees 
and having at least two operating sites in Europe with 150 employees each. This initial point of 
departure was adapted in accordance with several criteria. Following Edwards et al. (2007b), 
thresholds were lowered to 100 employees in the subsidiary and 500 employees worldwide. This is in 
line with literature on employment management and decision-making. Specifically, this number of 
employees still ensures the presence of some management structures (Kalleberg & Van Buren; 1996; 
Kotey & Slade, 2005). Consequently, adding these criteria resulted in two sub-populations: 
 
- Foreign-owned MNCs with at least 500 employees worldwide and 100 in Belgian subsidiaries 
- Belgian-owned MNCs with at least 500 employees worldwide and 100 employees in foreign 
subsidiaries 
 
To select companies that fulfil these criteria, three datasets were combined. The following paragraphs 
will describe how this selection occurred. 
 
Table 4 Overview of concept, definition and measurement of an MNC for investigating the 
transfer 
 
Concept Conceptual definition Operational definition Measurement 
Multinational 
company 
MNC as an organisation in 
which employment 
policies and practices are 
transferred between 
economically interlinked 
activities, i.e. this is 
between the headquarters 
and the subsidiaries on the 
one hand and among 
subsidiaries located in 
more than one country on 
the other hand. 
The headquarters is a 
company or person having 
control over another 
company; 
the subsidiary is the 
subordinated company; 
the subsidiary employs 
enough employees to set 
up formal policies 
Global ultimate owners 
with at least 50.01 per cent 
in the host country 
subsidiary, employing at 
least 500 employees 
worldwide and 100 
employees in the host 
country 
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3.3.1 Constructing a representative MNC population for the study on the transfer of pay 
and training policies and practices in Belgium 
 
A representative dataset of MNCs in Belgium fulfilling the criteria as defined above was not available 
at the start of the thesis. Similar to other studies (for an overview see table 18 in appendix), company-
related secondary datasets were therefore used as a point of departure (Ritchie, 2003). As these 
datasets were not initially set up for research purposes, three remarks need to be taken into account 
when making use of these datasets. First of all, criticism has been raised because of the weak 
representativeness the selected MNCs were offering to the entire population (Edwards et al., 2007b; 
McDonell et al., 2007). The information in these datasets with regard to the MNC population is most 
often based on listings provided by chambers of commerce, regional development agencies or other 
sources. This creates problems. For example, lists provided by the chambers of commerce tend to be 
particularly problematic, as membership is mostly a precondition for being listed. This implies 
incompleteness and the fact that such lists could hardly be called ‘representative’ for an entire 
population. As a consequence of such considerations, the selected MNCs probably do not represent a 
larger population. A second remark, related to the first comment, refers to the way the concept of ‘the 
multinational company’ is defined. The definition and operationalisation above does not necessarily fit 
with the search criteria in these secondary datasets (Aharoni & Broch, 2010). Consequently a clear 
link between the concept as defined and a set of variables or indicators to operationalise the concept as 
intended in valid research is not guaranteed (Collinson & Pettigrew, 2009). This means that the 
process of operationalisation from concept to items should be sufficiently explored. In addition, the 
quality of the data available in these datasets can be questioned. More specifically, reported 
employment figures (in line with real figures), countries of origin (country of origin of MNCs versus 
country of origin of regional headquarters) and shareholder structure (joint ventures and independent 
companies instead of subsidiaries) are not always appropriate. This means that, companies, not 
intended to be included in the population, are selected (Edwards et al, 2007b; McDonell et al., 2007). 
A first step in our methodology is to construct a representative list of MNCs to study the transfer of 
pay and training policies and practices in Belgium, taking into account the three above mentioned 
remarks.  
 
Therefore, the thesis initially focused on data retrieved from secondary datasets (Amadeus, Belfirst, 
Trendstop) (table 5). Although these datasets give an overview on business activities in Belgium, the 
nature of MNCs and particularly the fact that they are operational across borders poses difficulties. If 
secondary datasets exist, their cross-national comparability is by no means ensured. Thus, when 
making use of them, an adequate level of comparability needs to be assured. To guarantee this, cross-
checking information among several of these datasets, and individual contacts with companies was set 
up. The following paragraphs will describe the different steps in this screening process. It shows that 
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the information available to investigate the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs 
in Belgium is not always in line with the criteria used to define the MNC, i.e. the country of origin 
(domestically-owned versus foreign-owned MNCs), the employment thresholds and the ownerships 
structures (subsidiaries instead of joint ventures or independent companies). How this information was 
controlled, is discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
Table 5 Overview of secondary datasets 
 
Dataset Available information 
Amadeus Provides information on companies of all kind 
operational in Europe. Search criteria like sector, 
size, home country can be inserted 
Belfirst Provides information on companies of all kind 
operational in Belgium and Luxembourg. Search 
criteria are similar to Amadeus 
Trendstop Provides information on companies operational in 
Belgium, not on global ultimate owners. Personal 
contact details of specific responsibles can be 
looked up 
 
3.3.2 From three secondary datasets to a representative list of MNCs in Belgium  
  
Concrete thresholds regarding shareholder structure (50.01 per cent) and employment size (500 
employees worldwide and 100 in Belgium) were formulated in order to set clear boundaries for 
companies to be included based on secondary datasets (Amadeus, Belfirst and Trendstop) (table 5). As 
these secondary datasets did not guarantee measurement validity (figure 6), a company-by-company 
check was needed including examining websites and personal phone contact. The first two datasets, 
Amadeus and Belfirst were used to construct the domestically-owned and foreign-owned MNC 
population, based on ownership structure and employment criteria. These datasets incorporate 
information on MNCs operational in Belgium. Trendstop was used to re-check employment criteria as 
it does not provide information on the global ultimate owner.  
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Figure 6 Illustration of validity 
 
 
Billiet, 2013 
 
In order to optimise the population listing, two search strategies were used, incorporating the nature of 
the company as a research indicator (being a subsidiary owned for 50.01 per cent by a global ultimate 
owner or being a global ultimate owner with subsidiaries in Belgium). The first search strategy used 
the location of the subsidiary (bottom up) and the number of employees in Belgium as criteria. Criteria 
were: being owned for at least 50.01 per cent by a global ultimate owner and 100 employees in the 
subsidiary in Belgium. The second one used the global ultimate owner with subsidiaries in Belgium 
and having at least 500 employees worldwide. These two search strategies resulted in two lists, 
respectively consisting of 1928 and 926 MNCs in Belgium, fitting our criteria. The initial lists were 
downloaded in June 2011 and updated with a more recent version in February 2012.
7
 
 
The two research strategies, however, showed different numbers of MNCs. This could be explained by 
MNCs not having 500 employees worldwide or not having 100 employees in Belgium. However, the 
difference also reflects inconsistencies in information, as the following paragraphs will explain. 
Specifically, these datasets were both based on the companies’ annual reports, although other 
companies were selected depending on the search strategy used. Using one list as the reference list, a 
company-by-company screening was executed in order to refine the list. Combining these two lists 
and thereby eliminating problems such as double-listings resulted in a list of 879 companies (figure 7). 
 
 
                                                          
7
 The final population was used to organise a survey in 2013 with 194 HR managers in Belgian subsidiaries. 
Results of this survey were published as Pulignano, V., & Dekocker, V. (2014). Employment practices in 
Multinationals in Belgium. Leuven: Acco. 
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Figure 7 Overview of research steps in constructing a representative MNC population 
 
 
The second step in compiling the dataset consists of checking employment criteria, by using 
Trendstop, or through phone contact with companies. Phone contacts were also used as screening 
interviews. More specifically, the information gathered from different secondary resources was 
rechecked: the country of origin, the number of employees in Belgium and worldwide. This phase also 
allowed identifying companies that were dissolved or were taken over by other companies, since the 
data in our initial list were based on the data of the last year available. For a number of companies 
however, information on the number of employees in Belgium or worldwide was still missing. The 
final screening resulted in a total of 504 companies meeting the population criteria (table 6). Put 
differently, out of the 879 companies based on a combination of datasets, 375 were left after the phone 
screening. This is remarkable, since selection criteria like country of origin, host country (Belgium), 
employment threshold and ownership structures could be filled in. So when inserting a criterion like 
an employment threshold of 500 employees worldwide, not all companies in the reported list were apt 
to the criterion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Belfirst  
• Amadeus 
Remove double listings 
• Intermediate 
MNC 
population 
(n=879) 
Check employment figures 
and country of origin based 
on phone contact, websites 
and trendstop • MNC 
population for 
the study of 
transfer (n=504) 
case selection based on a 
representative list of MNCs 
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Table 6 Result of the revision of national and international datasets 
 
 Frequency Relative frequency 
(per cent) 
Useable  504 57.3 
Non response (type I) 45 5.1 
Non response (type II-missing information) 169 19.2 
Not meeting the selection criteria 140 15.9 
Belonging to a company already listed in the 
population (double occurrence) 
21 2.4 
Total Listing 879 100 
 
With regard to the final screening phase, there are some important additional aspects to mention. First 
of all, one might expect a time lag between the data obtained from the datasets and the current 
situation of MNCs, as data are based on the last available year. Certainly, due to the particular 
economic situation, a lot of companies have undergone major restructuring processes leading to a 
closure, fusion or merger. Of all companies not fulfilling the criteria, only 5 per cent is due to 
decreased employment figures because of a reorganisation in the past years. These restructuring 
processes may, however, have caused a change in ownership. As such, the possible double mentioning 
of a specific global ultimate owner in the population list needed to be checked. Consequently, 
companies that became part of a larger group that was already listed, were removed (n=21). As only 5 
per cent of the non-listed companies were object to reorganisation, the remaining companies not 
fulfilling the criteria, were non-responsive, or no information could be found. 37 per cent was linked 
to misclassification. These companies did not have a multinational character or did not fulfil the 
required employment figures, but were, however, listed as MNCs in the datasets used. This was 
particularly the case for Belgian-owned companies. Besides this, two types of non-response can be 
found. The first type refers to companies not willing to give information (n=45); the second type refers 
to companies for which no information was found at all (n=169) (no company website, no phone 
number). The cross-checking as described in the previous paragraphs has shown to be relevant for 
validity of our MNC population. In doing this cross-checking, some additional decisions had to be 
made for special cases regarding country of origin, employment size and ownership structure. The 
following section will report on these decisions. 
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3.3.3 Problems and pitfalls when using secondary datasets 
 
Based on the revision of the listed companies and on phone contacts with companies, 37 per cent of 
the companies were deleted (figure 6). Four domains were taken into account while selecting the 
MNCs on the list: the country of origin, the ownership per centage, the intermediate structures and the 
presence of holdings. They will be discussed in the following in order to explain the decisions that 
were made and how they impact the construction of the MNC population 
 
Sometimes, the country of origin of the global ultimate owner was listed as the country in which the 
national or regional headquarters are located. For cases giving national or regional headquarters 
instead of the country of origin, the information was adapted. The list also reported some tax havens 
(n=29, n (United Arab Emirates)= 1, n (Switzerland)= 18 and n (Luxembourg)=10). In these cases, the 
country of origin was not adapted as to the best of our knowledge, the global ultimate owner was 
located in this country.  
 
Secondly, the per centage of shares owned by the global ultimate owner was not always in accordance 
with headquarters owning at least 50.01 per cent of the subsidiaries’ shares. Although this should 
exclude joint ventures, intermediate structures and independent companies, some of these company 
structures were found in the list. As one of the central features of the research was the formal 
interdependence between headquarters and subsidiaries, joint ventures were not within the target 
population. More specifically, Belgian Company Law (Justitie, 1999) refers to common control as 
control that a limited number of partners exercise together when they have agreed that decisions 
regarding the orientation of company-specific policy (such as employment policies or research and 
development) cannot be taken without their common consent. Not taking into account joint ventures 
for the study on the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries is in line 
with research on the effect of ownership structures (Madhok, 2006). In addition, independent 
companies were listed, even though the research aimed to include subsidiaries only. Phone contact 
with these companies indeed revealed that these subsidiaries were no longer owned by the MNC. In 
most of the cases, it was a former subsidiary now acting as an independent supplier for a particular 
sector (e.g. automotive industry). 
 
A third remark is related to the prevalence of intermediate structures. Specifically, when cross-
checking the two initial lists, companies were identified as global ultimate owner and subsidiary at the 
same time. A frequently occurring structure was a Belgian subsidiary having subsidiaries in Belgium 
or even in other European countries. As a consequence, this company could appear as a Belgian 
ultimate owner with different subsidiaries in Belgium and as subsidiary with a foreign ultimate owner. 
Since Trendstop could only be used for checking the number of employees, company websites and 
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annual reports were consulted for each case with intermediate structures. The number of employees 
had to be verified, since the numbers for the main subsidiaries and the sub-subsidiaries together, were 
not always equal to the total number of employees in Belgium. This meant that the number of 
employees mentioned on the level of the subsidiary, for example consisting of two sites, could differ 
from the sum when adding up the number of employees of the two sites separately.  
 
A final remark has to do with the ownership structure of holdings. A holding is a typical structure 
within MNCs. Sometimes, the listed holdings had more than100 employees, and thus met the criteria 
to be included in the target population. Specific for holding structures is, however, their complex 
ownership status – some companies had more than one owner, without having a global ultimate 
owner. In these cases, it was decided to consider the owner with the highest per centage of the 
subsidiary’s shares as the global ultimate owner. It was important to reconstruct the holdings’ 
ownership structure in order to avoid having the same global ultimate owner more than once in the 
population listing. Specifically, a global ultimate owner could be listed twice when it was at the same 
time a majority owner in a fund. In these cases, unravelling the structure made it possible to have each 
global majority owner only once in the list.  
 
In addition to the shortcomings above, not all information could directly be obtained within the 
datasets, as was the case for the number of employees in Belgium. The majority of the MNCs only had 
one subsidiary. When companies had different sites and subsidiaries in Belgium, however, the number 
of employees had to be counted manually to be able to check whether the employment criterion of 
having at least 100 employees in Belgium was met. Although the subsidiary was defined apart from 
sites because of the legal statute of subsidiaries, one formal subsidiary could consist of different sites. 
In addition, the operational definition of domestically-owned companies needed to be checked, in 
particular whether the Belgian-owned companies had at least 100 employees abroad. Those two search 
criteria, the number of sites and the sum of employees across sites could not be added to the search 
strategy so manual calculation was necessary. This confirms the finding of Van Beveren (2007) who 
already pointed to the need of additional search criteria within these datasets when doing research on 
MNCs.  
 
Thus, to the best of our knowledge, the MNC population operational in Belgium is composed of 504 
firms meeting the criteria. In the remainder part, this MNC population will be used as a point of 
departure to select the case studies. Specifically, the dimensions of presence in regional governments, 
sectors and web of inter-firm relations will be added in order to investigate how social actors mediate 
the transfer of pay and training policies and practices by shaping employment policies at multiple sub-
national levels. The fact that the subsidiaries of MNCs operating in Belgium could be drawn from the 
MNCs’ population entails important advantages that are not so often met in qualitative research on 
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MNCs. First of all, much case study research on the transfer of employment practices and policies is 
based on the easy access to subsidiaries or merely focuses on one country of origin or sector (Edwards 
et al., 2007b; McDonnell et al., 2007). Furthermore, many studies have considered MNCs as big 
players and focus on very large scaled MNCs like Dell, Microsoft or Apple. This means that data on 
more moderate MNCs is often missing. This representative MNC population however, allows to select 
subsidiaries based on predefined criteria for integrating employment policies at sub-national levels. 
The next paragraphs explain the way cases have been selected, the method used to gather information 
and the required respondents. 
 
 
3.4 Case selection 
 
Once the MNC population has been set up, the next step is to add criteria to integrate employment 
policies at multiple sub-national levels into the study of the transfer. Specifically, in order to examine 
the resources offered by employment policies at multiple sub-national levels and to investigate how 
they are used by subsidiaries’ social actors to mediate the transfer, the case selection needs to 
guarantee the presence of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels. At the same time, the 
research requires variation. The latter is necessary to be able to investigate how different 
configurations of one employment policy can go along with a particular transfer within the same 
MNC’s strategy. So next to the presence in more than one country, the employment thresholds 
worldwide (500) and in Belgium (100) and a formal interdependence (50.01 per cent owned), the 
criterion of presence of employment policies at more than one sub-national level was added.  
 
Accordingly, the selection of MNCs’ subsidiaries was based on the presence of employment policies 
on at least two sub-national levels. Having subsidiaries in two of the three regions could easily be 
measured based on the postal code of the subsidiaries. These regions are the Flemish and Walloon 
region, as regional development agencies are installed in each region
8
. Presence of the sector was 
based on the number of the joint committees in the subsidiaries. The presence of two different 
committees was required to maximise variance within and across cases. After all, the research wants to 
allow for divergence in configurations between social actors, employment policies at sub-national 
levels and the transfer of pay and training policies in MNCs’ subsidiaries. The web of inter-firm 
relations could not be captured as input-output tables, a proxy variable used to indicate the exchange 
within and between sectors in given locations, is only available on the macro-level. However, the fact 
that the presence of two sub-national levels is guaranteed in our cases, allows us to examine the two 
                                                          
8
 The Brussels-Capital Region and the German speaking community have not been considered as placement and 
initial education for companies in this region and community are also partially foreseen by the Flemish and 
Walloon government. 
79 
 
propositions. This way, the research set up allows us to examine the resources of each level separately, 
as well as employment policies at sub-national levels as interlocked or nested (Ritchie, 2003). In 
addition, as subsidiaries in different regions and sectors belong to the same MNC, MNCs’ 
characteristics could be controlled. Other potential variance was minimised as well: the supra-national 
dimension (European, Asian or American) was kept invariable as previous studies have shown the 
influence of these levels on the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs (Edwards 
et al., 2012; Oh & Rugman, 2012). Consequently the thesis only considers one supranational level: 
European MNCs were selected to keep the supra-national level constant (n= 350). The European level 
was chosen for instead of Asian or American MNCs as literature has shown that foreign owned MNCs 
have their headquarters most frequently in the neighbouring countries (Edwards et al., 2007; 
McDonnell et al., 2007).  
 
Based on these selection criteria, 8 MNCs were selected. This means that within a general population 
of MNCs with minimum 500 employees worldwide and 100 in Belgium, only 8 MNCs had at least 2 
subsidiaries in one region consisting of at least 100 employees, together with the presence of two 
different joint committees per subsidiary.  
 
At first, it was surprising to see that only 8 MNCs met the criteria, as many large MNCs have been 
known to have different operations in Belgium. Four reasons are put forward to explain the limited 
number of MNCs. First of all, it is important take into account the difference between a site and a 
subsidiary, as mentioned above. There are MNCs with different sites in different regions in Belgium, 
but in reality, the sites are clustered in one Belgian subsidiary. Most of the time, this structure reflects 
a tendency for centralisation and control in order to set up a uniform Belgian employment policy. 
Second, different legal subsidiaries would require separate works councils and trade union 
representations. So by integrating different sites in one formal subsidiary, MNCs have to install the 
works council and a union representation only once. Third, the assumed number of MNCs with 
subsidiaries each having 100 employees can be overestimated. Often, sites or subsidiaries do not have 
a subsidiary status because they are independent (sometimes a former subsidiary that became a 
supplier for the whole sector) or they have the status of joint ventures, meaning that no formal control 
is executed. Fourth and related to the third explanation, the nature of MNCs’ structure can cause an 
overestimation of MNCs with more than one subsidiary in Belgium. As defined in the literature 
review, MNCs are not only composed by headquarters and national subsidiaries, but are based on 
global business functions and business divisions (each division delivering one specific type of product 
or service). Over time, one business division can be acquired (see for example the first business 
division of Packaging (p.115)). This can result in two Belgian subsidiaries belonging to two different 
owners. However, due to their former shared owner, subsidiaries can still be assumed to be part of the 
same MNC.  
80 
 
 
All 8 MNCs were contacted and four of them confirmed collaboration. They will be labelled based on 
the sector they operate in: Waste, Food, Packaging and ICT (see chapter V). The following paragraphs 
will describe the respondents, the questions used and the method of data gathering within these MNCs. 
 
 
3.5 Data collection process 
 
After having defined and selected an MNC to integrate employment policies at sub-national levels, 
three additional questions need to be answered: what will be examined, whom the thesis will question 
to collect the information and how this data collection will be done. These three parameters will be 
described in the last paragraphs of this chapter. 
 
 
3.5.1 What has been examined? 
 
The goal of this thesis is to distinguish between different configurations of employment policies at 
multiple sub-national levels, social actors and transfer. With policies at sub-national levels, the thesis 
first of all encompasses regional policies, their agencies and the resources on these levels like board of 
directors of advisory committees. Second, two forms of the inter-firm level are integrated. The inter-
firm level in its first dimension refers to the sector, with training institutes and social or pension funds 
giving resources to social actors by their boards (based on parity). The second dimension of the inter-
firm level is composed of geographically clustered companies. Within this group of companies MNCs 
can access and divide valuable resources as MNCs are most frequency crucial in the competitiveness 
of the web of inter-firm relations. So not only the number of resources and the number of initiatives 
differ between employment policies at sub-national levels, also the nature of resources and policies 
varies. A resource at the sub-national level is here understood as an instrument that can potentially 
enhance the bargaining position of the social actor to shape the policy. An employment policy at the 
sub-national level, as previously described, is understood as an initiative used by social actors to 
mediate the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries because of its 
contribution to MNCs’ competitive advantage. 
 
As previously described, the thesis focuses on the transfer of training and pay policies and practices, 
because employment policies at sub-national levels are relevant for them (see chapter II). In addition, 
they have widely been investigated within the literature on the transfer within MNCs (Ferner et al., 
2005; Marginson et al., 2010; Quintanilla, et al., 2008). As previously defined, pay policies refer to 
formal systems of appraisal (a system for setting individuals’ performance objectives and monitoring 
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performance against past objectives, carried out annually or more frequently), variable pay (merit pay, 
performance-related pay, performance-related bonuses or payment by results) or function 
classification (added value of different functions within the whole company). Training refers to 
vocational training defined as training sessions offered by internal or external organisations to 
employees, in order to adjust and adapt employees’ skills to meet changing demands and remain 
competitive (Cappelli, 2012; Colbert, 2004). This vocational training entails both general and job 
specific training. General training is defined as training for personal development (e.g. presentation 
skills, negotiation skills); specific training is training for the job (e.g. statistical software for 
researchers). These policies will initially be questioned for the largest occupational group (LOG) 
within the subsidiaries. The focus on the LOG is in line with the methods used in previous studies on 
this topic in order to distinguish between different groups in the same subsidiaries. In Belgium, this 
means that the LOG will refer to blue-collar workers, white-collar workers or senior staff as collective 
bargaining was organised separately for these groups at the time of data collection. 
 
For the transfer, the thesis makes a distinction between control, centralisation and discretion and the 
headquarters-subsidiary configuration. Control (bureaucratic control) is reflected by the amount of 
written documents, policies, planning and systems set up to measure output and behaviour. In MNCs 
this can refer to shared services (services used in all or the majority of the subsidiaries) and 
information systems (systems gaining access to information of all subsidiaries worldwide) (Gamble, 
2003; Edwards & Kuruvilla, 2005). Centralisation is then defined as a decision-making process 
between headquarters and subsidiaries in which control is to a certain extent hierarchically organised 
(Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Martinez & Jarillo, 1989). More specifically, it examines whether control is 
located only on headquarters’ level, or whether regional and national headquarters also execute 
control. Furthermore, centralisation is inversely related to the extent of subsidiary’s discretion. That is 
whether the subsidiary is forced to implement a policy or practice set by a higher level such as the 
corporate headquarters, whether the subsidiary can develop a policy or practice within the 
guidelines/framework set by a higher organisational level or whether the subsidiary can set its own 
policy and practices (Edwards et al., 2007; McDonell et al., 2007; Minbaeva & Navrbjerg, 2011). The 
headquarters-subsidiary configuration is defined as a tight constellation of mutually supportive 
elements, a set of formal and informal employment tools (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995). Concretely 
it investigates whether there are headquarters with national subsidiaries or global headquarters with 
subsequent hierarchical levels or organisational structures like business divisions, European 
headquarters and national headquarters. These different dimensions of transfer and employment 
policies were questioned with different respondents within MNCs. The next section gives information 
on the type of respondents and how they have been selected. 
 
 
82 
 
3.5.2 Who has been approached? 
 
As the thesis wants to investigate how subsidiaries’ social actors mediate the transfer of pay and 
training policies by shaping employment policies at sub-national levels, respondents or informants 
need to offer an insight into 1) the resources and bargaining space of employees, employers and their 
representative organisations, 2) how these resources are used to shape employment policies at sub-
national levels and 3) how these policies are used by social actors to mediate the transfer of pay and 
training policies and practices. Therefore trade unions representatives as well as managers (and their 
federations) are questioned in each subsidiary. Not only the subsidiary level is hereby taken into 
account but also the representatives at the sector level and the supra-national or global manager for the 
MNC were interviewed.  
 
Within the subsidiaries, trade union representatives as well as managers and employers’ organisations 
were contacted. Access to (HR) managers within the subsidiaries was based on Trendstop. This 
database allows to look up the email address and direct phone number of the HR managers. However, 
it is important to note that not all subsidiaries in Belgium had an overall HR manager. In these 
situations, the director has been approached, as in many cases this was the former director of an 
acquired SME that had been responsible for employment policies. Access to trade union 
representatives mainly happened via informal contacts. Specifically, a list of the selected companies 
was given to contacts within trade unions, namely the socialist trade union (ABVV) and the Christian 
trade union (ACV). They added the sector and company union representatives per joint committee. 
The use of these informal contacts was necessary as no public lists of representatives on company 
level are available. There was no direct access to the liberal trade union that has relatively few 
members and thus was less likely to be represented in our cases. Therefore, scheduled interviewees 
were asked for the contact details of the representative of the liberal trade union (ACLVB) where 
applicable. A similar approach was used when trade unions did not respond via email or phone. 
Specifically, trade union representatives of the socialist or Christian trade union could check whether 
the person was still in place or had been replaced by a newly appointed representative. However, it 
should be noted that not all trade unions were represented in each subsidiary. Most frequently, one 
dominant trade union was engaged in the works council, depending on the location of the subsidiary or 
the sector (manufacturing versus services). Local or Belgian HR managers were also asked to get in 
contact with the regional HR manager or manager on headquarters’ level. For Waste, there was no 
global HR manager during the time of data collection. Access to the employers’ federation was 
organised via mail and phone and an interview could easily be organised. A similar approach was used 
for training centres on the sector level.  
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The nature of the respondents, however, differs. HR managers are, as opposed to trade unions 
(informants), very often considered to be elite interviewees. Elite interviewees are defined as a group 
in society because of their power, talent or privileges (Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen, & 
Tahvanainen, 2002). Accordingly, in business research, an elite is referred to as someone from the 
senior or middle management level, with a longstanding track record within the company and a widely 
spread network and who is responsible for a functional area which enjoys a high status within the 
corporation (Welch et al., 2002). In line with the literature, Belgian HR managers in the investigated 
cases have a seniority of 11 (Food), 5 (Walloon subsidiary Packaging) and 20 years (ICT)
9
. Waste was 
an exception, as the function of Belgian HR manager had only recently been created. A second 
characteristic is the difficult access to an elite. Quite often informal contacts or an intermediary step 
are needed to be organised in order to get in contact with the elite. This was particularly the case for 
HR managers on headquarters or supra-national level. In these cases, an interview with the Belgian 
HR manager was a necessary step to obtain access to global HR managers, since contact details were 
not available in another way. Third, the most obvious characteristic distinguishing HR managers from 
trade unions, is that the former are more likely to inform on all the aspects of the transfer as they did 
participate in it (e.g. worldwide employment policies). Trade union representatives are informants that 
are not always involved in the whole process of employment policies. This became clear when some 
trade union representatives clearly stated that they had no idea on how a particular practice had been 
implemented or that contact with global or European headquarters never took place.  
 
The interviews were organised in 2012 by one researcher, starting at the end of February and finishing 
by the end of October 2012. To guarantee and maximise data gathering , interviews related to the same 
MNC were spread. This allowed first of all to transcribe the interviews and read the information that 
then could be integrated in the next interview in order to obtain more (specific) information. In 
addition the recorded interviews were transcribed as soon as possible to minimise bias (Beamer, 
2002). In total 36 interviews with 42 respondents were executed (table 5). The shortest interview 
lasted 32 minutes, the longest interview 1 hour and 42 minutes. Most of the interviews were scheduled 
to last one hour, since particularly managers were not able to dedicate more time. The number of cases 
reflects all social actors involved, expect for one subsidiary (see section on non-response, p.96). 
 
All the participants were informed in advance and had the possibility to withdraw from participation at 
any time, even after having confirmed their collaboration. In addition an agreement with the 
conditions for confidentiality was set up (Weiss, 1995). For the majority of the subsidiaries, some 
parts of the interview were off the record. Moreover, as the interview was sometimes considered as a 
‘listening post’ for both trade unions or managers on different levels, non-disclosure agreements were 
                                                          
9
 The HR manager of the largest SME became the HR manager within ICT 
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set up. All the interviews with trade unions and managers are shown in table 7. The way these 
interviews were organised, is the topic of the next section. 
 
Table 7 Overview of the interviews 
 
Company Level Social actors Location Language 
Waste National level Belgian HR manager Belgian Head office D 
 Subsidiary level Trade union FGTB Phone interview-
office 
FR 
 Subsidiary level Trade union 
representative CSC 
Subsidiary FR 
 Sector level Trade union 
representative CSC 
Trade unions FR 
 Subsidiary level Local Manager Subsidiary FR 
 Subsidiary level and 
sector level 
Trade union 
representatives ACV 
(2) 
Subsidiary D 
 Sector level Trade union 
representatives ACV 
Trade unions D 
 Subsidiary level Local Manager Subsidiary D 
ICT Headquarters-
Belgian 
Headquarters 
Global Manager and 
Belgian HR manager 
Belgian Head office D 
 Subsidiary level Trade union 
representative FGTB 
Subsidiary D 
 Subsidiary level Local Manager Subsidiary D 
 Subsidiary level Trade union 
representative ACV 
Subsidiary level D 
Food Subsidiary International HR 
manager business 
divisions 2&3 
Head office D 
 Subsidiary Local Manager Subsidiary D/FR 
 Sector level Trade union 
representative ACV 
Trade unions D 
 Headquarters Global HR manager Global headquarters E 
 Subsidiary Trade union Home D 
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representative ACV 
 National level Belgian HR manager 
business division 1 
Belgian 
Headquarters 
D 
 Subsidiary Trade union 
representative 
ACLVB 
Belgian 
Headquarters 
D 
Packaging Supra-national level HR manager Phone call FR 
 Subsidiary level HR manager 
business division 2 
(Walloon subsidiary) 
Subsidiary FR 
 Subsidiary level HR managers 
business division 1 
(Flanders) 
Subsidiary D 
 Sector level + 
subsidiary level 
Trade union 
representative sector 
and company 
representatives 
ACV(2) 
Trade unions D 
 Subsidiary Trade union 
representative 
ABVV 
Home D 
 Subsidiary Trade union 
representative FGTB 
Subsidiary D 
 Subsidiary Trade union 
representative FGTB 
Subsidiary FR 
Sector 
level  
Employers 
federation packaging 
 Employers-
federation 
D 
 Training institute 
white-collar 
workers-trade unions 
 Office  D 
 Training institute 
white-collar workers 
 Office D 
 Training institute 
Waste 
 Training institute FR/D 
 Training institute 
white-collar workers 
 Trade unions FR 
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– trade unions 
 Training institute 
Food 
 Training institute D 
 Training institute 
white collar workers 
–employers 
 Employers-
federation 
D 
 Employers 
federation Waste 
 Employers-
federation 
D 
 Employers 
Federation Food 
 Employers-
federation 
D 
 Training institute 
white collars- 
Employers 
 Employers-
federation 
D 
 
3.5.3 How the data have been collected? 
 
A final step in the research set up is the method of data collection. This happened through semi-
structured interviews and documents analyses. The latter composes of a collection of agreements on 
the company and the sector level, company specific documents, newspaper articles and regional 
policies (table 8). The document analysis was initially used to get a first impression on pay and 
training policies and practices within MNCs’ operations in Belgium, and to have general information 
on the company worldwide and background characteristics of subsidiaries in Belgium. Thereafter, 
more specific information on pay and training policies and practices was obtained based on the 
collective agreements and regional policies. The former relates to the per centage of expenditure to 
training, contributions to the sector fund or employees involved in training the social actors on the 
sector agreed on. The latter refers to soft governance in the sense that regional development agencies 
can be used but are not obligatory.  
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Table 8 Overview of consulted documents 
 
Collective agreements 
10
 
Food Collective agreements 
ICT Collective agreements 
Packaging Collective agreements 
Waste Collective agreements 
Newspaper articles  
Food 42 
ICT 36 
Packaging 11 
Waste 26 
Other secondary data sources 
Company specific presentations Waste 
Policy documents DE VLAAMSE REGERING 2009-2014 
EEN DAADKRACHTIG VLAANDEREN IN 
BESLISSENDE TIJDEN, Voor een 
vernieuwende, duurzame, en warme samenleving 
Beleidsnota werk, 2009-2014, een nieuwe 
arbeidsmarktvisie voor Vlaanderen 
Biotech in Wallonia Report 2008 
Streven naar uitmuntendheid, Plan Marschall, 
2.vert 
Beleidsnota Brussel 2009-2014, Samen grenzen 
verleggen 
 
Before constructing the topic guide, all the documents mentioned in table 8 were read. This was an 
important step before the actual data collection (figure 8), as differences in employment policies were 
to be expected. Specifically, regional initiatives differed between the Flemish and Walloon region, like 
for example the sector convenant. Furthermore, a comparison of collective agreements between joint 
committees illustrates that the per centage of the payroll spent to training services differed between 
sectors and that not all sectors had a training centre or a pension fund. In addition, newspaper articles 
could inform on the web of inter-firm relations and the differences in initiatives among companies. For 
the company Waste for example, newspaper articles reported on a collaboration between the regional 
                                                          
10
 The consulted collective agreements and articles are not mentioned in the overview table as this would affect 
anonimity and non-disclosure agreements.   
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government and a network of companies of which Waste Walloon was the leading company. 
Similarly, Food was involved in setting up a web of inter-firm relations in close collaboration with the 
university. Waste Flanders was also frequently mentioned in the newspapers because of a conflict with 
the neighbourhood with regard to noise and pollution. This information was important to keep in mind 
while constructing the topic guide. Not only theoretical frameworks should be represented as concrete 
situations on the sub-national level, also concrete examples for the pay and training policies and 
practices will give more reliable information (Weiss, 1995) (figure 8).  
 
Besides these concrete situations, the use of probe questions was foreseen. These probes, described as 
follow-up questions, enable researchers to have more information, descriptions and explanations. 
Furthermore, they allow the interviewee to talk about topics that were not expected by the interviewer. 
The latter, for example, occurred in the first group of interviews where interviewees talked about the 
way social actors formally and informally shaped employment policies at sub-national levels by using 
resources at these levels (Berry, 2002). As questions on this theme were not initially set up, probes 
were helpful in getting more in-depth information. As a consequence, the information received from 
the first group of interviews was reflected upon. By integrating more recent literature on the 
bargaining space caused by inequality in resources, the first proposition was added. Consequently, 
questions on social actors shaping employment policies at sub-national levels were included in 
subsequent interviews (figure 8).  
 
The latter shows the usefulness of probes within the research set up. They proved to be very important 
since it enables the interviewer to push the interviewee beyond first impressions on the transfer of pay 
and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. In addition, probes motivate interviewees to 
consider a particular topic from different perspectives (Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2007). Probes were 
used when the interviewee gave an indication of a broader explanation or perspective on the transfer 
without fully describing it. Probes were only used when additional information was obtained, in other 
words, till a particular level of saturation was reached. The use of probes to get more information was 
only successful when more general questions were formulated first. These questions allow to give an 
overview of different dimensions and configurations probes can be used for to get more information. 
However, in the elite interviews, questions that were too generally put, were problematic. Specifically, 
the interviewer was not assumed to ask for information that could be found somewhere else as it was 
seen as a waste of time (Beamer, 2002). Therefore concrete situations showed the interviewee that the 
interviewer was informed. Moreover, concrete situations maximise the chance to receive concrete 
answers instead of vague responses. So while constructing the topic guide, a balance between general 
and more detailed questions was put forward to have a complete answer, taking care not to influence 
the answer itself (Legard et al., 2007).   
  
89 
 
Specifically, general and more detailed questions are reflected in the structure of the topic guide. The 
list of the topics as presented in table 19 and table 20 in appendix was the same for all respondents at 
the subsidiary level. The opening questions were used to introduce the respondents, their function 
within the company and their seniority. The second and third part dealt with background questions on 
the subsidiary and the MNC worldwide. This retrospective questioning aimed at getting an insight into 
how the subsidiary and the MNC had evolved over time. The fourth and fifth part explicitly dealt with 
the transfer, what headquarters-subsidiary configurations looked like, the extent of control, 
centralisation and discretion. In these parts, more detailed questions started to differ based on the 
analysis of collective agreements and other secondary documents (step 1 figure 8). The overall 
approach, however, remained the same, bearing in mind that concrete situations encourage 
respondents to give more reliable information (Weiss, 1995). The final part, i.e. the way employment 
policies at sub-national levels has been set up, was added based on the first interviews. The original 
checklist was adapted as the initial focus was on the influence of employment policies at sub-national 
levels on the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Based on the 
first group of interviews (figure 8), and the concepts of institutional entrepreneurship and resources, it 
seemed valuable to add questions on the way these employment policies at sub-national levels were 
set up.  
 
The order of the topic guide was not strict; the specific order could vary between the interviews. The 
topic guide was translated in French and English to make the interview more accessible for the 
respondents and in order to maximise collaboration. The topic guide on the sector level is a separate 
one, as the insight in processes on sector level differs from the one on company level. The topic guide 
for the sector is composed of five parts: the profile of the interviewee, the composition of the sector 
(companies, social actors), the description of the services and funds at sector level, the way they have 
been set up and the connection with other employment policies at sub-national levels. 
 
Ideally, topic guides would have been tested in advance; however, due to the limited number of MNCs 
in our sample, and the non-response of the MNCs, no respondents within our target population could 
be interviewed to test the topic guide (Beamer, 2002). A second best option would have been to 
contact another company of the MNC list. However, due to the screening process and individual 
phone contact, the companies were overburdened and this would possibly harm further collaboration 
for the survey. Therefore, the topic guide was adapted during the data collection and questions 
regarding the employment policies at sub-national level were included for all interviewees. After 
having finished the data collection, the next step is data management and data analysis. Both will be 
discussed in the second chapter of the methodology section. 
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Figure 8 Overview of research steps 
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Chapter IV: Analysis and reflection  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The second chapter of this methodology section will give an insight into the process between finalised 
data collection and the report on the cases and findings. After all, data collection and a transcription of 
the interviews do not suffice to investigate the above mentioned proposition: social actors mediate the 
transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries by shaping employment 
policies at multiple sub-national levels. Therefore, this chapter will first of all report on how the data 
have been indexed and coded. Furthermore it will tackle data validity and reliability. Specifically, it 
will report on issues like non-response and selection bias. In doing so, the chapter provides 
transparency regarding all research steps in this thesis.  
 
 
4.2 Data management and analysis  
 
After having transcribed the interviews, an important step before data analysis is organising the data 
by making use of themes (Ritchie, Spencer, & O’Connor, 2003). The clustering of these data 
happened in two phases. A first phase was indexing all recurring themes based on theoretical 
frameworks, represented in the topic guide and in information from the interviews. During this 
process, hereafter called indexing, the distance between the theme and data is small. Put differently, no 
generalisation towards more abstract codes is being made at this moment. Rather, all quotes are 
labelled as specific as possible. In the process of indexing, the following guidelines were taken into 
account: the initial expression of the respondents is kept and interpretation is not yet at place (Ritchie 
& Lewis, 2003; Silverman, 2000). Accordingly, paragraphs that do not seem relevant at this moment 
were not removed from the interviews: as the index, and later on the coding process is under constant 
revision, these paragraphs can add to the understanding of the data in later phases of data analysis 
(Ritchie et al., 2003). The second phase was coding. This process refers to the capturing of more 
abstract dimensions. This is explained by some examples. In the process of indexing, the number of 
competitors and the market situation for both subsidiaries and headquarters were formulated. This 
resulted in four separate dimensions in the index, whereas in the codebook, these four dimensions 
were collected under the code ‘economic conditions’. Similarly, each regulatory level for the main 
activity (European, national, regional) was given a separate theme, whereas one code ‘regulation’ 
collected these three levels in the codebook. The initial index consisted of 105 themes, the final 
codebook has 35 codes (table 21 and 22 in appendix). A prior index of more than 100 themes is no 
exception, as the process of coding distracts more abstract labels (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1995).  
 
After having finalised the coding, two analyses have been executed, a within case study analysis and a 
cross-comparative analysis (figure 9). The within case study analysis aimed at obtaining three aspects 
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(Bennett & Elman, 2006): the casual mechanism within a case, the configuration between conditions 
to capture which values go along with a particular transfer and the conditions that are needed to cause 
a particular transfer. Doing so, the objective was to map all potential relevant dimensions. Based on 
this, the next step is a cross-comparative analysis to draw some inferences based on case study 
research, aimed at examining different combinations of employment policies at sub-national levels, 
resources on these levels and the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ 
subsidiaries. Therefore, an elaborated version of the method of difference and the method of 
agreement was used. The following logic has been applied in this regard: if two cases have different 
outcomes, and only one condition differs, it is accepted that this condition is sufficient to cause the 
outcome. Vice versa, when the outcome is similar and only one condition is alike, the condition is 
needed to cause the outcome. However, as formulated before, the thesis did not expect one single way 
of shaping employment policies at sub-national levels to mediate the transfer of pay and training 
policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Rather, a combination of conditions will cause a 
particular headquarter-subsidiary configuration or extent of subsidiaries’ discretion or headquarters’ 
control (Bennett & Elman, 2006). Therefore, this approach is elaborated upon by considering the 
transfer as a configuration. For doing both types of analysis, the software Nvivo has been used. This 
program support data management and storage of material as well as analysis but the interpretation 
itself has to be done by the researcher. 
 
 
Figure 9 Overview of steps in data-management and analysis 
 
 
Based on Ritchie and Lewis (2003) 
Data management 
•general themes 
•sorting 
interviews per 
theme 
•from themes to 
codes 
 
 
 
•Within case 
analysis 
Data analysis  
•clustering data 
•identifying 
patterns 
•looking for 
configurations 
 
 
 
 
•Cross 
comparative 
analysis 
 
Results  
•  how sub-
national 
employment 
policies are 
shaped by social 
actors 
•how these 
policies mediate 
subsidiaries' 
discretion and 
headquarters' 
control 
•how these 
policies mediate 
subsidiaries' roles 
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4.3 Methodological reflection 
 
A final paragraph reflects on the way the research has been set up. Indeed, key to all research is the 
importance of reliability and validity to evaluate a thesis as scientific. Reliability hereby refers to 
whether or not other researchers would come to similar results when all the research steps would be 
repeated. Accordingly, it is highly important that the researcher is transparent in describing every step 
of the research: the sample design and selection, the fieldwork, the analysis and the interpretation. 
Reliability will measure to what extent other conditions exist which can explain the findings (Lewis & 
Ritchie, 2003). The second dimension to evaluate research relates to validity: controlling whether the 
thesis has investigated what it pretended to investigate. Similar to reliability, increase in validity can 
be obtained by paying attention to every step in the research set up. Specifically, to maximise validity, 
a first aspect to take into account is sample coverage and analysis of non-response. Furthermore, 
validity can be obtained by integrating the full range of perspectives during the interviews, by 
controlling similar labelling between interviewee and interviewer and by an analytical set up to be 
followed by other researchers. (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003). The need to guarantee validity and reliability 
is furthermore reinforced by the nature of qualitative research. That is, in qualitative research, the 
researcher him or herself is a research instrument addressing codes and interpretation on raw data. As 
such, self-reflexivity in all research steps is required (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001). Following 
paragraphs will reflect upon the validity and reliability of the thesis by discussing topics like non-
response and selection bias. 
 
 
4.3.1 Reliability 
 
As previously stated, reliability refers to whether or not other researchers would come to similar 
results when investigating the research topic and following similar research steps. In quantitative 
research, reliability is obtained through standardised procedures and methods. As the researcher in 
qualitative research is an important research instrument hem/herself, reliability is less easily obtained. 
Against this background, transparency is put forward (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001; Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003). This means that every step within the thesis, even if adjustments are inherent to qualitative 
research, should be made available to other researchers. Therefore, all the steps were carefully 
archived as were the decisions made during the research process, in order to enable other researchers 
to go back to a specific decision. The way the thesis has been set up and the construction of the 
previous methodological chapter aim to be transparent and inform about every step and decision taken. 
Also the remaining empirical chapters will explain which concepts and theoretical frameworks were 
used and tested. 
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Besides this, transparency regarding the labelling and interpretation is of high importance. This 
transparency is crucial on two levels: 1) on the level of indexing and coding and 2) on the level of 
interpretation. Indeed, apart from the method used to analyse qualitative interviews (interpretative or 
more realist approaches), researchers have to put a method used to measure the accuracy of their 
interpretations in their research design (Silverman, 2000). The intercoding or interrate reliability is the 
most appropriate way to control this. This measurement has been set up to check whether similar 
codes would be linked to the same quotes by different researchers. Specifically, this measurement is 
most frequently used to code attitudes or the meaning of interviewees relating to the subjective 
experience of each interviewee (e.g. Deville, 2008) (Armstrong, Goslin, Weinman, & Marteau, 1997; 
Neuendorf, 2002). In the thesis, the interrate reliability has been obtained in a different way. 
Specifically, reliability was checked through an ongoing revision of the codebook and the themes 
addressed to within the interviews. Therefore, six meetings were organised with another non-affiliated 
researcher
11
. The first meeting focused on the explanation of the topic and the way the codebook has 
been set up and constructed. Thereafter, 34 paragraphs out of 4 interviews were highlighted (some of 
them more than once) and the external researcher gave them a code based on the codebook. This 
process was organised twice in order to reflect on the codes, to avoid misunderstandings and to 
elaborate or reformulate codes that could lead to misinterpretation. 8 out of 36 interviews were 
recoded. Within this process, quotes that were given more than one code or codes that were coded 
differently, were discussed. For example, a quotation referring to subsidiaries of the MNC got two 
different codes ‘contact with other companies’ and ‘network of the subsidiaries’ because the other 
researcher did not know the subsidiaries belonged to the same MNC. Therefore, the code was 
formulated in a more general way. As a result of this consolidation, the final codebook composed of 
35 codes. The intercoder reliability at the end of this process has not been calculated because the 
continuous adaptation of the codebook resulted in consistency in actions between researchers. In 
addition, the nature of the data and analysis did not fit with the interpretative method for which this 
reliability measure has been set up. In our research, the codes were used to describe facts and 
processes within MNCs, not to code the meaning social actors put on these processes (Neuendorf, 
2002). 
 
A second path for transparency and reliability is obtained by using quotes to support what is described 
and concluded (Silverman, 2000). So by presenting evidence in that way, readers can evaluate the 
interpretations of the researcher to come to similar findings. After all, the researcher uses particular 
theoretical and empirical knowledge to transform raw data to interpreted data. By illustrating the 
arguments with quotes in the following chapters, readers can decide whether they agree on the 
                                                          
11
 In this regard, special thanks go to Eva Jaspaert who was willing to dedicate some of her time to reflect upon 
the interpretations of the codes. 
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interpretations and the derived conclusions. Moreover, the results are also synthesised in tables and 
graphs. 
 
 
4.3.2 Validity 
 
A second dimension to evaluate the research set up, is validity. By focusing on validity, the 
accordance between employment policies at sub-national levels, social actors and transfer of pay and 
training policies and practices as intended to examine, and the collected data, is being controlled. 
Increase in this type of validity is generally obtained by including reflection on the different 
dimensions of the sample, the topic guide, the labels, the interpretation and the results (Lewis & 
Ritchie, 2007). These different steps will be reflected upon in the following paragraphs.  
 
The initial step of the methodology, constructing a representative MNC population, was a first phase 
in increasing the validity. Specifically, MNCs’ subsidiaries were screened individually to allow the 
presence of formal control mechanisms: a status of being a subsidiary or a global ultimate owner and 
the required number of employees. Based on this, the sub-national dimension was integrated based on 
the location of the subsidiaries in the region and the presence of two joint committees. Besides this, 
two different aspects needed to be checked in order to guarantee the full diversity of employment 
policies at sub-national levels and the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ 
subsidiaries in Belgium: 1) selection bias and 2) non–response (on the level of the cases and on the 
level of the sample) (King et al., 1995). In doing so, validity is maximised. 
 
To minimise the risk on selection bias, a sample consisting of present-present cases or absent-absent 
cases only should be avoided (Bennett & Elman, 2006). Indeed, the most frequently mentioned 
selection bias is found when expectations influence the process of case and respondent selection. In 
these situations, particular combinations or configurations are chosen as they support the expectations. 
The problem of selection bias was minimised in the thesis because of the way the cases have been 
selected. Specifically, selecting the cases based on the presence of at least two employment policies at 
sub-national levels did not give insight into the transfer of employment policies and practices in 
MNCs’ subsidiaries. This way, selection bias could not be introduced by the predefined propositions. 
Furthermore, as criteria only referred to the presence of joint committees and locations or regions, no 
bias was introduced by pre-selecting particular values or conditions or combinations of them (e.g. 
presence of training centres or social funds and a high level of discretion) as this information was not 
known before the data collection. Moreover, in order to prevent selection on a particular condition, 
variation in the conditions is needed. Some researchers even point to control of cases where the 
expected outcome does not occur. Research can include the contrast space, as defined by Collier and 
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Malony (1996), and offer negative cases or investigate the proposed relations based on a large number 
of cases. As the MNC population only consisted of 8 MNCs, room for adding negative cases was 
limited. However, variation among MNCs and between subsidiaries of the same MNCs has been 
observed (see chapter V: Description of the cases).  
 
However, selection bias can also be introduced by a limited access to respondents. This might have an 
influence, as the refusal to participate may be associated with the conditions inserted in the research 
set up. The latter relate to another issue, the non-response. As mentioned earlier, only 8 MNCs 
fulfilled the required criteria. They were all contacted via mail and phone, but four of them refused 
collaboration. Therefore, it is important to control to what extent, if possible, the non-response relates 
to the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. In addition, reporting 
on non-response implies investigating whether these MNCs had particular characteristics which might 
influence the transfer. As 4 MNCs refused to collaborate, access to representatives or employees and 
managers was impossible. Therefore, newspapers articles, collective agreements and company 
websites were consulted to execute the non-response analysis. Based on a comparison of the 
explanatory conditions (table 9), two factors need to be taken into account: 1) the country of origin, as 
France was mentioned twice, and 2) the total number of employees. Based on empirical literature, no 
evidence so far revealed the French business system as a distinct system leading to a particular type of 
transfer. Rather, the main differences were observed between Anglo-Saxon countries (US, UK and 
Ireland) and other European countries (Almond et al., 2005; Edwards et al., 2007). With regard to size, 
it is generally found that the number of employees worldwide is related to the number of employment 
policies and practices and the extent of discretion, centralisation and control (Kalleberg & Van Buren, 
1996; Kotey & Slade, 2005). However, although the size of non-response MNC1 and the MNCs in the 
sample differ, differences in the literature have been mainly found between small (<5000), medium 
(5000-29999) and large MNCs (30000+). This way, Packaging and MNC1 belong to the same 
category (Edwards et al., 2007b; Pulignano & Dekocker, 2014).  
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Table 9 Non-response 
 
 
Finally, next to non-response, introduced in the sample, informants or elites can also refuse to 
participate or cannot be present. The latter occurred in the case of Waste where no global HR manager 
was in place during the time of data collection. Similar for Packaging, the regional HR manager was 
interviewed instead of the global HR manager as a consequence of the restructuring processes in one 
of the business divisions. Furthermore, on the subsidiary level, the Walloon subsidiary of ICT could 
not be contacted. Information on this MNC was obtained from informants on the headquarters’ level. 
In these cases, the following question is addressed: did the semi-structured interviews allow to collect 
the full range of perspectives?. In the situation of Waste, the role of global HR manager was taken 
over by the Belgian HR managers, since Belgian operations employed most employees. A similar 
reasoning goes for the regional manager within Packaging. Only the Walloon case of ICT might cause 
a problem, since the per centage of ownership is an important condition when studying the transfer in 
MNCs’ subsidiaries. Specifically, whereas all the subsidiaries were fully owned, the Walloon case of 
ICT was only owned for 75 percent. In order to maximise capturing all dimensions, the per centage of 
ownership was integrated in the analysis afterwards. 
 
 Country of origin Sector Size MNC structure 
MNC1- FR Manufacturing Very big MNC 
195.000 employees 
- 
MNC2  FR Services Similar to packaging 
regarding employment 
figures 
70.000 employees 
Similar to packaging, 
structure is based on 5 
business divisions with 
geographic structures 
MNC3  GE Services Similar to packaging 
regarding employment 
size worldwide 
55.000 Employees 
Similar to packaging, 
structure is based on 5 
business divisions with 
geographic structures 
MNC4  NL Services Similar to ICT 
6.047 employees 
Similar to ICT, 
subsidiaries do not 
relate to business 
divisions, in one site 
more than one business 
division 
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A final way to increase validity relates to the findings by checking the interpretation that was given by 
the interviewer ,with the interviewee. Instead of reporting back to the interviewees afterwards (limited 
time in case of an elite-interview), the interpretation was added during the interviews in order to make 
sure the interviewer understood it as it was intended. A summarising statement or question was used to 
wrap up the interpretation and check with the interviewee (Silverman, 2000). 
 
 
4.3.3 Final reflections on methodology 
 
Next to the two central aspects in the evaluation of social science research as scientific, some other 
points are worth discussing more in-depth when evaluating the thesis: 1) the personal characteristics of 
the interviewee and 2) the format of the interviews, because of the qualitative nature of the research. 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Personal characteristics of the interviewee 
 
First of all, central to an elite interview is that the researcher is often willing to let the interviewee tutor 
him or her on the topic under investigation (Dexter, 2006). Vice versa, elite interviewees are eager to 
counter of give more background information on the assumptions the researcher might have. As a 
result, contrary to other types of interviews, a lot of information was provided for by the interviewee. 
Welch et al. (2002) described this as a paternal attitude for the less experienced researcher. Indeed, 
since the interviewees hold positions that give access or that participate in a process the researcher is 
interested in, they have a powerful position. During the data collection process, this unequal relation 
changed as the researchers obtained more knowledge on the topic throughout the field interviews 
(Welch et al., 2002). 
 
A second observation relates to the language used. What has been wrongly assumed at the beginning 
of the thesis, is that foreign managers are comfortable in expressing themselves in another language; 
quite the opposite was the case (Welch et al., 2002). As a consequence and in order to maximise the 
chances of collaboration, the native language of the respondents was put forward. As French and 
English were no native languages of the respondents, data gathering was expected to be more difficult 
since in-depth questioning, although well prepared, happens in a less spontaneous way. Surprisingly, 
the interviews in French and English were very elaborated because interviewees appreciated the efforts 
made by the interviewer and prepared a lot of details. For this preparation, some interviewees asked 
for the topic guide in advance. This resulted in a more structured interview, and a lot of concrete 
examples and new information was obtained during the interviews. 
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4.3.3.2 Nature of the interview 
 
Another comment relates to the way the interviews have been conducted. First of all, as mentioned 
earlier, 36 interviews with 42 respondents have been organised, meaning that in some interviews more 
than 1 respondent was present. As the presence of others influences the interview, the prescribed way 
to deal with other respondents is to include them (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Silverman, 2000). The joint 
interviews were organised with trade union representatives on company and sector level at the same 
time, as it was easier to have access to the union representative after a training or a meeting (e.g. in 
case of shift work). The influence with regard to the amount of information was not observed; it was 
rather a hierarchical relation that could be identified, meaning that union representatives were looking 
at the representative on sector level for the correct answers or for confirmation (Weiss, 1995). In these 
cases, using examples seem to be relevant to come to more general descriptions. 
 
In addition, the format of the interviews also relates to the quality of the interviews in general. As 36 
interviews have been conducted, it was likely that not every interview had the same good quality. This 
was particularly the case for interviews with managers of formerly acquired SMEs. In two interviews, 
the respondents seemed not only to be frustrated, but also mentioned the limited time available for 
conducting the interview several times and answered with ‘I already told you this’. This way, the 
interviews did not add much knowledge, they only confirmed the information found during the 
document analysis. Related to this, some interviewees, particularly the ones on the sector level (being 
representatives of trade unions and employers), tended to present the process of setting up a particular 
policy more positively (Berry, 2002). This was mainly counterbalanced by the use of probes and the 
multi-actors approach of the study. The former refer to the fact that it is less likely that respondents 
will deviate from reality when they have to give in-depth details about the transfer of pay and training 
policies and practices (Mason, 2002). Furthermore, by interviewing trade unions as well as employers, 
information of previous interviews could be checked and counter facts could be used. 
 
A final aspect is the use of retrospective questioning. For dynamic or changing employment policies, 
as assumed within our study, retrospective questioning can give an idea on different stages within the 
process of constructing employment policies. However, this should be treated with caution as 
retrospective questioning can cause recall or rationalisation or more general adaptation of the answers 
(Lewis, 2007). As with the previous comment, including multi-respondents maximised the collection 
of information on all aspects of the transfer of pay and training policies and practices. This is 
furthermore assured by the relatively short-term period they refer to. Moreover, the employment 
policies that were tackled, were still in place and (re)formed. Additional checks based on collective 
agreements and company websites were made. This way, detailed information on these employment 
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policies, on the transfer and the background characteristics of the MNC was collected. In the next 
chapter, this detailed information will be described for each MNC . 
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Chapter V: Case description 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
After having coded the data and having reflected on the different steps, the final chapter of the 
methodological part describes the key characteristics of each MNC and its subsidiaries involved. For 
each MNC, four dimensions are outlined: the background characteristics of the company worldwide, 
the characteristics of the subsidiaries in Belgium, the relevant employment policies at sub-national 
levels and the transfer of pay and training policies and practices. These four dimensions are described 
for Waste, Food, Packaging and ICT in the following paragraphs. Based on this, the finding section 
will describe configurations of how social actors shape employment policies at sub-national levels to 
mediate the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries.  
 
 
5.2 Waste 
 
5.2.1 Background characteristics of Waste worldwide: no formal management structure 
 
The first multinational company is headquartered in the UK and found in the late 19
th
 century. Next to 
its operations in the UK, Waste is present in Belgium, The Netherlands, Canada and France. The 
worldwide workforce adds up to approximately 4.000 employees and is ranked as one of the largest 
listed independent waste management companies. Waste focuses on waste collection, waste transport 
and waste treatment, and to foster this, its strategy is built on five pillars. The R&D dimension is the 
most important pillar, as it is key to the company’s growth strategy. Country specific strategies (BE, 
FR, CA, NL) can, however, slightly differ from the worldwide strategy as a consequence of legislation 
and specific national markets. The former refers to European regulation in setting standards (minimum 
standards) regarding environmental regulation which (sub-) national governments should meet or can 
add to. The latter refers to markets in terms of the number of main competitors. Accordingly, 
performance differs between host countries: the Netherlands have a leading position followed by 
Belgium, the UK (home country) and Canada.  
 
The presence of these different host countries and legislation for the main activity is, however, not 
represented in the company’s structure. At the time of the data collection there were only global 
headquarters and national subsidiaries or sites. National headquarters had not been set up. In addition, 
the host countries are not represented in the board of directors and management committees as they 
only consist of managers and directors based in UK. Similarly, on the employee sites, no general 
international structure had been set up. Particularly, a European works council had not been installed, 
although Waste meets the criteria to do this. The absence of formal structures does, however, not mean 
that global management aims at having a fragmented structure. Rather, the organisational structure is 
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the result of a fragmented acquisition process in the different countries. Therefore Waste is labelled as 
having no formal management structure. 
 
 
5.2.2 Background characteristics of Waste in Belgium: collection of former SME’s 
 
The overall fragmented structure is also present in Belgium. Specifically, Waste Belgium employs 
1.200 employees on 22 sites. This high number of sites reflects the specific historic context within 
Belgium. More specifically, Waste Belgium is the result of acquisitions of former successful Belgian 
small and medium-sized enterprises that became part of a bigger group. Therefore, the organisational 
structure is described as a collection of former SMEs. For example, the sites in the Walloon region had 
to be sold to Waste Belgium because of the monopoly position of a current competitor. Also more 
recently, a number of acquisitions was done within the Flemish region, of which the most recent one 
happened in 2008. The market has been known as fragmented as well, since only 40 percent of the 
market is owned by the four largest players, all composed by former SMEs. 
 
This structure, a collection of former SMEs, influences the way collective bargaining is organised 
within Waste Belgium. Specifically, 22 sites are clustered in four subsidiaries each having a separate 
works council and committee for prevention and protection at work (figure 10). However, the joint 
committees of former SMEs remain, resulting in a high number of joint committees within one 
subsidiary. As a consequence, it is more difficult to aim at a central uniform decision. This is 
explained by the fact that trade union representatives act in accordance to their members’ interest. For 
example, an increase in meal vouchers was proposed to be introduced for all employees as fringe 
benefit. One representative initially opposed to this, because it would affect the taxation of its 
members in an unbeneficial way. This is observed not only in trade unions but also between joint 
committees within the same trade union. Furthermore, there is a big difference between the 
subsidiaries with regard to the nature of social dialogue. The latter is explained by referring to the 
dominant trade union in the subsidiary. In Flanders, the Christian trade union accounts for the highest 
number of members, whereas in the Walloon subsidiary, the socialist trade union is the most important 
trade union. This respectively goes along with a stronger consensus-approach with management and a 
conflict model. However, the union representatives recognised the importance of a Belgian policy (at 
the time of data collection) because no site could be favoured. In addition, all trade unions agreed on 
the importance of transparency. Before, when fragmented policies were applied, it was not clear which 
criteria were used to give an employee an increase or benefit and the criterion of favouritism had been 
observed to be used.  
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At the time of data collection, the company’s structure was being transformed. This transformation 
started in 2009, aiming at a more centralised structure and approach. Because of regional legislation, 
three formal subsidiaries, one in each region resulting in Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-capital 
region, was put forward. Flanders had already been considered as one subsidiary and had one 
committee and council instead of each site having its own committee. More specifically, the structure 
of the company within Belgium is aimed at being based on regional axes where each subsidiary 
focuses on a business division or waste activity. This is part of a global strategy where the 
management aims to operate more as a single business than as a federation of companies. Working 
with one single point of contact would furthermore prevent companies from being contacted two times 
by other sites or subsidiaries executing similar activities. In addition, there sometimes was competition 
between different Waste sites. Finally, there was a need to cluster support functions. Before the 
restructuring process, local directors executed a number of similar tasks across sites (administration, 
marketing and finance). In other words, the presence of three regional directors, a national accounts 
team and a national human resources manager is seen as a first step towards a formal Waste Belgium. 
So in general, there is a trend towards centralisation which, according to the management, makes the 
company more efficient. This is supported by a system that encourages the sharing of ideas across the 
group and a new information system for comparing performance indicators between sites. However, 
the different subsidiaries were still labelled in accordance to the region and provinces in which they 
were operational. Every site had its director, who could act autonomously without guiding principles 
set by a higher hierarchical level. At the time of the data collection, only a monthly report on 
performance indicators was required.  
 
Figure 10 Structure of Waste Belgium 
 
 
 
Waste Belgium  
did not exist at time 
of data collection 
Waste Flanders 
6 sites 
+ 1 joint venture  
Waste Wallonia 1: 
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5.2.3 Employment policies at sub-national levels: full package 
 
The presence of employment policies at sub-national levels in Waste is described as a full package, 
since all the policies that were theoretically distinguished, are present. A first employment policy 
results from regional environment policies. The main activity of the company, waste collection and 
treatment, is highly regulated and, within Belgium, even regionalised. This means that in Belgium, 
three separate legislations have been set up that concern environmental issues. The Walloon region, 
for example, has been known as having the highest taxation for landfill compared to the Flemish and 
Brussels-Capital Region. Accordingly, this regionalisation affects the nature of the main activity in the 
different subsidiaries. Other activities within each region result in a regional specific profile; solid 
waste is the only activity in the whole of Belgium. In addition, the nature of waste collection causes 
Waste to be embedded within local economies. Being embedded in local economies occurs on the 
level of the municipality and on the level of the web of inter-firm relations. First of all, waste 
collection is not something that is geographically organised on a large scale. Rather, Waste has 
contracts with municipalities for waste collection. This is also reflected in the web of inter-firm 
relations where some of the sites are located. The industrial cleaning division, both for the site in 
Ghent and the site in Seraing, are located near the industry of Ghent-Zeehaven and around 
Cockerill/Arcelor Mittal. However, next to the physical presence on the sub-national level, obligatory 
training sessions are organised between regional governments and sectors. Specifically, in order to 
execute the main activity of waste collection and particularly for waste treatment, employees of all 
companies in the waste sector are required to follow a yearly training. This training is provided for by 
regional governments (setting the content of the training) and organised by the sector (practical 
organisation). 
 
Next to the regional government and the sector, the case of Waste also reflects the presence of the 
inter-firm and firm level. First of all, one site of the Walloon subsidiary is part of a web of inter-firm 
relations. The company is the leader in a consortium with two universities, two research centres and 
other private companies for developing green technologies. This consortium has been funded by the 
Walloon regional government of which the green party (Ecolo) was part, in order to develop methods 
for green waste treatment. In addition, Waste Belgium also succeeded in having a 20-year public-
private contract in the region of Wallonia. This support from the Walloon region has its origin in the 
creation of Waste in Belgium. At the time of acquisitions, the Walloon region was asked to support the 
different sites in order to keep the former SME’s operational and profitable and in order to guarantee 
employment. Within the Flemish region, the subsidiary level is also present, be it in a less positive 
way. As Waste collection is locally operational and neighbourhoods are becoming more and more 
sensitive to environmental issues, a claim against the company in Flanders was filed. As a 
consequence, the company organised meetings during which the neighbourhood was informed on the 
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way the nuisance would be treated. In addition, the company was obliged to provide evidence of 
improvements in order to keep its license. For example, the number of complaints as a consequence of 
noise during morning shifts was integrated as one of the performance indicators for blue-collar 
workers. Also the contracts on the level of the inter-municipalities were agreed on based on 
improvements. 
  
 
5.2.4 Transfer: no formal employment policy 
 
A final dimension of the Waste configuration refers to the transfer. In the case of Waste, pay and 
training policies and practices follow the overall strategy, in the sense that policies and practices adapt 
to the structure of the organisation. Accordingly, Waste is not only described as ‘no overall formal 
management structure’, but also as ‘no overall employment policies and practices’. This results in a 
high level of subsidiaries’ discretion, limited control and centralisation.  
 
The label of no formal employment policy is used because no attempts have been made by global 
managers or by Belgian directors to formalise the employment policies. At time of the data collection, 
only one attempt had been made with regard to the reward policy for all employees in Belgian 
operations. This attempt had been set up as part of the new structure Waste was evolving too. 
Specifically, the HR manager tried to make uniform remuneration instruments across operations. This 
standardisation only relates to benefits because basic income was regulated by collective agreements 
in the joint committees. For this standardisation, the HR manager made use of an initiative foreseen by 
the Belgian government, the collective labour agreement 90 which allows to give a group bonus to all 
or a specific group of employees. Initially, the goal was to install this for all the operations. However, 
conflicts between representatives along the regional axes arose. It was discussed that this collective 
bonus did not guarantee an income contrary to an increase in meal vouchers. This was further 
reinforced by the differences in joint committees. More specific, as mentioned before, members of one 
joint committee would have paid more taxes if there was an increase in meal vouchers. In addition, no 
general list of criteria on which the bonus could be based, could be made up because of the different 
nature of economic activities within the different subsidiaries and sites. As a consequence, CAO 90 
was implemented, but the criteria were determined at site level by former directors of acquired SMEs.  
 
To conclude, Waste is characterised by a limited management. Particularly, before the reforms started, 
the role of HR department was mainly administrative. No clear pay and training policies and practices 
were set up across sites. Everything that was approved for in the collective agreements, had been 
followed. In this regard, it is important to note that for what concerns job classification, the main 
competitors agreed during collective bargaining on the sector level. Specifically, the four MNCs even 
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negotiated additional functions, including less risky jobs in order to be able to pay less to employees 
on the company level. As a consequence, employees are paid less on the company level as Waste 
needed to pay at least what has been agreed upon in the collective agreements. For training policies, 
subsidiaries followed what was legally obliged. This is related to the license subsidiaries need to 
obtain in order to remain operational in the waste sector. Employees within this sector were required 
to be trained regarding safety guidelines as employers should have a license to collect and recycle 
particular types of waste. If employees did not follow these obligatory training sessions, they were not 
allowed to execute the collection and recycle of particular types of Waste. So discretion on pay and 
training policies is being transferred to the subsidiaries. This is first of all explained by the limited 
global management approach. However, even when the global or Belgian HR management would 
strive for a central policy, this would be hard to set up because national subsidiaries have access to the 
required training sessions and local directors defend their position. The latter refers to local directors 
(former owners of acquired SMEs) aimed at their autonomy; they feel part of their autonomy has been 
taken away to the upper national level. Particularly, the contrast between the period before and after 
the structural changes is clear. During this period, the UK determined the level of money to be spent 
within the different subsidiaries in Belgium. The way it was spent was not of their interest as long as 
local directors acted within the boundaries.  
 
 
5.3 Food  
 
5.3.1 Background characteristics of Food worldwide: open structure with dominant 
business division 
 
The second company was founded in the middle of the last century and operates in the food sector. It 
has 17.500 employees worldwide across 4 business divisions (in the remainder referred to as food 1-
4). However, the four divisions are not equally important. Specifically, the first division is the most 
important one as half of the employees are employed here. Furthermore, up to today, this division 
remains the most profitable one and is market leader in its segment. Moreover, the three other 
divisions are based on the first division as a consequence of the need to diversify. At the same time, 
the first business division supplies the other divisions. An important note with regard to this 
profitability and position of the first division is the European regulatory framework for production and 
competition. That is, in order to be able to cope with overproduction, in 2001, the European Union 
encouraged to stop producing on a voluntary basis. It was expected that the least efficient countries in 
the south of Europe would stop to produce. However, additional regulation was needed to make this 
happen. Consequently, additional regulation was implemented and was built up around three main 
rules:1) production should be reduced with 30 percent, 2) prices should be reduced with 30 per cent 
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and 3) European member states are not allowed to export and have to allow an import of 3 percent 
from low developing countries (LDC). Next to the European Union, the WTO also restricted the levels 
of production in order to encourage LDC to enter the market. However, the regulation did not meet the 
objectives as the crops failed and LDC did not want to export to the European Union because of price 
limitations. Consequently, there was a high demand for the product of the first business division in the 
European Union. The product demand was further reinforced by a new product, ethanol, being used as 
biogas, (booming business) and available in large amounts on the world market. Also in Food, the 
expansion of the third business division required more supplies from the first business division. All 
these dynamics result in a shortage of the main product of the first division; therefore profit was very 
high and still was at the moment of the data collection.  
 
A second characteristic of Food is its link with providers. For production and supply within each 
division, Food is highly dependent on farmers. Therefore, it has set up a close collaboration with 
neighbouring farmers in each host country and with southern American countries. The latter has been 
organised in order to guarantee resources during all seasons. This close collaboration with farmers is 
also represented in the company’s shareholder structure. Specifically, about two thirds of the 
company’s shares are owned by associations in the agricultural sector (cooperatives of farmers), which 
evolved towards 75 per cent in 2001. Moreover, as the company has its origin in Germany, it falls 
under the co-determination act. This means that the supervisory board is based on parity. The attitudes 
towards this co-determination has been described as constructive, not only towards the company’s 
growth but also in case of closures. Furthermore, as the company is operational in different European 
countries and has more than 1.000 employees within the European Union, it fulfils the criteria for the 
setup of an European Works Council. Since 1996, this council is operational within Food. At the 
moment of the data collection, 14 representatives from 8 countries were represented in the European 
works council. The open way of communication is finally reinforced by the overall management 
structure with regard to how the business divisions are organised internally and vis-à-vis other 
business division. It is a matrix structure in which employees report to and are informed by multiple 
supervisors and can learn from one another, not only within a country but also across countries. Based 
on this, the structure of Food is described as an open structure with the presence of a dominant 
business division. 
 
 
5.3.2 Background characteristics of Food in Belgium: Belgian headquarters of four 
business divisions 
 
The global structure of the MNC composing four business divisions, is also reflected in Food 
Belgium, operational since 1989. More specifically, all the four segments are present in Belgium with 
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a similar division regarding size and worldwide. The first segment (Food B1) has two operational sites 
in Belgium. It was founded in the mid-19t
h
 century as a family owned SME. From its origin, the SME 
had a lot of success in the food sector as a sharp increase in growth and the setup of different sites 
(now part of other divisions) across Belgium show. In 1987, the company became listed on the stock 
exchange, with a majority of shares still family owned. In order to remain competitive in the food 
sector however, the group of family owners decided to sell its activities to Food.  
 
From the beginning of the acquisition onwards, Food headquarters confirmed and emphasised that the 
first segment would be able to develop autonomously without changing its direction or staff. More 
specifically, the German headquarters were only interested in 51 per cent of the company’ shares 
because of its profit generating character. At the moment of data collection, the Belgian director of the 
first division was, however, German. The involvement of the German headquarters started when the 
European regulation regarding quota and prices were set up. In order to have a stronger impact on the 
strategy followed, the local managers were replaced by German managers. Along this evolution, the 
central responsibilities within the executive committee in Belgium were also changed. Specifically, to 
date, the HR function is no longer part of the executive committee in Belgium and Germany. As a 
consequence, the direct channel to impact or influence the executive committee was no longer 
available since the vice president HR was no longer a member of the supervisory board. Moreover, the 
headquarters wanted to focus on the creation of synergies for research and development with the 
formerly acquired SME. Therefore, more German presence had been installed. These synergies were 
aimed at evolving towards separate business divisions, each having another main activity. Similar to 
Food global, three business divisions are based on the first division. This is still reflected in the 
structure of Food Belgium today (figure 11), as different divisions are present in one subsidiary and 
the Belgian headquarters are located at the biggest production site of business division one (former 
SME). 
 
Next to the interconnectedness of the divisions in Food Belgium, the differences between the divisions 
and their subsidiaries not only relate to the main activity, but also to the relation with unions. 
Important to note is the division of members among the three unions. In Belgium in general, the 
Christian union has the majority of the members, followed by the socialist union and the liberal party. 
Within the first business division however, the majority of the employees is member of the liberal 
trade union. This is explained by referring to the former SME. Specifically, it was informally known 
that a member card of the liberal party was a condition to work for the company (former SME). 
Moreover, a lot of small farmers initially worked in the company next to their farming activities. 
Within Belgium in this period, a lot of self-employed people were member of the liberal party, and 
farmers became part of the liberal trade unions. The high number of members of the liberal union in 
the first and second business segment spread over different subsidiaries can be explained based on 
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this. In the subsidiaries in the Walloon region, a high number of the socialist trade unions was being 
represented as well. Although the socialist unions are generally expected to adopt a more controversial 
approach compared to the Flemish subsidiary, Food Belgium is generally characterised by a good 
relation between unions and management. This is explained by the way management dealt with the 
closure of companies because of the European regulation mentioned earlier. The company went 
through a crisis before the worldwide crisis broke out. Due to the European restrictions with reduced 
quota and prices, the company had to close operating sites in Belgium. As there already had been a 
process of differentiation, the company reformed one of the operating sites for the second business 
division. Based on this, management and unions agreed on recruiting employees of the closed units for 
the newly starting units. In addition, with regard to pay levels, the company has been known to be in 
the top 5 of best payers. Furthermore, unions confirm that being part of a bigger group has been 
beneficial. Instead of the previous SME culture where social dialogue were preferably left out of the 
company, the rules for social dialogue are followed nowadays. This does, however, not mean that 
there are no conflicts or disagreements.  
 
Despite the presence of different business divisions, the initial importance of the first business division 
for the development of Food is still reflected in the management structure and in the geographic 
locations of the subsidiaries. In practice, the office of the first business segment is the national head 
office of Food in Belgium. The support functions like HR and finance are initially organised within 
this location. More specific, the company has shared services for HR for efficiently organising training 
that are interesting for employees in different sites or subsidiaries. This means that the supporting 
functions are centralised on the level of Belgium and decentralised vis-à-vis Germany. This shared 
dimension is also present in the R&D centre of the first segment. The department not only delivers 
analyses for external customers, but also for other operating sites or subsidiaries worldwide and 
certainly for the other subsidiaries and operating sites of the same and other business divisions in 
Belgium. So at the time of data collection, there were Belgian headquarters located in the Flemish 
subsidiary and business divisions were spread across subsidiaries.  
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Figure 11 Structure of Food Belgium 
 
5.3.3 Employment policies at sub-national levels: full package 
 
Similar to Waste, employment policies at sub-national levels are described as a full package, because 
multiple policy levels are present. First of all, the management of the first business division is a 
member of the employers’ federation and one of the representatives of the employers within the board 
of directors of the sector (training centre and pension fund). The HR manager emphasised the 
importance of being part of this centre, because for collective bargaining issues, the social partners are 
the same as in other committees. Remarkable to mention is that its training centre is known as a best 
practice among companies, by offering vocational training and services like career guidance. 
 
The second characteristic is related to the main activity of the first business division and consequently 
of the other business divisions as the first one supplies the others. As previously mentioned, the 
materials needed for production should be delivered from the neighbouring agricultural sector in order 
to reduce transport costs and fresh products. To guarantee supply and production, the first business 
division is responsible for making agreements with farmers and transport companies. Depending on 
the planning, farmers are expected to deliver their products, even if they think the weather 
circumstances would improve their products. The newly created function, responsible for these 
agreements, sets prices and agreements to compensate the farmers. In addition, also for environmental 
issues business division one is in connection with sub-national non-profit organisations. Because the 
production requires a lot of water, basins that are used for agricultural activities afterwards are 
necessary . Furthermore, the first business division aims to create a feed, food and health cluster for 
the region. This is financially supported by the municipality and is possible because of the close 
collaboration with the nearest university. Against this background, a network organisation has been set 
up to bring local companies together to exchange information and experience and set up collective 
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(HR) services. The first business division is, due to its historical roots, a member of the network. The 
second business division is not initially involved as it is operational in a niche market. Accordingly it 
is important to keep R&D internal, because of potential linkages with main competitors. This second 
business division is, however, also involved in another way: it lobbied within the federal government 
to guarantee a market for its product, because the activity is sensitive to government regulation. 
Therefore, the federal government took several initiatives. After all, the creation of the second division 
would create job opportunities not only for the factory but also for the local economy, as it was highly 
dependent on a fast supply of material. Also regional governments took initiatives. The Walloon 
subsidiary of the second business division was embedded within the local environment as well. 
Because of the specific product and the innovative capacity of the Walloon subsidiary of the second 
business division, the Walloon government subsidised part of the infrastructure.  
 
 
5.3.4 Transfer: controlled discretion 
 
Despite the presence of more German directors as described above, the company in Belgium still has 2 
HR managers. One is responsible for the first, third and fourth business division on a Belgian scale 
and the second HR manager is responsible for the second division internationally. The need to create 
an additional HR manager was put forward by the first division in Belgium, as the second division has 
around 1.000 employees (majority in Belgium). Moreover, the division operates in another sector so it 
requires another HR management. In addition, contrary to the first business segment, recruitment for 
the second business segment is far more difficult since they operate within a web of inter-firm 
relations, all aiming at the same profiles. Specifically, the first business division mainly employs blue-
collar workers opposed to the second business division that mainly employs white-collar workers. 
Also the markets in which both segments have their operations, are completely different. The first 
segment is a constant market, the second one is more pioneering and has to struggle more to defend its 
position in the market. The embeddedness is less local as the material and the customers of the second 
business division are more internationally oriented. Interesting in this respect is that the R&D centre, 
and accordingly the growth of the second business division, emerged based on the first business 
division. Specifically, as a consequence of the mad cow disease, the R&D centre within food B1 was 
asked to produce an alternative for gelatine and grew as a separate business division.  
 
Independent of the business divisions, the approach of Food is generally described as controlled 
discretion because of following reason. Contrary to Waste, the limited transfer of the German 
headquarters is purposive in the sense that it does not result from the acquisition of former small and 
medium-sized enterprises with their own logic, but from an intended strategy. Although the first (also 
responsible for the third and fourth business division regarding employment) and second segment have 
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German directors in their supervisory board, they are left quite autonomously regarding employment 
policy. The profitability of the business division, certainly the first division in Belgium, was initially 
part of an increased interest from Germany. However, it also played a major role for discretion as the 
subsidiary in the first business segment has 80 per cent of the market. An example of this autonomy is 
the following: the German headquarters wanted to install an HR tool which would require more 
fulltime employees in the HR department. Because HR administration is outsourced in Belgium, local 
HR managers showed German directors the implication of the new HR tool in Belgian operations 
because of Belgian social law. After this consultation, the HR tool was not implemented but the 
Belgian system was applied in other sites. A kind of reverse diffusion took place. Apart from the 
profitable position of the site, two other explanations are formulated in this regard. First of all, the 
Belgian subsidiary tempted to be very proactive, in particular the Belgian headquarters. They do not 
directly or explicitly contest new proposals. However, as they assume that there is a tendency to 
influence processes, they try to change as much as possible as in accordance with the way it is done in 
Belgium. In other words, the Belgian headquarters try to influence by anticipating. This way, it 
prevents that something is installed or that more German directors are ‘dropped’ as a consequence of 
explicit contesting, as is the case in other countries of the group. A third explanation is the use of 
consultants. As consultants are operational in other German companies, they experience that Food is 
not professionally organised with regard to employment issues. By pointing this out during 
conversations with consultants, they are encouraged to emphasise more professionalised proposals 
within the board in Germany. This resulted in the involvement of the Belgian HR manager in more 
general projects. For example, the German headquarters wanted to be an international group and 
Belgian operations emphasised the need to develop an international on-boarding program. 
 
The approach within Food can be described as controlled discretion when considering the relation 
between the German headquarters and the Belgian subsidiaries. However, it is quite centralised within 
Belgium. The need for a uniform Belgian policy is explained by referring to one workforce working 
for the same company and the fact that one cannot have other working conditions depending on the 
locations negotiated by the representatives. In addition and as mentioned earlier, shared services, an 
indication of control, are installed at the Belgian headquarters. A uniform Belgian policy however, is 
not preferred. Specifically, training and pay policies are differently organised because of the above 
mentioned differences between the divisions. For training, employees of the first business division can 
make use of the well-developed training centre of the food sector for blue-collar workers. For white-
collars, they can make use of the training centre across sectors or shared services. For higher profiles 
of the second business division, internal training sessions are organised. Regarding performance 
related pay, the first business division uses of the sector classification. Similar to training, the second 
business division uses an internal classification.  
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5.4 Packaging  
 
5.4.1 Background characteristics of Packaging worldwide: structure based on centralised 
business divisions 
 
The third company, Packaging, is headquartered in Sweden and employs about 44.000 employees 
worldwide in the paper industry. The company’s organisation is based on two axes. First of all, there is 
a functional segmentation, meaning that there is a division based on (a group of) products. Four 
business divisions are present in the company. In addition, these business divisions are organised 
geographically. Apart from the national level, there is a supra-national level (e.g. European, Asian or 
American level), a global level for the division and a company level. This top-down approach occurs 
within every business division. Moreover managers on the same level across different business 
divisions do, however, not have contact within one country. Accordingly, decisions within one 
business division do not affect decisions in another business division. Therefore the structure of 
Packaging is described as a structure based on centralised business divisions. A cross- national 
structure is present on employee level, in terms of a European works council. This council not only 
functions as an instrument to inform and consult the workers representatives, it also aims at creating a 
common corporate culture and at decreasing the national differences between the representatives. 
 
Although the business divisions are structured similarly, they differ in terms of competitive position. 
In general, the company has a strong leading position within its main market Western Europa, and 
Northern America and is now evolving within emerging markets as Eastern Europa, Asia and Russia. 
Growth is, however, mainly based on acquisitions and organic growth within the second, third and 
fourth business segment. Moreover, the group emphasised investments in the innovative ability of the 
second business division. Based on this, customer needs can be dealt with at the bottom and be spread 
more generally throughout the group. Complementary to its focus on innovation, the company 
strategically focuses on developing strong brands within this second business division. Contrary to 
this, the first business area is characterised by disinvestment. At the time of data collection, this 
division was in a process of acquisition by a British multinational.  
 
 
5.4.2 Background characteristics of Packaging in Belgium: strongly differing subsidiaries 
 
Within Belgium, three business divisions are represented by one subsidiary each, located in Flanders, 
Brussels and Wallonia (figure 12). The Brussels subsidiary is responsible for sales in the second and 
third business divisions and the Walloon subsidiary therefore manages both divisions together. 
Whereas the first business area was in a process of merger during data collection, the other two are 
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described as very profitable. This is explained by the completely different economic conditions and 
the history of the business divisions.  
 
Since its origin, the second division was part of a pilot project implementing new procedures and 
policies, and as such has been part of the group since the start of Packaging Belgium. This does not 
mean that the second division has no competitors. Quite the contrary is true for this business division: 
it struggles to remain one of the pilot companies implementing and testing new methods of working 
structure within Packaging. This constant investment in new procedures and methods is very important 
in order to remain the market leader in a market where competitors use similar work procedures and 
where price setting is tight. Remarkable in this regard is that the majority of the competition comes 
from other subsidiaries in the same business area. This internal competition is caused by the presence 
of international clients and the short distance between subsidiaries (the German subsidiary in the same 
business division is only 90 kilometres away). In addition, this subsidiary is characterised by a good 
relation between subsidiary’s social actors. A transparent employment policy is explanatory in this 
regard. For example, the subsidiary’s management communicates the per centage of the bonus already 
achieved on a monthly basis. 
 
The first business division on the contrary, has already been part of many large groups; it was acquired 
by a British group at the time of the data collection. The first division consisted of two separate sites. 
Both were acquired from other multinational groups and employed 340 employees in total. These sites 
do only exist as one legal entity. In doing so, potential customers have one single point of contact 
because the different sites have complementary products. Depending on the client’s request, the 
production will happen in a particular site. The differences between the sites, however, are strongly 
emphasised by the employees, and therefore the first business division, the Flemish subsidiary, can 
hardly be considered as a whole. Specifically, before being part of a big group, one site was a family 
business whereas the other part had always been owned by a multinational group. Besides this 
difference in origin, the company culture and the preferred working conditions strongly differ among 
sites: employees in one site prefer to have more holidays whereas the other site prefer to have higher 
wages. The management already tried several times to converge both sites, but they were not 
successful.  
 
Similar in all sites of the first business division, is the conflictual relation between management and 
trade unions. This is partially explained by the high level of unionisation. Approximately 90 per cent 
of the employees in the first business division is unionised. Furthermore, as the sector in which the 
company is operational, is very intense, production is under constant pressure. For example, the 
precarious situation in this business area is represented by numerous acquisitions of sites in the first 
business division and the collective agreement on employment and job security. Specifically, because 
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of a loss of profit due to strikes, a collective agreement was set up in order to prevent work 
interruption. This would further prevent the loss of clients going to other suppliers in case of work 
interruption, and the competitive position of the first business division. In return, employees asked for 
security after having been confronted with a number of restructuring processes in the past. In 2005, 
one site had already closed and in 2009 once again, 2.200 employees from this business area 
worldwide were dismissed because of restructuring purposes.  
 
Figure 12 Structure of Packaging Belgium 
 
5.4.3 Employment policies at sub-national levels: limited presence of employment 
policies at the sector level 
 
The sub-national dimension for the Packaging case is limited. Contrary to the Food and Waste cases, a 
regional government does not provide for the required training necessary to execute the main activity. 
In addition, regional governments do not support exchanges between companies. For Packaging, only 
the sector level is of any importance. Services on the sector level are limited, however, because 
members only partially agree on the usefulness of collective services. The composition in terms of 
SMEs of the sector is explanatory for the absence of collective services. They are considered to be 
threatening for the majority of the sector in Flanders and Wallonia: employees sharing information is 
not advantageous in a tight market where companies deliver the same products and use similar 
procedures and production techniques. Therefore employment policies at sub-national levels are 
described as limited presence of employment policies at the sector level. 
 
 
 
Packaging  
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5.4.4 Transfer: centralisation with limited space for manoeuvre 
 
The approach towards the subsidiaries is described as a strong hierarchical structure. Similar to the 
organisational structure, there is a global, supra-national and Belgian HR manager for the first and 
second business division. As sales are only present in the third business division, sales people are 
managed together with the Walloon region. In general, there is a high level of centralisation and 
headquarters control. However, both local managers emphasise that this strong centralisation does not 
prevent them from being innovative or from developing their own employment policy or specific local 
instruments or tools. There are indeed general values and a mission that are expected to be reflected in 
the way the policy is set up. Depending on the national legislative context, other instruments are , 
however, more interesting to set up. The structure and the approach versus the subsidiaries is 
centralised, with a local focus only to stimulate reverse diffusion.  
 
With regard to employment policies, the general worldwide policy is set up within each division. For 
example for performance related pay, the group level decided which criteria have to be involved. At 
the subsidiary level, subsidiaries’ management transforms these criteria into a collective bonus policy 
(as a specific kind of collective labour agreement (CAO 90) on performance related pay in Belgium). 
Higher organisational levels determine the level of pay, but how it is distributed locally, remains the 
responsibility of local management. The local influence on the pay policy is most visible when looking 
at fringe benefits, since they are highly dependent on the legislation of the different countries in which 
subsidiaries of business areas are operational. The pay budget has been determined globally. The only 
guideline given, is that is should contribute to the companies’ activity. However, training policies 
within the first business division are rather limited. After all, training and learning is one of the first to 
suffer from disinvestment when a company is in a tight market and struggling to maintain its position. 
Based on the importance of higher organisational levels in setting the outlines for pay and training 
policies and practices and the fact that discretion mainly occurs to encourage reverse diffusion, the 
transfer is described as centralisation with limited space for manoeuvre. 
 
 
5.5 ICT 
 
5.5.1 Background characteristics of ICT worldwide: fast growing company, hierarchical 
structure 
 
The fourth and final company is a Belgian owned company operational in the ICT sector. As the 
company has Belgian owners, background characteristics of ICT and ICT Belgium are described 
together. ICT is first of all, compared to the other MNCs in the study, rather new as MNC. The initial 
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company has been set up 20 years ago as a collection of former SMEs. These SMEs were private 
companies and two of them were set up as public institutions for data management. The evolution to 
becoming an MNC only started in 2011 when a newly acquired company joined. As ICT unites former 
take-overs and SMEs, an integration process needed to be set up because similar activities were being 
executed. As ICT has only recently obtained its multinational character, its focus on the neighbouring 
countries does not come as a surprise. Specifically, ICT currently focuses on the Benelux and Eastern 
Europe. This is reinforced by the request of the ‘acquired’ customers: the local clients want their data 
management close by.  
 
To serve these local customers, ICT is organised in 4 business divisions and nowadays employs 1.600 
people (figure 13). As the company is the result of organic growth and acquisitions, the four business 
divisions reflect the main activities of former small and medium-sized enterprises. Specific for these 
business divisions, is that they are not attached to one geographical location. In other words, profit 
cannot be compared between sites or subsidiaries but only between business divisions. ICT is built up 
by several workplaces, like flexible offices in which employees from different divisions work on a 
particular project. The same divisions can also be represented in other sites. During the time of the 
data collection, there was not much communication between the sites. The only means of 
communication was the report on performance indicators. Moreover, the difference between 
employees working in the headquarters and employees within the different initial SMEs was still 
present. This is reflected in the way the headquarters are seen by the employees. For former SMEs an 
absence of trust has been observed because of a lack of transparency regarding labour conditions. In 
addition, the tendency towards integration is also seen as alienating, because directors are not present 
in the subsidiaries and communication is reduced to a minimum. Put differently, measurements and 
policies were considered as developed in the headquarters without considering the sites. Against this 
background, it is surprising that only 20 per cent of the workforce is unionised (and this is decreasing). 
For the social elections, for example, positions were hard to fill in. Consequently and in general it can 
be stated that there is no involvement of trade unions, only legal obligations are communicated. ICT 
can thus be described as a recent developed MNC with a hierarchical structure. 
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Figure 13 Structure of ICT  
 
5.5.2 Employment policies at sub-national levels: relevant employment policies at sub-
national levels only at the headquarters’ level 
 
As ICT is a Belgian owned MNC, it was expected that it would be far more linked with different 
employment policies at sub-national levels. However the sub-national dimension is mainly present for 
the headquarters. This is first of all reflected in the historical sharing of infrastructure with the 
province. Specifically, the province and current headquarters (former public company) had a similar 
evolution over the past 20 years. That is, ICT and the province underwent a process of modernisation. 
In addition, IT services of the municipality and province had also been outsourced to ICT. 
Furthermore, there is a close collaboration between the company headquarters and the universities 
with regard to hiring graduates. That is, ICT headquarters organise summer schools for recruitment 
reasons. Well-performing students are given the opportunity to come to a one-week recruitment 
seminar during their summer holidays in order to be hired by the company. This is part of a systematic 
approach for universities, meaning that the possibilities are shown through guest lectures, company 
visits and internships. The aim of these contacts is to enable ICT to identify the most promising 
students. However, these initiatives are only set up within the environment where the headquarters are 
located, not where the different sites are vested. Therefore the employment policies at sub-national 
levels are described as relevant sub-national levels only at headquarters level. 
 
 
5.5.3 Transfer: hierarchy and centralised control for fully owned subsidiaries 
 
Regarding pay and training policies and practices, the relation between headquarters and subsidiaries 
within Belgium is described as centralised. The foreign subsidiaries still operate quite autonomously 
but the aim is to integrate them in ICT. As a part of this integration process, the company already 
started to set up a company Flanders with one works council. The Walloon subsidiary still operates in 
a rather independent way because of the shareholder structure. Contrary to the subsidiaries in Flanders, 
the company has 75 per cent of the shares compared to 100 per cent for the subsidiaries in Flanders. 
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One subsidiary in Eastern Europe is a joint venture. So during the period of data collection there was 
an HR manager with responsibilities limited to Flanders; the responsible persons for the different 
subsidiaries report to her. Both the foreign subsidiaries and the one in the Walloon region are part of a 
future integration process. Therefore, at the time of the data collection, the HR manager for Belgium 
has been visiting these subsidiaries in order to implement the procedures used in Belgium. It concerns 
job classification, evaluation systems and remuneration. 
  
With regard to the period of integration, the transfer of these pay and training policies and practices 
differs between sites. The initiative regarding pay on the one hand and training policy on the other 
hand has been developed within the Belgian headquarters. All procedures and systems developed are 
offered to the other subsidiaries as service. In some of them the transfer goes quite easily as local HR 
managers are asking for systems and procedures themselves. In other cases, the transfer is more 
difficult. According to the Belgian HR management, two explanations are important in this regard: the 
presence of the former CEO and the per centage of ownership. The former refers to the delegation of 
autonomy towards the headquarters, since the former founder still is the director of the subsidiary. As 
such, the transfer of pay and training policies and practices will be difficult or even blocked. The latter 
refers to the fit with other owners where no shared interests on employment are present; in this case 
the transfer of pay and training policies and practices is more likely to be inhibited. Based on this, ICT 
is described as a company with centralised control at headquarters’ level, particularly if the subsidiary 
is fully owned.  
 
So, the decision-making role for pay and training policies and practices is centralised within Belgium 
and is transferred across countries. The presence of international clients asked for this initiative. 
Specifically, ICT needs to have comparable functions everywhere if international teams are required. 
If ICT has, for example, an international client operating across countries, the goal is to have mixed 
teams, for example 5 located in Belgium and 5 in Eastern Europa. Therefore, it is necessary to have 
the same job classification, enabling employees to understand each other’s’ responsibilities during 
common projects. The process of standardisation regarding job classification has been set up 
internationally in this regard. The operations in Eastern Europe, will be ‘copy paste’ of the practices in 
Belgium.  
 
This does not mean that the local market is left out. A similar benchmark study is done for Eastern 
Europe as well. This mainly relates to fringe benefits. For example, generally a car is not given to 
employees, while this is the case in Belgium because of the beneficial tax policy at the time of the data 
collection. This means that it is not a blind and complete copy paste. Labour markets are different as 
well. As Eastern European countries are far less confronted with a lack of IT graduates, compensation 
and benefits differ. Small adaptations within the job classification system are possible because of the 
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need to remain competitive. For what concerns training, the centralisation tendency differs slightly as 
a centralised training policy was still being developed. Specifically, at the moment of the data 
collection, there was a formal and an informal policy. The latter refers to the possibility of employees 
to ask their superior to be able to attend a training. The formal aspect is aimed at systematising these 
initiatives. When, for example, a large group of employees want to follow a particular training, the 
training will be organised internally but not necessary by internal trainers. ICT uses both public and 
private partners for training depending on its specificity. The unions were not involved in the training 
policy, they just monitor or check whether the days, as foreseen in the collective agreement, are taken 
up.  
 
After having described all background characteristics, employment policies at sub-national levels and 
the transfer of pay and training policies and practices of each MNC (table 10), the next part (Part III) 
will integrate all the information to investigate configurations between these three dimensions. 
Specifically, Part III contains four chapters investigating following questions: 
 
 Chapter VI: How do subsidiaries’ social actors shape employment policies at sub-national levels? 
 Chapter VII: How do employment policies at multiple sub-national levels affect centralisation, 
headquarters’ control and subsidiaries’ discretion? 
 Chapter VIII: How do employment policies at multiple sub-national levels affect headquarters-
subsidiary configurations and subsidiaries’ roles? 
 Chapter IX: Do subsidiaries’ social actors mediate the transfer of pay and training policies and 
practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries by shaping employment policies at multiple sub-national levels? 
 
 
Table 10 Overview of MNCs’ main characteristics 
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Part III: Findings 
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The third part will use the case studies as described above to investigate configurations of employment 
policies at sub-national levels, subsidiaries’ social actors and the transfer of pay and training policies 
and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Specifically, the general research question, do social actors shape 
employment policies at multiple sub-national levels to mediate the transfer of pay and training policies 
and practices, is split up into two research propositions: 1) subsidiaries’ social actors shape 
employment policies at sub-national levels if there are resources at these multiple levels to align these 
policies with their aims 2) employment policies at sub-national levels will affect the transfer of pay 
and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries if these policies affect MNCs’ competitive 
advantage. To investigate the first proposition, the first chapter of the findings (Chapter VI) will 
investigate how subsidiaries’ social actors shape employment policies at multiple sub-national levels. 
Employment policies and resources will be observed on four distinct levels, but not always in the way 
expected: the regional, the sector, the web of inter-firm relations and the company level. Specifically, 
for the regional and company level, informal relations between employers and politicians and between 
employees and employers were also found to be used as resources. Thereafter, the second (chapter 
VII) and third chapter (VIII) of the findings section will build upon these findings by investigating 
how these employment policies at sub-national levels affect the transfer of pay and training policies 
and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Within these chapters, following previous studies on the topic, a 
distinction is made between headquarters’ control, centralisation and subsidiaries’ discretion, and 
headquarters-subsidiary configurations. As the focus on employment policies at multiple sub-national 
levels assumes divergent pay and training policies and practices at the subsidiary level, the business 
system approach and the resource-based view are respectively used as a theoretical point of departure 
within chapters VII and VIII (see Chapter I, p.33, table 2). The part on the findings ends with a 
summarising chapter (chapter IX) answering the main research proposition by making use of the 
theoretical frameworks and the case study evidence of chapters VI, VII and VIII.  
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ChapterVI: How do social actors 
shape employment policies at 
multiple sub-national levels?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on : 
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Dekocker, V. (in press ). When do social actors shape sub-national employment policies? Economic 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates when subsidiaries’ social actors (employees and employers and their 
representative organisations) shape employment policies at multiple sub-national levels. The chapter, 
based on literature presented in chapter I, argues that there are two key factors influencing their ability 
to contribute in constructing employment policies at multiple sub-national levels: 1) the presence of 
resources at these sub-national levels and 2) the complementarity between these levels. In other words, 
subsidiaries’ social actors engage in these levels if there are resources available at multiple sub-
national levels that enable them to shape these policies in line with their aims. Adapted or newly 
formed policies in turn offer resources to subsidiaries’ social actors to engage in these levels. So a 
continuous interaction between subsidiaries’ social actors and employment policies at multiple sub-
national levels is assumed. Consequently, the extent of social actors’ engagement depends on the 
specific historical development of the sub-national levels and the role taken up by social actors within 
this development.  
 
In order to investigate how social actors within MNCs contribute to employment policies at sub-
national levels, the remainder of chapter is organised as follows. First this chapter briefly repeats how 
employment policies at sub-national levels have been defined. Thereafter it considers theoretically 
how social actors in MNCs can contribute to the shaping of employment policies at sub-national 
levels. Based here on, the next section formulates propositions for the Belgian case. Following that, 
the amount of diversity found with regard to the subsidiaries’ social actors and their roles will be 
described. To conclude, the chapter briefly presents some concluding remarks to take into account.  
 
 
6.2 Employment policies at sub-national levels and social actors within 
MNCs 
 
6.2.1 What are employment policies at sub-national levels? 
 
Based on studies in economic geography, studies focusing on institutional variance and the specific 
Belgian institutional context, the study distinguishes between three types of employment policies at 
sub-national levels: regional employment policies, inter-firm employment policies and company 
specific employment policies (Crouch et al., 2009; Lane & Wood, 2009). Each of these policies and 
their evolution will be described in turn. 
 
Regional employment policies. As described earlier, regional employment policies refer to formal 
constitutions or regulations applicable in a particular area or territory (Lane & Wood, 2009). Regional 
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policy is hereby considered as a political construction closely connected to national politics (Trigilia, 
1991). In this respect, it is an intermediate regulatory level between the national and the local level 
(e.g. provinces and municipalities). Its aim is to contribute to the economic development of a 
particular region within a country (Halkier & Danson, 1997). Consequently employment policies 
between regions can differ and other socio-economic profiles arise with varying priorities in each 
region. These other profiles are particularly the case when regional governments are influenced by 
interest groups or social actors within MNCs (Trigilia, 1991). Accordingly differing regional contexts 
and employment policies will in turn increase divergence between regions (Lane & Wood, 2009; 
Phelps et al., 2003; Trigilia, 1991). 
 
Inter-firm employment policies. The second level, inter-firm employment policies refer to informal 
employment policies within industrial districts, local production systems, regional economies or 
territorial clusters. These policies are typically set up by agglomerations of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME). Key to these agglomerations is the specialisation in a particular industry sector and 
the presence of cooperation based on tacit knowledge and informal social norms (Beccatini, 1990; 
Pyke & Sengenbenger,1992). This specialisation is supported by employment policies that focus on 
internal labour market issues such as good labour conditions, training and aspects of flexibility 
(Crouch et al., 2009). So policies at this level are valuable in encouraging companies’ growth and 
development through differentiation and specialisation (You & Wilkinson, 1994). As such, they foster 
a high level of innovation and adaptive capacity to changing environments encouraged by internal 
labour markets. In this respect, policy-making at the inter-firm level had long been considered as an 
alternative form to the fordist mode of production. (Sforzi, 2002). Inter-firm employment policies have 
indeed been observed to emphasise internal labour market as being important in the development of 
this adaptive capacity (Del Ottati, 2002).  
 
Company-specific employment policies. Finally, company-specific employment policies function at 
the subsidiary level. They can be shaped by collective agreements, works councils and co-
determination rights in the host country (Almond et al., 2005). Deviation from prescribed policies can 
be the result of the prior existence of local policies that have survived over time (Lane & Wood, 
2009). Indeed, subsidiaries can be former SMEs in which the employment policies of the previously 
independent company remain. This occurs because of their ability to attract and keep employees (Lane 
& Wood, 2009). In addition management and trade unions in high performing subsidiaries can 
leverage this performance quality to advocate for a particular employment policy (Anderson et al., 
2007; Pulignano, 2006).  
 
Two remarks can be made regarding these three employment policies at sub-national levels. These 
three levels are first of all interlinked as subsidiaries are operating in a given regional government and 
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belong to a particular inter-firm level. Similarly clusters of companies can be located in more than one 
regional government. The occurrence of cross-border clustering depends however on the way the 
political and socio-economic borders are reinforcing one another. Specifically, if political borders 
coincide the socio-economic ones, cross-border ties are few and companies will cluster in one regional 
government. If this is not the case, networks have been found to operate across borders (Strihan, 
2008). Second, these three levels are not static so employment policies at sub-national levels can and 
do evolve over time. Regional employment policies for example are in many cases no longer 
considered as an intermediate level but as the primary policy-making level (Burroni, 2014; Hudson, 
2007). Indeed in many European countries, a delegation of responsibility from the national state 
towards lower political levels with regard to employment policies has been observed (Cognard, 2011). 
This trend is supported by the increasing presence of regional development agencies designed to 
promote indigenous economic development. The latter occurs through additional means like advice, 
financial support and infrastructure (Burroni, 2014; Halkier & Danson, 1997). So the study of regional 
employment policies must encompass the political parties involved in the regional government but 
also governmental agencies. 
 
In addition, the original definition of inter-firm employment policies has been challenged as MNCs 
also gained access to these clusters (Coro & Grandinetti, 2001). As a result, SMEs were no longer the 
only corporate participants at the inter-firm level. Furthermore, within this change, only a part of the 
production process remained endogenous as external products and services entered the inter-firm level. 
However the companies actively involved at the inter-firm level generally remain quite close to each 
other geographically. Specifically, despite modern IT facilities, informal interaction between 
entrepreneurs occurs more often when they are near each other, thus enhancing the diffusion of 
employment policies (Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez, 2008). In addition, access to 
employment services reduces the cost of looking for new ideas, knowledge or other relevant 
information (Coro & Grandinetti, 2001; Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez, 2008; Pyke & 
Sengenberger, 1992). This convenient access is particularly important as employees are the least 
mobile production factor within companies (Meyer et al., 2011; Ter Wal & Boschma, 2011). 
Furthermore, the notion of trust among companies remains strong at the inter-firm level. The nature of 
institutions to install trust evolved however. More formal institutions like training institutions, 
knowledge exchange or information have been set up in order to reflect their common interest 
(Molina-Morales &Martinez-Fernandez, 2008). So the inter-firm employment policies are still largely 
characterised by internal labour markets for geographically clustered groups of companies, even 
though their common institutions have become more formalised and larger companies are part of the 
inter-firm level as well. 
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Finally the company-specific level has also been subjected to change. Systems of collective bargaining 
in many countries have lost their previous inclusiveness. Indeed, employment policies have been 
observed to be fragmented and segmented. The latter is caused by an increasing importance of the 
company level for negotiation rather than more collectively (Holst, 2013). In addition the normative 
character of labour institutions has changed as they are increasingly seen as voluntary organisations 
(Holst, 2013). As such, company-specific employment policies have greater potential to become 
diversified. The above paragraphs clearly illustrate that the three employment policies have changed 
over time. Specifically, regional employment policies overall have become more elaborated, inter-firm 
employment policies have become more formalised and company-specific employment policies have 
become more fragmented. The evolution of policies at these levels results from a continuous 
interaction between these policy levels and social actors. How this interaction is assumed to take 
place, will be described in greater detail in the next section.  
 
 
6.2.2 Dynamic sub-national levels 
 
In this chapter, the aim is to investigate how social actors within the spheres of capital, labour and 
finance shape employment policies at sub-national levels (Amable & Palombarini, 2008; Crouch et al., 
2009; Morgan, 2009). Changes in employment policies are hereby expected to be produced by 
endogenous social actors operating within different path-dependent systems (Crouch & Farrell, 2004). 
More specifically, social actors behave as institutional entrepreneurs to cope with changing demands 
and expectations from the environment in which they are operational (Crouch, 2005). Consequently, 
other employment policies at sub-national levels or combinations of policies emerge. 
 
These (combinations of) policies are however not just the result of social actors shaping the 
institutional environment in line with their aims. Rather they imply a creative reinterpretation of 
resources at the sub-national levels by social actors within MNCs (Heidenreich, 2012). Endogenous 
creation of employment policies at sub-national levels is then rooted in the levels themselves as actors 
use their resources (like seats on the advisory boards of regional development agencies or the system 
of collective bargaining) to influence policy development (Musyck, 1995). The result is the creation of 
employment policies which in return shape MNCs’ activities (transfer in MNCs). Furthermore newly 
or adapted policies provide the actors with additional resources to reshape employment policies 
(Gibbon et al., 2008; Hervas-Olliver & Albors-Garrigos, 2007). Cantwell et al. (2010) refer in this 
respect to co-evolution between the aims of social actors and policies at sub-national levels. Core to 
this co-evolution is the continuous interaction between their value adding activities and the policies 
that sustain these activities. 
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Engagement in employment policies at sub-national levels does however, not depend on the presence 
of specific resources at one level. Even if a policy at one sub-national level offers limited resources, 
engagement in policies at sub-national policies is possible because of employment policies at 
complementary sub-national levels. In this respect, employment policies are expected to be 
complementary if there are aspects of two or more levels that enhance and maintain one another. This 
occurs through a reinforcing or compensating effect for each other or for the national level. This 
means respectively that the multiple levels are compatible or that one level is somehow supplementary 
and makes up for the deficiencies of the other (Deeg, 2009; Lane & Wood, 2009). In addition, 
complementarity between levels can be observed only if it contributes to social actors’ employment 
aims. As such these policies influence the strategic choices of social actors. If this is not the case, 
actors will not express their engagement in employment policies at sub-national levels (Deeg, 2009; 
Reid & Musyck, 2000).  
 
Based here on subsidiaries’ social actors (employees and employers and their representative 
organisations) are expected to engage at a given sub-national level when the specific historical context 
enables the social actors to have resources by which to intervene at the level. In addition, it is expected 
that high levels of engagement will be observed when multiple resources are complementary- that is, 
that the engagement will allow them to set up the employment policies that they desire to establish 
(Meyer et al., 2011). The next paragraph will briefly repeat the employment policies at sub-national 
levels in Belgium and how they offer resources enabling social actors to become engaged. As 
previously mentioned, the inter-firm level is hereby understood in two dimensions: the sector level and 
the web of inter-firm relations. 
 
 
6.2.3 Employment policies at sub-national levels in Belgium 
 
The Belgian institutional context can be described in terms of employment policy levels at four 
distinct levels each offering social actors resources to engage at these levels. They will be described 
one after the other. State reforms result first of all in the creation of three regional governments. 
Specifically, these governments are responsible for the creation of regional training bodies (public as 
well as private), regional incentives to promote vocational training of some target groups or regional 
training cheques for companies. Also the content of obligatory training sessions for specific economic 
activities are regionally determined. In order to set up these initiatives, regional government are 
supported by regional development agencies. These agencies compose of an advisory board based on 
parity meaning that representatives of both employers and employees are represented. As the number 
of agencies, committees and advisory boards has increased with state reforms, more resources have 
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been given to social actors. Therefore, social actors are expected to shape employment policies if they 
are represented on these advisory boards.  
 
Secondly, the inter-firm level entails employment policies at the level of the sector. All these 
institutions of the sector, be it training institutions or social funds have similar structures to those of 
the regional governments. So social actors can shape this level too if they are the representatives for 
the sector on the advisory boards of training centres and social funds. Thirdly, a second form of inter-
firm employment policies results from clusters around locations of shared economic interest. These 
inter-firm policies can be supported by regional policies. Specifically the latter can project future 
needs and designate funding for innovative employment measures in order to address the shortages of 
skilled employees within these webs of inter-firm relations (Musyck, 1995; Reid & Musyck, 2000). 
How these employment policies within webs of inter-firm relations are determined depend heavily on 
the presence of a leading firm. The type of firm (most of the time a MNC) is found to be frequently in 
charge of dividing up the resources (Gibbon et al., 2008). In this respect, subsidiaries’ social actors are 
expected to shape employment policies within the web of inter-firm relations.  
 
Finally on the company level, three mechanisms, the works council, committee for prevention and 
safety at work and union representative, can be used. The two former mechanisms are based on parity. 
This means that the social actors can use them to shape employment policies in accordance with their 
aims. Alternatively, social actors can also bypass the resources, particularly the ones that are part of 
the system of collective bargaining and industrial relations. In these cases, other policy domains are 
put forward to install particular employment policies. Above mentioned levels, however, are not 
independent of each other. Regional governments can support sectors or webs of inter-firm relations in 
achieving desired employment policies. The company level can add to what has been agreed upon at 
the level of the joint committee. In this way, it is expected that resources at sub-national levels alone 
will not fully explain the extent of actors’ engagement. Complementarity between levels also explains 
how social actors shape employment policies at sub-national levels. Followings paragraphs will 
investigate how the presence of resources at multiple levels are used to shape employment policies. 
The first section describes resources and strategies of subsidiaries’ social actors. The second part 
reports on common patterns or configurations within MNCs.  
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6.3 How do subsidiaries’ social actors shape employment policies at sub-
national levels? 
 
6.3.1 Within case study analysis- resources at sub-national levels  
 
The observations of resources at multiple sub-national levels in our case studies varied. The cases 
Food and Waste illustrated the presence of resources at multiple sub-national levels to engage at these 
levels. For ICT the opposite was found, no resources at sub-national levels were observed. Packaging 
was an intermediate case, there are some resources at sub-national levels used but not to the extent of 
Food and Waste. The cases will be discussed individually.  
 
Waste-resources at multiple sub-national levels. As previously described, Waste is a UK-owned 
company operating in the waste collection and treatment sector. It comprises former SMEs clustered 
in a Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-based subsidiary and employs mainly blue-collar workers. Not 
only does the former SMEs’- character link Waste closely to the sub-national levels, but so also does 
the main activity. Specifically, waste collection is organised within villages and cities as well as in 
webs of inter-firm relations. Accordingly the sub-national dimension is emphasised because of the 
contracts with local governments and companies. Every two years, these contracts are renegotiated and 
Waste must compete with three other MNCs for the new contract. Therefore, the initial aim of the 
Belgian employment policy is to (re) train employees in order to execute the main activity and prevent 
work interruptions. For this all employees need to follow obligatory vocational training sessions for 
employees working in this sector. Put it differently if employees of Waste do not attend the sessions, 
they are not allowed to work like any other blue- collar worker in the sector. As vocational training is 
one of the policy domains that have become regionalised through state reforms, regional governments 
and their agencies are responsible for organising the obligatory sessions. The boards of these agencies 
are based on parity and therefore it is expected that social actors engage at this level. However 
employers’ federations also apply informal means for engagement. These informal resources build 
upon personal relations of trust with politicians that sometimes remain for more than one government. 
In this respect, employers’ federation become a resource actively involved in shaping the organisation 
of vocational training because of its informal relations:  
 
‘For us it is much more efficient to go to a Cabinet, as we know the employees, or the minister. If we 
can convince them, it will be approved. This means that you do not work through parliament, no, we 
have contacts with several parliamentarians and that enables us to raise issues in parliament if we 
find a Minister is not sufficiently answering our letters. So yes a lot of energy is invested in the 
relationships with cabinets and personal contacts, all behind the scenes. And through these contacts 
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behind the scenes, occasionally, relationship of trust is created (Waste, Representative of employers’ 
federation). 
 
So vocational training is a regionalised policy domain where the employers’ federations of Waste are 
influential. In this way, the sector level is already involved. Moreover these vocational training 
sessions are in reality organised in collaboration with the sector where the employers’ federations is 
responsible for organising them. In this respect, two levels (the regional government and the joint 
committee) are observed to be complementary to each other and to Waste’s own employment policy. 
At the same time these policy levels are important for the employers’ federations as well, as the 
federations can introduce an employer’s’ message: The following quote illustrate this complementarity 
and the sub-national resource involved: 
 
 ‘Employees complete these 35 hours of vocational training within five years. We are responsible for 
the organisation of the courses but governments should push companies to send their employees 
otherwise we will have a bottle neck in the last year. At the same time, we of course want to insert the 
employer’s’ message. Not that we want to brainwash them into thinking that the rule is white but we 
think it is actually black that absolutely cannot be the case. It's about business, where an employee is 
supposed to act in the interests of the company’ (Waste, Representative of employers’ federation) 
 
Besides the involvement of the sector for the training policy, the level of the joint committee was also 
involved in shaping pay policies. Specifically a more detailed job classification for blue-collar workers 
was put forward to decrease hourly wage for less risky jobs. Agreements on the joint committee level 
for this adapted classification were easily obtained among four MNCs. Despite their market share of 
40 per cent, their proposal was inserted in a collective agreement for the sector. In this way Waste was 
able to undermine or decrease labour conditions on the company level because companies have to pay 
at least what has been decided within the collective agreements. At the same time, this change left 
more room on the subsidiary or site level. Specifically, the complementarity between sector and 
company allows the existence of different fringe benefits between sites of Waste. This is important 
regarding the main activity and the historic specific evolution of Waste. The former refers to existing 
fringe benefits that has maintained the constructive relation with trade unions that sought to protect 
their acquired benefits. As Waste depends on long-term contracts with villages and webs of inter-firm 
relations in a tight market, work interruptions could indeed threaten the prolongation of the contracts. 
As such, Waste benefitted from having different policies. The latter refers to the former composition 
of Waste, Waste composes of former SMEs. In most cases the subsidiaries were still directed by the 
former owner and informal bargaining occurred with former social partners. As such, instead of 
standardising the policies at the subsidiary or the national level, former site directors were given this 
responsibility resulting in site-specific employment policies. As Waste’s HR manager said, 
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‘Rather than focusing on a Belgian policy, former directors, who are still in place, prefer to do it their 
own way as they have been used to it’ (Waste, HR manager) 
 
A final complementarity was found between regional employment policies and the webs of inter-firm 
relations. Specifically, all subsidiaries of Waste were encouraged to engage in new greener methods of 
waste treatment in order to remain competitive. The Walloon subsidiary responsible for cleaning 
around the communities of Liege and Verviers, saw in the coalition of the Walloon government an 
additional resource by which to set up a cluster of green waste companies. As the green party was part 
of the Walloon coalition, the coalition was especially sensitive to environmental issues. Furthermore it 
was willing to fund employment policies that would invest in green treatment. This resulted in the 
formation of a training and competence centre for employees to learn these new techniques which 
were also available for the surrounding companies. In this way, besides the obligatory training, Waste 
Walloon could meet future employee skill needs. 
 
Food-resources at sub-national levels. Food is a German-owned company with four business divisions 
in Flanders as well as in Wallonia. The Brussels subsidiary employs the sales force for all divisions. 
Differences in engagement were found between the business divisions because of the presence of 
resources and complementarity. In this regard it is important to note the historical evolution of both 
divisions. The first business division (also managing the third and fourth division), mainly employing 
blue-collar workers, has existed for 200 years and is characterised by long-term relations with clients 
and suppliers. In contrast, the second is a spin-off that mainly employs white-collar workers and has 
been in existence since 2007. This difference in historical development has contributed to the 
divisions’ amount of resources at sub-national levels. Specifically, the HR manager of the first 
business division, who has held the post for 11 years, is a member of the advisory board of the 
regional agency, the social fund and the training centre. As such he has three resources at sub-national 
levels to his disposal to shape employment policies in line with the aims of the first business division. 
These aims include cost reduction in the packaging division, multiple skill development of employees 
and attracting and retaining skilled employees. 
 
Engagement in these policies at these sub-national levels resulted first of all in a simulation company 
for blue-collars workers in the food sector. Because of the presence of this company, blue-collar 
workers could practice on packaging for food products. This simulation company contributed to the 
company-specific policy as the packaging department still suffers from higher costs within the 
company. On the level of the joint committee, the training aims of multi-employability were further 
supported by trade unions and other employers within the advisory board of the training institutes. 
Specifically employees’ representatives were concerned about the consequences of company 
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restructuring for employees’ job security issues, while local management suffered from employees 
being able to operate only one machine. Therefore both parties are in favour of more services:  
 
‘Employers give enough money to the sector institute to develop a variety of training programs aiming 
at involving 80 to 90 per cent of the employees of the sector. It has been said that our sector training 
institute is a best practice.’ (Food, Director employers’ federation) 
 
Furthermore, similar to the cases of Waste, the first business division had pay policies that differed 
from those of other subsidiaries within the MNC. Being a former SME, the company retained a family 
business character and was described as taking good care of its employees. As the HR manager was 
part of different committees, this policy aim shaped actions at the joint committee level. Specifically 
pension contributions for all employees within the Food sector were proposed by the HR manager of 
Food. In this way, a complementary effect between the joint committee and the company level 
remained visible as the company made contributions (to the social fund) even after retirement. These 
additional contributions were not present for other companies in the sector. In this respect Food was 
still able to attract many employees, often through their family members who were already employed 
within the company. 
 
The above-mentioned employment policies at sub-national levels are opposed to the aims of the 
training and pay policies within the second division, which are established internally. However, 
recently the municipality in Flanders has announced support for the creation of a food business cluster 
in cooperation with the university and local SMEs. This will give the other business divisions future 
resources at sub-national levels to shape employment policies needed to improve their performance in 
research and development. In other words, the first business division has had its own system of 
contacts with surrounding companies and is now using this capacity both to reinforce future 
specialisation and to create a local food cluster for the other three, more recently created business 
divisions. At the time of data collection, the involvement was however still limited because of 
competitive reasons. 
 
Packaging- Limited resources at sub-national levels. Packaging has a Swedish headquarters and its 
three business divisions are represented in three subsidiaries in Belgium. The Walloon subsidiary is a 
pilot company where international employment policies of the division are internally tested. It also 
manages the Brussels division. Because of the nature as a pilot company, resources at sub-national 
levels are less relevant for the Walloon subsidiary because of its internal focus. 
 
In the case of Flanders, the employment policy focused on skill development and on attracting and 
keeping skilled employees. Both aspects were key to remain competitive. Particularly the packaging 
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division of the Flemish subsidiary has been characterised by a tight market and extensive 
restructuring. In fact, during time of data collection, the Flemish subsidiary was taken over by a new 
parent company. Against this background, local management sought to use the system of collective 
bargaining but Packaging Flanders was successful in doing so only with regard to pay policy. 
Specifically the MNCs within the employers’ federation attempted to establish a pay package adjusted 
to the larger SME and not to the smaller one. Moreover, the companies agreed that the higher 
performing companies or MNCs could add to this pay package. As such the MNCs succeeded in 
offering a more beneficial pay package in order to attract key employees in areas where a shortage 
existed:  
‘There was almost an explosion between the bigger and the smaller companies and then we said we 
need a new system; we need a system to negotiate agreement on terms aligned with those of the big 
SME. Then you can say that international companies can do something on top of that but that should 
be a very small group.’ (Packaging, Representative of employers’ federation) 
 
Engaging at the level of the sector did not work out with regard to training though the employers’ 
federation was striving to set up their own training centre. However SMEs making up 80 per cent of 
the sector, refused to contribute to the collective fund. They state that collective training would not 
enable to offer more competitive training since employees of other companies would be trained as 
well: 
 
‘Until this year, our members were not willing to invest in training on a sector level as it is a tight 
market and they are all competitors. It took a lot of effort to convince the board of directors about the 
relevance of training and the possibilities on the sector level.’ (Packaging, Director of employers’ 
federation) 
 
The case of Packaging Flanders furthermore illustrates that trade unions can make use of the specific 
historical background of the subsidiaries. The Flemish subsidiary of Packaging comprises two sites 
characterised by a high number of strikes. As the sites are formally one subsidiary, global and Belgian 
management tried to set up a policy on working hours, number of holidays and pay level. However 
employees of the second site have historically preferred extra holidays rather than wage increases 
whereas the first site preferred the opposite. Although global and local management wanted to 
standardise policy, trade unions used the preference for these different instruments to guarantee 
employment. For management, production is of particular importance given the tight market in which 
the subsidiary is operating. So trade unions used the system of collective bargaining at the subsidiary 
level to maintain the fringe benefits. In this regard, Packaging differs from the case of Waste where 
fringe benefits were agreed upon informally rather than through the system of collective bargaining. 
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ICT-no resources at sub-national levels. ICT is a fast-growing Belgian- owned MNC that began to 
internationalise only in 2011. In this respect it should not come a as surprise that ICT is less involved 
in employment policies at sub-national levels as previous cases have shown the importance of the 
specific historical context of resources. Particularly neither management nor trade unions are 
represented in the advisory boards of the regional development agencies or sector funds or centres. 
However ICT composes of former Belgian SMEs which could have been engaged before being part of 
ICT, though this was not the case. Based here on, it is concluded that the absence of engagement is 
mainly explained by the lack of fit with ICT’s employment policies and practices regarding pay as 
well as training policies: 
 
‘The employers’ organisation set minimum standards; what they present is really basic. There are 
companies that completely take this over. What we have implemented is a lot more than what the 
employers' organisation presents, it is much more detailed.’ (ICT, HR manager)  
 
‘The sector training centre is mainly used for the support functions; for ICT the MNCs and its 
subsidiaries needs specific programs like those offered by IBM or Cetrix who are really experienced in 
the IT world.’ (ICT, union representative) 
 
After having described the presence of resources and social actors aims, next paragraphs will describe 
how particular combinations of resources and aims result in different kinds of institutional 
entrepreneurship of co-evolution. 
 
 
6.3.2 Discussion and cross-comparative analysis: Kinds of institutional entrepreneurship 
or co-evolution 
 
Based on a cross-comparative analysis of the case studies, institutional entrepreneurship or co-
evolution for employment policies at sub-national levels seem to occur when resources at multiple 
sub-national levels enable social actors to shape employment policies. These resources need to be 
contextualised within the specific historical development of these levels as this factor explains the role 
of social actors and the available resources (table 11).  
 
Based on the description of the cases, Waste and the first business division of Food are in the situation 
of co-evolution and institutional entrepreneurship. Specifically, in all the subsidiaries of Waste 
complementarity between regional governments and the joint committee with regard to training and 
between the joint committee and subsidiary level for pay has been observed. For the former, local 
management of Waste tried to shape training policies in order to guarantee the main activity. However 
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this result via an unexpected channel. Based on the Belgian context, it was expected that subsidiaries’ 
social actors would use the advisory board of regional agencies but this was not the case. Rather, 
informal personal contact with cabinets was established over time, enabling the employers’ federations 
to shape the content and organisation of obligatory vocational training. For pay policies 
complementarity was found between the joint committee level and the subsidiary level. Specifically, 
Waste reshaped pay policies by collective agreement together with three other MNCs (which together 
owned 40 percent of the market); job classifications were adapted in order to pay some employees 
less. As such more space was left for differentiation in pay policies and practices at the subsidiary or 
site level. On the site level, management maintained informal agreements with trade unions that 
originated from the former SMEs. Thereby it limited the occurrence of work interruptions. Moreover, 
co-evolution was even slightly more pronounced in the Walloon case. Specifically, green waste 
treatment as a forward-thinking employment policy was achieved through complementarity between 
the web of inter-firm relations and regional governments.  
 
For Food similar observations were made for the first business division. The aims of its employment 
policy were threefold: cost optimisation in the packaging division, employee cross-training in multiple 
skills and attracting employees. Therefore local management shaped policies at the level of regional 
government and the joint committee. More precisely, as part of the advisory board of regional 
agencies, the training fund and the social fund, local management co-determined employment policies 
in those settings. As a result, simulation companies, a training centre and a pension scheme in line 
with the subsidiaries’ employment aims were set up. At the same time, it left room for additional 
measures, such as contributing to social funds even after employees left the subsidiary. So co-
evolution for the first business division resulted from complementarity between the three sub-national 
levels and actors’ roles within these levels. For the other divisions this was not so much the case as the 
historical context and the main activity differed significantly. However, at the time of data collection, 
the municipality aims to fund a R&D centre with facilities for high-skills employees to help in 
attracting, recruiting and training them. As the HR manager of the second business division is also 
involved in the centre’s start-up, though quite limited initially because of the competitive position 
(R&D), future policies within local clusters are expected to be shaped by the second business division.  
 
However, there are differences between the cases of Food and Waste. In the case of Food, there is a 
long-term orientation as illustrated by the presence of Belgian headquarters for the Belgian operations. 
In the case of Waste, a short-term focus on profit has been observed as some of the subsidiaries have 
been taken over or sold again. The latter fit with the findings of Kristensen and Morgan (2007). They 
state that even if the headquarters has a short-term focus, subsidiaries can think about the long-term by 
engaging in sub-national initiatives, as the Walloon subsidiary did. In this respect it could be argued 
that the case of Waste is more an example of adaptation to the institutional logic. However, Cantwell 
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et al. (2010) while discussing co-evolution, recognise that there is a difference in degree but not in 
kind.  
 
Quite the opposite situation, no institutional entrepreneurship at all, was observed for ICT and the 
Walloon subsidiary of Packaging. The strategic aims of Packaging Wallonia were to test new practices 
within the pilot company. As such shaping employment policies at sub-national levels would not have 
contributed as alternative employment policies were internally developed. In the case of ICT there 
were indeed training centres on the sector level but they were organised for all white-collar workers 
across sectors. In addition as the courses were too general, they were not in accordance with the 
training aims of ICT. Similar observations were made for the issue of pay.  
 
For the packaging in Flanders institutional entrepreneurship between employment policies at sub-
national levels and actors is rather limited. Indeed, in the case of Packaging Flanders, an agreement 
between SMEs and MNCs was made at the sector level regarding pay. In addition, fringe benefits 
were then negotiated differently at individual sites of the same subsidiary. Through this management 
could differentiate between the sites in order to maintain its good relations with trade unions and 
guarantee production. However, this was not yet the case for training as no training centre at the sector 
level was installed. Therefore the case of Packaging Flanders is best described as limited institutional 
entrepreneurship (table 11). 
 
 
Table 11 Co-evolution and institutional entrepreneurship 
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
The chapter observed subsidiaries’ social actors to shape employment policies at sub-national levels if 
resources at sub-national levels are available for social actors to engage in these levels. In this case, 
social actors could set up employment policies at sub-national levels in line with their aims. High 
levels of institutional entrepreneurship or co-evolution took place if resources were available at 
multiple complementary sub-national levels at the same time. The latter were however dependent on 
the specific historical evolution of the sub-national levels.  
 
Three additional remarks can be made regarding the results found. First of all unexpected resources 
were also used to shape employment policies at sub-national levels. Indeed on the level of the regional 
government, trust relations were set up between the employers’ federation and politicians that 
remained over time. In this way employers’ interest could be put forward when discussing vocational 
training policies within regional governments. Another informal resource could be observed on the 
subsidiary level as a consequence of the way companies have evolved over time. Specifically the way 
former site directors negotiated employment policies in an informal way resulted in resources for these 
site directors to remain in the position of how to handle trade unions. Second, the chapter shows that 
social actors within MNCs in Belgium have a wide range of resources, even beyond the formal 
institutions. However this chapter has observed far more entrepreneurship from management than 
from trade unions. This can be explained by the pillarisation of trade unions in Belgium. Indeed, in 
Belgium, there are a Christian, socialist and liberal trade unions each with their own employment 
aims. Trade unions could benefit more from these resources if trade unions would work together to set 
up a common employment policy. As many boards and committees are based on parity, trade unions 
representatives can then use these resources at sub-national levels to shape employment policies 
supporting their employment aims. Third, there is quite some differences in the presence of resources 
to shape training versus pay policies. Specifically, for training all employment policies at sub-national 
levels as identified in the literature and the case of Belgium are used. For pay policies on the contrary 
only the sector and the subsidiary level offer resources to shape these policies. 
 
Based on the findings of this section, it can be concluded that there are formal as well as informal 
resources to set up employment policies at sub-national levels. By investigating the influence of 
multiple resources, the findings make clear that compensating of reinforcing policy levels are 
important to take into consideration. In this way, the findings of this chapter contribute to previous 
studies integrating only the national or one sub-national level. Moreover these employment policies at 
sub-national levels are found to be shaped. Many empirical studies have indeed used the business 
system approach or the resource-based view (Whitley, 2000) to explain the way different employment 
policies are set up within MNCs (Almond et al., 2005; Edwards et al., 2013). Scholars using these 
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approaches generally focus on the national level only; limited attention has been devoted to 
employment policies at sub-national levels and the social actors involved at these levels (Amable & 
Palombarini, 2009; Dunning & Lundan, 2010; Morgan, 2009). These shortcomings have been 
addressed in part by institutional scholars who have focussed on within country variations and how 
they are constituted by social actors. Empirically, Crouch et al. (2009) studied how local coordination 
forms were shaped by MNCs based on international competition and companies’ interests. Pulignano 
(2006) emphasised the role of trade unions, noting they have made use of subsidiaries’ performance to 
play a role in constructing employment policies. Similarly regional economic studies have shown 
MNCs to be influencing employment policies within former industrial districts (Beccatini, 2002). As 
leading firms, MNCs enter these districts by merger or take-over and link indigenous companies with 
the international market (Whitford, 2001). Through this activity, they shape information on 
employment, internal labour markets and the presence of supporting institutions like universities, 
vocational training centres and trade and professional organisations (Molina-Morales & Martinez-
Fernandez, 2004, 2008). Still missing amidst this research, however, was information on how 
employment policies at multiple sub-national levels are shaped by subsidiaries’ social actors within 
MNCs. This chapter filled this gap by investigating under which conditions employment policies at 
each of several levels namely in the regional government, at the inter-firm level and at the company 
level are shaped by social actors within MNCs in Belgium. In doing so, this chapter added to studies 
on within country variation and regional studies focusing on the emergence of alternative employment 
policies by integrating multiple levels. More generally, issues of space and location are considered in a 
more fully elaborated way than do studies that examine the national level only. This more nuanced 
examination fits with the idea that growing attention should be devoted to the sub-national relations of 
MNCs’ subsidiaries (Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012). In addition, rather than considering employment 
policies at sub-national levels as constraints to social actors, social actors as institutional entrepreneurs 
contribute to employment policies at sub-national levels. The findings confirm hereby the statement of 
Ferner et al. (2012) which describes MNCs social actors as setting the standards for institution 
building. Similarly, Crouch et al. (2009) positioned social actors at sub-national levels as rule makers 
and social actors at the national level operating as rule takers. 
 
Based on this interaction between policies at sub-national levels and social actors, these policies are 
expected in turn to influence the transfer of pay and training policies and practices. Specifically, 
vocational training centre at the regional and sector level will affect the transfer within MNCs’ 
subsidiaries as subsidiaries have access to benefit from these initiatives. Furthermore, sector specific 
job classification will allow room on the subsidiary level to transfer pay and training policies and 
practices. In addition, employment policies that have been put in place as a results of the specific 
historic evolution of the subsidiary are expected to inhibit transfer as local directors are trusted 
regarding the daily operations of the subsidiary. However the transfer is not expected to be observed if 
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multiple employment policies at sub-national levels are only present. Rather based on the limited 
pieces of literature on the employment policies at sub-national levels and transfer (Bélanger et al., 
2013), it is expected that these policies will only be influential for transfer it they are contributing to 
MNCs’ employment aims for the subsidiary under consideration. This is not necessarily the case as 
employment policies at sub-national levels as shaped by subsidiaries’ social actors are not always in 
line with headquarters’ aims. This can occur because of two reasons. First of all, part of the resources 
are available because of the system of industrial relations or are based on parity. This means that the 
obtained policies also reflect trade unions’ interest. In addition, conflictual interests have been 
observed between subsidiaries and MNCs headquarters (Edwards et al., 2007a). Following two 
chapters will therefore investigate how policies at sub-national levels affect the transfer. 
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Chapter VII: How do employment 
policies at multiple sub-national 
levels affect headquarters’ control, 
centralisation and subsidiaries’ 
discretion in MNCs? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on:  
 
Dekocker, V. (2013). Variation within the host country: How does the sub-national level affect the 
transfer of training policies in MNCs' subsidiaries in Belgium? Paper accepted for ILERA. 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands  
 
Dekocker, V. (in press). Variation within the host country: How do complementary sub-national levels 
affect subsidiary discretion on vocational training policies within multinationals? Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 57 (2). doi: 10.1177/0022185614564376 (IF=0.649) 
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7.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter has shown the relevance of regional, inter-firm and firm specific employment 
policies for MNCs. Specifically it has shown that resources at multiple reinforcing or compensating 
employment policies affect the level of entrepreneurship or co-evolution. It is the aim of the two 
coming chapters to investigate how these employment policies at sub-national levels mediate the 
transfer. Two aspects of the transfer, following previous empirical studies will be distinguished, 
subsidiaries’ discretion, centralisation and headquarters’ control12 and the headquarters-subsidiary 
configuration. As our study fits with the focus on diverging policies, these chapters will respectively 
use the business system approach and resource-based view as a theoretical point of departure. The 
present chapter will focus on the former.  
 
Specifically, the current chapter will focus on how employment policies at multiple reinforcing or 
compensating levels within the host country affect the extent of discretion and headquarters’ control. 
After all, policies at complementary levels can shape strategic choices such as discretion, as these 
policies can enhance headquarters to achieve their goals (Deeg, 2009). This chapter, therefore, aims to 
investigate how complementarity between employment policies at the regional government, the sector, 
the web of inter-firm relations, the subsidiary level and the national level influences subsidiaries’ 
discretion and headquarters’ control in MNCs’ subsidiaries in Belgium. To investigate this, the 
remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next paragraphs the chapter will briefly 
describe the theoretical framework used. Thereafter the chapter distinguishes between the importance 
of vocational training and pay policies for MNCs. Furthermore, it described the way employment 
policies at sub-national levels are assumed to influence headquarters’ control and subsidiaries’ 
discretion. This is followed by a case study analysis. This section will discuss the different levels that 
influence the extent of discretion and headquarters’ control. In addition, this section will present 
employment policies at these sub-national levels as complementary for MNCs.  
 
 
7.2 Employment policies at complementary sub-national levels and 
headquarters’ control, centralisation and discretion  
 
Empirical studies on employment policies and practices frequently use the national business system 
approach to explain subsidiaries’ discretion (Whitley, 2000: 33). These studies fall between two 
conceptual paths: the parent or home-country-centred approach (country-of-origin effect) and the host-
country–centred approach. These approaches respectively refer to the socio-economic characteristics 
                                                          
12
 In the remainder, centralisation and discretion will be used interchangeable as the concepts are oppposite 
interpretations of the span of control 
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of the country in which the headquarters is located and the countries in which subsidiaries are 
operational. It is expected that the host context mediates the country-of-origin effect because external 
management styles differ or other industrial relations systems are installed (Ferner & Quintanilla, 
2002; Pulignano, 2006). However, the extent of the host country effect has been found to depend on 
the nature of the employment practice studied (Storey, 1989). Contrary to other employment practices, 
training policies are expected to increasingly be subjected to the development and control systems of 
the host country (Almond, 2011; Heidenreich, 2012). For example, studies have found subsidiary’s 
discretion regarding vocational training policies, as the subsidiary should conform to the national 
employment system. Conversely, global management strive to minimise the pay instruments 
negotiated locally because of host countries’ collective bargaining systems (Almond et al., 2005; 
Pulignano, 2006). Accordingly, contrary to pay, for training more discretion and less headquarters 
control is expected to be observed.  
 
Furthermore, studies indicate that the host country should not be considered as internally homogenous 
(Bélanger et al., 2013; Morgan, 2007). Specifically, employment policies are likely to vary in 
accordance with local and regional labour markets, as well as between sectors with different workforce 
compositions (Almond, 2011; Crouch et al., 2009). Case study research on MNCs indicates the 
prevalence of sub-national institutions (the Chamber of Commerce and Industry) and particular sub-
national labour markets to be explanatory for headquarters’ control and subsidiary’s discretion 
(Almond et al., 2005; Muller, 1998). Also Whitley’s original assumption stated that different levels 
exist, such as the inter-firm level or the level of regional government (Almond, 2011; Morgan, 2007; 
Whitley, 2000). Based here on studies on the transfer would benefit from integrating employment 
policies at sub-national levels. 
 
To integrate policies at sub-national levels into the study on headquarters’ control and subsidiaries’ 
discretion, the idea of subsidiaries’ social actors as institutional entrepreneurs with the business system 
approach is combined. In this way, it will enable to investigate how employment policies at multiple 
sub-national levels shaped by subsidiaries’ social actors, enable MNCs to attract the necessary skills 
and train employees. Based on the policies’ contribution to MNCs’ aims, it is expected to affect 
subsidiaries’ discretion as headquarters may benefit from these initiatives. So these different 
employment policies at sub-national levels are hereby expected to be complementary. First, 
complementarity between employment policies levels can only be observed if it contributes to social 
actors’ competitive advantage. As such it influences the strategic choices of MNCs’ headquarters like 
discretion and control. If this is not the case, actors will not express their desire to keep 
complementary institutions (Deeg, 2009). Put it differently, if these employment policies at sub-
national levels do not contribute to MNCs’ competitive advantage, it is unlikely that they will 
influence headquarters’ control and subsidiaries’ discretion. Second complementarity refers to the co-
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existence of employment policies at more than one level to enhance and maintain one another. This 
occurs, first of all, through a reinforcing or compensating effect for each other or the national level. In 
addition, this means that both levels are compatible or that one level is supplementary and makes up 
for the deficiencies of the other (Deeg, 2009; Lane & Wood, 2009).  
 
 So in this chapter complementarity as in the previous chapter refers to the reinforcing and 
compensating character of employment policies at different sub-national levels. In addition it refers to 
complementarity with headquarters’ employment aims for the subsidiary under study and not with 
subsidiaries’ social actors aims like in the previous chapter. However, headquarters’ aims are hereby 
not considered as equal to subsidiaries’ social actors’ aims. Specifically, as previously stated (chapter 
VI), employment policies at sub-national levels were first of all aligned with subsidiaries’ social 
actors. The latter are not necessary in accordance with headquarters’ aims because some resources are 
based on parity reflecting trade unions’ interest and conflict between local managers and headquarters’ 
interests have been observed (Pulignano, 2006). So the present chapter will investigate how 
employment policies at sub-national levels affect the discretion and headquarters’ control on pay and 
training policies and practices. The following paragraphs will therefore define sub-national policies, as 
well as discuss how these can contribute to MNCs’ employment aims for a particular subsidiary. This 
section will also discuss how this affects discretion and headquarters’ control. 
 
 
7.2.1 How can employment policies at sub-national levels enable MNCs to achieve their 
objectives? 
 
MNCs all emphasise the need for a skilled workforce as being highly strategic nowadays given the 
economic context in which they operate (Noe, 2003). Indeed, within the coming years, many OECD 
countries will be confronted with a shortage of skilled workers as a result of baby boomers leaving the 
labour market and an inadequate number of employees entering the market. As a consequence, 
vacancies will remain and a war for talent, particularly with regards to key positions, is expected to 
take place. In this context, vocational training will become increasingly important as a means of 
adjusting and adapting employees’ skills to meet changing demands and remain competitive (Cappelli, 
2012; Colbert, 2004). Similarly, attractive packages as well as elaborated job classification to integrate 
more senior workers will be present in companies (Cappelli, 2012; Noe, 2003).  
 
To meet this demand, complementarity between employment policies at national and employment 
policies at sub-national levels can support MNCs. Specifically these policies can contribute to MNCs 
as they enable MNCs to meet their aims. Consequently, they affect strategic choices such as 
discretion, centralisation and headquarters’ control to benefit from these policies. Management 
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literature has indeed pointed to the emergence of ‘multi-centred’ firms besides the vertically integrated 
MNC. In the former, discretion is no longer centralised but widely disseminated and strategic 
responsibilities need to be coordinated (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Malnight, 2001). As a result, a wide 
variety of intermediate structures and modes of organising these policies at the international level has 
been observed (Rugman et al., 2011). Specifically, together with the vertically integrated firm, policies 
developed at headquarters were assumed to be universally competitive. However, the prevalence of the 
multi-centred MNCs, characterised by their key subsidiaries located in different regions, clusters and 
sectors, raise the expectation that competitive policies are also found at the sub-national level (Hervas-
Oliver & Albors-Garrigos, 2007; Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez, 2008). As a consequence, 
employment policies at complementary sub-national levels potentially enable MNCs in the first 
instance, to train and recruit employees in line with their objectives due to sector specific skills and 
competences and sub-national training centres or competitive pay packages (Colbert, 2004; Hervas-
Oliver & Albors-Garrigos, 2007). Second, making use of these provisions can affect strategic 
decisions such as discretion because national subsidiaries have the knowledge of and access to sub-
national initiatives (Bélanger et al., 2013). 
 
 
7.2.2 How can employment policies at complementary sub-national levels affect 
discretion and headquarters’ control in MNCs’ subsidiaries in Belgium? 
 
Based on the previous chapter, three possible employment policies at sub-national levels for training 
and two for pay have been distinguished. These policies are expected to affect headquarters’ control 
and discretion particularly when there exists complementarity between these sub-national levels. 
Following paragraphs will discuss each of these (complementary) levels. Complementarity as 
previously defined, refer to two aspects: employment policies at reinforcing or compensating sub-
national levels and the contribution to social actors’ aims. 
 
Regional government. The first notion of complementarity represents the national, regional, the sector 
and the subsidiary level where the latter three supplements the former. More specifically, during the 
institutional reform of the state, vocational training as a tool of the employment policy was delegated 
to the regions (Swenden et al., 2006). Regions and their regional government agencies fund the 
employment and training bodies (public as well as private). In addition they provide incentives to 
promote vocational training of certain target groups and training cheques for companies. Moreover, 
sectors can rely on the agencies to develop sector vocational training. The main difference between the 
regional governments relates to the level of the training cheques as well as the scope of the training 
policies. Unlike other regions, Flanders gained an additional initiative. That is, some sectors in 
Flanders have a ‘convenant’. This is a specific agreement between a particular sector and the Flemish 
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government, specifying the employability and training initiatives for a particular sector. As the 
supplementary effect is higher in Flanders, Flemish subsidiaries are expected to have greater discretion 
than those in other regions. This will only be the case if these policies are considered as competitive 
by the headquarters. 
 
Inter-firm level-collective bargaining. The inter-firm level creates complementarity between sub-
national systems in two ways: 1) compatibility between the national level, the sector level and the 
subsidiary level within the domain of collective bargaining; 2) reinforcement between two different 
policies to establish a web of inter-firm relations. The former is applicable for pay and training 
policies whereas the latter is only applicable for training policies. Specifically, within the system of 
collective bargaining, social partners initially develop a framework for vocational training for all 
employees at the national level. For pay, a maximum increase in pay is bi-annually negotiated. These 
national negotiations result in guidelines in terms of the financial contribution from the employers to 
the sector training fund as well as the training participation rate. In each sector, these guidelines are 
aligned with sector-specific needs. It is important to note that the guidelines are formulated as 
objectives rather than obligations. If no sector agreement exists, the national agreement is applied. 
This encourages companies to make use of vocational training initiatives without being concerned 
about clearing thresholds or punishment when the agreement is not followed. Other differences 
between sectors can be traced back to two aspects: the prevalence of training centres and the 
distinction between white-collar and blue-collar workers regarding vocational training. Regarding the 
former, not every sector has a training centre that is financed by collective means, as a way of better 
aligning the provision of training with training needs. In addition, in contrast to blue-collar workers, 
sector vocational training for white-collar workers is predominately organised across sectors; training 
for white-collar workers is only foreseen in some sectors. Therefore, higher discretion is expected 
when sector specific vocational training is organised for both blue-collar and white-collar workers. In 
addition, similar to the level of the regional government, these vocational training policies should be 
considered as influential for the transfer of pay and training policies and practices if it affects MNCs’ 
competitive position. 
 
For pay, on the contrary, what has been agreed in collective agreements on the sector level is 
obligatory. Specifically, minimum income and job classifications need to be followed, however 
subsidiaries can add to it or deviate from it, though only in a positive way. Furthermore, differences 
between sectors not only refer to pay levels and job classification, but also to the presence of a social 
or pension fund. In case of a sector agreement on contributions to a pension or social fund, all 
employers are obliged to contribute. Accordingly, discretion and headquarters’ control are expected to 
diverge between subsidiaries belonging to different sectors. So employment policies at complementary 
sub-national levels are expected to mediate the transfer for pay and training policies. As more potential 
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complementary between sub-national levels is present for training, it is expected to have a higher 
influence on the transfer than for pay. This is furthermore reinforced by the difference in nature 
between pay and training. Specifically, as previously stated, pay is more strategic and easier to 
measure and therefore much more controlled from the headquarters (Storey, 1989).  
 
Inter-firm level-two different policy levels. A final notion of complementarity results from clustering 
around economically interesting locations like the port of Ghent and Antwerp, or around former raw 
materials such as in Liege and Mons. This web of inter-firm relations does not necessarily comprise 
companies executing the same business activities. Quite often these webs are comprised of one central 
company (generally MNCs) surrounded by suppliers (generally former SMEs) (Zeitlin, 2004). 
Vocational training within these groups of companies is funded by two regionalised policies: industrial 
policy and vocational training. Regional governments and their agencies operate as supportive 
institutions, tasked with encouraging cooperation between different companies along the value chain. 
This can result in the development of innovative employment measures in order to solve the shortage 
of skilled employees needed for a particular web-of inter firm relations. More specifically, a funded 
collaboration can be formed with the surrounding universities, resulting in specialised training 
programs or the establishment of a new educational department (Molina-Morales & Martinez-
Fernandez, 2008). As such, there is a human resources specialisation in line with companies’ needs. 
Moreover a division of labour in line with the value chain within the local environment is created, 
which remains a specific competitive advantage for cluster companies (Hervas-Oliver & Albors-
Garrigos, 2007). Therefore subsidiaries belonging to a web of inter-firm relations are expected to 
report higher discretion on policies because collective services are only set up based on companies’ 
needs. 
 
Besides these three complementarities, subsidiaries’ policies can affect the transfer of pay and training 
policies in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Packaging and Waste showed that former negotiated policies between 
trade unions and site management could encourage management to keep site specific benefits. 
Furthermore also informal policies between employees and site directors that had evolved over time, 
resulted in site specific benefits. To investigate the expectations as raised above, the following section 
will discuss the findings. Specifically it will first of all describe the levels of discretion and control in 
MNCs’ subsidiaries. Thereafter it will examine the presence of employment policies at 
complementary sub-national levels. It will end by combining both illustrating how complementarity 
enhances subsidiaries’ discretion and inhibits headquarters’ control. 
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7.3 Employment policies at complementary sub-national levels, discretion 
and headquarters’ control 
 
Previous analyses showed a higher level of discretion for subsidiaries being part of particular sectors 
and federations (Bélanger et al., 2013). However, within this chapter it is expected that sub-national 
policies affect discretion and headquarters’ control if they are complementary. Put it differently if 
reinforcing or compensating levels enhance MNCs’ competitive advantage, these policies will affect 
headquarters’ control and discretion (Almond, 2011; Meyer et al., 2011). Hence in Belgium, if 
discretion and less headquarters control and centralisation is observed, findings will be addressed to 
regional governments, membership in sectors and web of inter-firm relations or subsidiary former 
policies. In this section, the chapter first of all sketches the training and pay policies of MNCs’ 
subsidiaries in Belgium. Thereafter, configurations of policies at sub-national levels and subsidiary 
discretion and headquarters’ control within the theoretical framework presented above, are discussed. 
 
 
7.3.1 Subsidiaries’ discretion, centralisation and headquarters’ control 
 
Waste: high level of discretion and limited control. Empirical evidence shows the tight control exerted 
by Anglo-Saxon companies over foreign subsidiaries (Fenton- O’Greevy et al., 2007). Although the 
study only studied one UK based MNC, a centralised approach regarding vocational training and pay 
policies was not found. In the case of Waste, the employment policies at sub-national levels mediated 
first of all the transfer of training policies as the MNC did not solely identify vocational training needs. 
More specifically, as Wastes’ main activity is waste cleaning and treatment, regional governments 
prescribed the needed vocational training in light of the regionalisation of environmental issues during 
state reform. Consequently, every blue-collar worker working in this sector was obliged to undertake 
35 hours of training. As such, the budget and content of vocational training was legally determined. In 
reality, the vocational training was foreseen at the sector level and the regional government like in 
many other European countries (Cognard, 2011). This resulted in subsidiaries’ discretion regarding 
vocational training as local knowledge was required in order to subscribe the workers to these sessions 
and guarantee the Belgian operations. No differences were hereby found between subsidiaries 
belonging to different regions. 
 
For the limited number of white-collar workers in all subsidiaries, former directors determined the 
training budget. Although the Belgian HR manager (in the absence of a global HR manager) undertook 
several attempts to centralise the vocational training policies, he was unsuccessful. In Waste, all the 
subsidiaries were former SMEs still directed by the former owner. As a consequence, former owners 
were still responsible for the majority of the management tasks although central functions like finance, 
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HR management or administration were being established. This situation is perhaps best summarised 
as follows: 
 
‘You also have a budget for training depending on the results, we are only decision maker… ok we are 
a multinational company and a large group but actually the sites can act quite autonomously and we 
still have a SME structure. For training for white- collar workers, done on the job or negotiated with 
the local director.’ (Site Director, Waste) 
 
Evidently, former owners understand the way the business operates and the importance of training 
policies to attract the right employees in order to remain competitive. As there were only four major 
players, Belgian management relied on local managers. One way to gain discretion is indeed to use 
one’s knowledge about the importance of long-term relationships with clients and the market situation 
in which MNCs are operational (Ferner et al., 2012).  
 
This high level of discretion for the Walloon subsidiary was further reinforced by membership in a 
web of inter-firm relations. Specifically, Wastes’ focus on green waste treatment to remain competitive 
was in line with the green party in the Walloon government (not represented in other regional 
governments). As such, collaboration was funded between universities, MNCs and SMEs. Within this 
cluster, a training and education centre for blue-collar and white-collar workers was established in 
order to (re)train employees to work with new methods. As a consequence, the role of Belgian HR 
management was limited to setting up a centralised vocational training policy as the local initiatives 
were in line with the MNCs’ needs. After all, when training is supported by the local contexts and 
aligned locally with the skill requirements, MNCs can better benefit from discretion (Benneworth & 
Hopers, 2006; Coulson & Ferrario, 2007). 
 
For pay policies, no formal policies have been in place. Specifically, for basic pay, the collective 
agreement was followed. This was competitive in the sense that as previously mentioned less risky 
jobs were added to pay lower basic income. As a result Waste needed to pay only what has been 
agreed on the sector level. At the same time it left room for site or subsidiary specific benefits. This is 
particularly important when taken into account MNCs’ competitive advantage. As mentioned earlier, 
these benefits maintained the good relations between employees and local management. Consequently, 
less work interruptions occurred and the position of Waste was less affected. Accordingly, the 
prolongation of contracts was not threatened based on work interruptions. Put it differently, MNCs’ 
headquarters benefitted from limited control. In this way the limited management structure, although 
initially in place because of acquired SMEs as described earlier, preserved to exist. Furthermore Waste 
showed that a tax-efficient initiative for variable pay contributed to subsidiaries’ discretion. 
Specifically, this national tax-efficient initiative could be integrated into sector collective agreements 
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and concrete criteria could be negotiated at the subsidiary level. In one subsidiary of Waste for 
example, the number of truck accidents and violation of safety rules were inserted as criteria to 
determine variable pay. These specific criteria were decided on the subsidiary or site level because it 
was cost effective. For example decrease in number of accidents as a criteria, was not relevant for all 
sites. In addition, no agreement could be obtained between representatives of different joint 
committees as previously mentioned. As such subsidiaries gained discretion regarding variable pay 
and less headquarters’ control was installed.  
 
ICT: no discretion and centralised control. Quite the opposite level of discretion is found in ICT and 
Packaging. ICT is a fast growing company with different sites across Belgium. As all employees are 
white-collar workers and no specific sector training for ICT has been developed, white-collar workers 
have access to the available cross-sector vocational training. Contrary to the case of Waste, ICT has a 
centralised vocational training policy, developed at the global level, for all its subsidiaries. 
 
The budget and training content for all employees are decided centrally and are aligned with the 
MNCs’ strategy. This does not mean that ICT does not make use of external vocational training. 
Rather, as the union representative explains, external companies foresee specific training sessions 
because collective services are unable to meet the competences requested by the clients: 
 
‘The sector training programs are mainly used for the support functions, ICT needs specific sessions 
offered by IBM, Cetrix, companies really experienced in the IT world.’ (ICT, Union representative)  
 
Similar for pay packages, ICT has its own classification developed at the headquarters. Moreover 
thresholds proposed by the sector are only used as a point of departure. The limited integration of the 
classification is explained by its limited up to date character. As ICT employs mainly high profiles, job 
classification of the sector does not allow to recruit the diversified profiles as needed by ICT. 
Accordingly when only using this sector classification, the needed competence to fulfil consultancy in 
the five divisions would be missing. As a consequence, the competitive position of ICT, like for 
training policies, would be affected: 
 
‘ICT makes use of the HAY model for its job classification, it is developed internally in collaboration 
with HAY. It composes of 60 described jobs with different pay levels. We are not involved, the method 
is reported to us but we don’t know which pay level is addressed to different jobs and levels within one 
job.’ (ICT, Union representative)  
   
Packaging: no discretion and control on supra-national and worldwide level. Similar to ICT, 
Packaging is controlled by higher organisational levels. The training budget, the content of the training 
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and proposed skills based on an employability matrix were put forward by the European offices and 
global headquarters. Flexibility was only allowed if non-compliance with overall policy could be 
justified based on the financial criteria. This centralised policy was set-up for both blue-collar and 
white-collar workers in both subsidiaries.  
 
However for the Flemish subsidiary, due to major restructuring, no budget for vocational training was 
foreseen by European offices or global headquarters. As the emphasis on higher skills levels remained, 
a standardised mentorship program for all subsidiaries in this division was introduced to meet the 
training requests. Employees with seniority taught younger employees to work with different 
machines: 
 
‘That's just someone from the subsidiary who has ever been worked as machine controller. Mainly 
older workers sitting together for four to eight weeks and older workers then decide yes he’s ready to 
just run with that machine.’ (Packaging, Union representative) 
 
This focus on centralisation was not mediated by the sector level due to limited collective means. As 
the means, as put forward by the national level, are to be considered as guidelines, sector federations 
cannot impose a budget. For pay, all subsidiaries followed the sector agreed level of the big SME. This 
did however not result in more subsidiaries’ discretion. Rather the collective agreement was integrated 
in the global classification and grading of each business division. For variable pay and fringe benefits, 
deviation was only possible if it contributes to MNCs’ competitive advantage. This competitive 
advantage refers particularly to tax beneficial instruments (e.g. collective agreement 90) 
 
Food: medium level of discretion and headquarters’ control. Contrary to the Packaging sector, 
companies in the food sector agreed to finance the sector level in a more elaborate way than was 
requested at the national level. In addition, the food sector was financed by regional development 
agencies to set-up sector specific initiatives for blue-collar and white-collar workers, such as a 
simulation company. However, the prevalence of these services does not affect subsidiaries’ discretion 
and headquarters’ control in the same way because of the nature of the business divisions in Food. 
Two business divisions
13
 were represented within the Flemish and Walloon subsidiaries. These 
business divisions employed different types of employees; the first and second division employed 
blue-collar and white-collar workers, respectively. Also their strategy differed; the first business 
division was very locally orientated and suppliers and clients needed to be close by, whereas the 
                                                          
13
 As previously described, the first business division also manages the third and fourth business division (in the 
remainder referred to as the first division). For the first division, the number of white-collar workers is rather 
small. 
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second business division was internationally driven and focused on R&D. As such competitive 
advantages differed between the division.  
 
In general, the budget for vocational training for both divisions was nationally centralised and the 
Belgian subsidiaries offered shared services regarding training. However, discretion on external 
vocational training policies is higher for the first business division than for the second division. For the 
second division, shared services offered to engineers vocational training and the content was 
determined by the headquarters. This meant that despite the availability of similar collective services, 
the training services were less commonly used as they did not completely meet the training needs. 
Accordingly, the first business division gained additional discretion on account of the competitive 
collective services. This discretion was further enhanced, as an aspect of the vocational training (the 
simulation company) was being reverse transferred to other subsidiaries because of its contribution to 
the divisions’ performance (Edwards et al., 2012): 
 
‘It is centralised yes but we have something to say as well, for all the things that have been developed, 
we contributed significantly.’(Food, HR manager, Division 1) 
 
For pay, no impact on the transfer has been observed. Although the presence of the pension fund 
raised different expectations, it did not affect the transfer as minor contribution to MNCs’ competitive 
position has been observed. So discretion on one part of the pay policy did not go along with an 
overall discretion on job classification.  
 
Based on the description of the four case studies the need to integrate the policies at sub-national 
levels into the study of subsidiaries’ discretion and headquarters’ control is illustrated. However, not 
all levels are considered as beneficial by the MNCs, and these levels do not operate independently. In 
addition, there is a big difference between training and pay policies. The next paragraphs will link the 
results with the concept of complementarity. It will hereby focus on training policies as 
complementarity for pay policies have only been marginally observed. Furthermore within and cross-
comparative analyses cannot be executed as limited variation is present. 
 
 
7.3.2 Complementary sub-national levels  
 
A cross-comparative analysis shows that in Belgium three complementary levels for vocational 
training exist. Central to the idea of complementarity is that at least two levels or domains have a 
reinforcing or compensating effect, and that the levels have a return to social actors (Deeg, 2009). In 
our research, this return for MNCs’ headquarters relate to the way vocational training systems enable 
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MNCs to retrain employees or attract skills in line with their objectives for the subsidiary considered. 
Consequently, this will affect subsidiaries’ discretion, centralisation and headquarters’ control as 
national subsidiaries have the knowledge to benefit from these initiatives (Bélanger et al., 2013). The 
following paragraphs distinguish between complementarity between two sub-national levels and 
between policy domains; they also discuss the effect of complementarity on discretion and 
headquarters’ control. Some quotes of the previous chapter will hereby reoccur where MNCs’ aims 
and subsidiaries’ aims match. 
 
Complementary (sub)-national levels. The first notion of complementarity exists because vocational 
training facilities at the regional government level are only indirectly applied. Indeed in Waste, the 
sector training centres were held responsible for the obligatory training sessions. The regional 
government determined the content of the training sessions but the practical aspects of organising the 
training were delegated. Hence, the regional government and the sector understood vocational training 
for Waste in the following terms: 
 
‘Employees should follow this 35 hours of vocational training within five years. We are responsible 
for the organisation of the courses but governments should push companies to send their employees 
otherwise we will have a bottleneck in the last year.’ (Waste, Director Employers’ Federation)  
 
This first interpretation also contributed to MNCs’ competitive advantage as illustrated by the 
following comments by an employee of Waste. In this way the aims of MNCs’ headquarters fit with 
social actors’ aims. 
 
‘It's a very special industry and there are only few competitors, a very special work, they do not 
benefit from the employees staying home because of backaches so these training sessions are 
important. If they need to work with air masks to pump pollution, they have everything to gain from 
ensuring it has been applied correctly. They cannot afford to have a fatal accident. They need to have 
the PCA certificate for international customers. They really have no choice.’ (Waste, Union 
representative) 
 
Similarly, in Food, regional governments offered additional financial support to establish a simulation 
company for food packaging. However, as regional governments offered a packaging machine to use 
across sectors, the financial means should be considered as compensating in order to meet the special 
request of the sector (Deeg, 2009). The complementarity between the regional government and sector 
level is further illustrated, as none of the respondents pointed to the need for regional agencies to set-
up a vocational training policy. Contrary to our expectations, the contribution of agencies is best 
illustrated as follows: 
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‘I have been a HR manager for 11 years now I have never used these regional development agencies 
simply because they are not good enough. The quality is not great, not good enough.’ (Food, HR 
manager) 
 
Another notion of complementarity also reflects a compensating rather than reinforcing dimension 
between the national and sector level within the domain of collective bargaining. At the sector level, 
Food went also beyond what was nationally advised in terms of the budget and range of training 
initiatives to meet companies’ needs, as the national guidelines were found to be limiting: 
 
‘…the increased contributions, employers as well as trade unions were really convinced about the 
need, it was thought through.’ (Food, Chairman Training centre) 
 
A final notion of complementarity encompasses two policy domains on the same sub-national level 
(regional level) as illustrated in the Walloon subsidiary of Waste (Deeg, 2009; Morgan, 2007). This 
subsidiary was financed to set-up a web of inter-firm relations working on green waste treatment. Due 
to the regionalisation of industrial policy and vocational training, the Walloon government of which 
the green party was a member, decided to invest in this skills centre with specific vocational training 
services. Findings reveal that membership of a web of inter-firm relations enables MNCs to access 
critical resources. In the case of Waste, the subsidiary was able to access the necessary skills to work 
with green waste technology. 
 
No complementarity. However, not all MNCs considered vocational training policies at sub-national 
levels as complementary, particularly when one level was missing or collective services did not enable 
the MNC to meet its employment aims for the subsidiary under consideration. Specifically, Packaging 
is part of a sector in which training centres and agreements on training have only been set-up over the 
last year. Employers assume that vocational training at the sector level would not contribute to 
distinguish themselves from their main competitors: 
 
‘All companies are copies, same machines, same procedures, …. Collective training sessions, then 
employees meet employees from other companies and compare ….’ (Packaging, Director Employers’ 
Federation) 
 
Similarly, ICT found the services of the sector were not in line with their main activity. As the 
vocational training foreseen by the sector targets white-collar workers across the various sectors, it 
does not fulfil their training needs. Therefore, ICT organised external training programs through 
private partners:  
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‘We provide the practical organisation and we organise the training programs in-house but foreseen 
by external companies like IBM and Microsoft, and as the HR department, we assure that all 
employees get the same training and that emphasis on similar aspects, important for our clients, is 
guaranteed.’ (ICT, HR manager) 
 
The paragraphs above illustrated a wide range of reinforcing or compensating policies at sub-national 
levels. Not all of them were however considered as contributing to MNCs’ aims. Therefore, different 
levels of headquarters’ control and subsidiaries’ discretion are expected. The following section 
investigates the link between employment policies at multiple sub-national levels and discretion and 
headquarters control. 
 
 
7.3.3 Complementarity enhancing discretion 
 
Following the idea of complementarity, the study expected vocational training at sub-national levels to 
potentially contribute to MNCs’ competitive advantage and as such increase discretion. In order to use 
the vocational training policies at sub-national levels14, headquarters were indeed assumed to give 
subsidiaries discretion as they have the local knowledge (Bélanger et al., 2013). Specifically, 
subsidiaries in the Flemish region were assumed to have higher discretion because of the prevalence of 
the ‘sector covenant’ which is not present in the other two regions. Secondly, a higher level of 
discretion for subsidiaries operational in sectors with a training centre and sector specific training for 
white-collar workers was predicted. Finally, subsidiaries part of a web of inter-firm relations were 
expected to have higher discretion because of specific training provisions.  
 
Cross-comparative analysis shows indeed that there is discretion on vocational training policies only 
when complementary levels or domains foresee vocational training as illustrated in figure 14. The 
highest level of discretion is observed for the cases of Waste as vocational training was foreseen at all 
three levels, and in line with their objectives. Long-term relations with clients enhanced discretion in 
all Waste subsidiaries. Although there was no general international training policy, the Belgian HR 
manager tried to centralise vocational training policies at the national level. However, this was 
unsuccessful due to obligatory training guaranteeing certificates to participants, and the web of inter-
firm relations foreseeing specialised training needs (for example, green waste treatment at the Walloon 
subsidiary). As such a formal procedure controlled by the headquarters was not installed or developed 
as policies at sub-national levels needed to be followed. 
                                                          
14
 As mentioned before, the remainder of the finding section will focus on vocational training policies as only 
Waste reported competitive policies. In this way, within and cross case study analysis could only be limited 
executed as variation is limited. 
164 
 
Medium level of discretion was observed for Food as collective services were not fully enabling the 
second division to retrain its employees in line with the divisions’ aim. As the business division was 
more internationally orientated and focused on R&D, internal vocational training programs were 
established. Moreover, for the second business division, formal mechanisms like international training 
programs were controlled by the headquarters. On the contrary for the first business division, some 
aspects of the training policy like the simulation company were reverse diffused. Although reverse 
diffusion differs from discretion, particularly in the presence of German expats, it does no equal 
centralised control. Because of this, Food is described as medium levels of discretion. The lowest 
levels of discretion were observed in ICT and Packaging due to the non-existence of vocational 
services (Packaging) or the missing link between offered services and the competitive position (ICT).  
 
Figure 14 Employment policies at complementary sub-national levels and discretion 
 
Food F1: Flemish subsidiary first business division; Food W1: Walloon subsidiary first business 
division; Food F2: Flemish subsidiary second business division; Food W2: Walloon subsidiary second 
business division; Waste W: Walloon subsidiary Waste; Waste FL/B: Flemish and Brussels subsidiary 
of Waste 
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7.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has focused on the way employment policies at sub-national levels affect subsidiaries’ 
discretion and headquarters’ control in MNCs in Belgium. Overall, it demonstrates that discretion is 
only observed if policies at sub-national levels offer supportive initiatives for MNCs and if these 
initiatives are simultaneously present at more than one level. Accordingly, if employment policies are 
only present on the national level, regional government level, sector or web of inter-firm relations or 
subsidiary level, no discretion is observed. Similarly, if policies at sub-national levels do not fit with 
MNCs’ aims, headquarters will limit subsidiaries’ discretion. Consequently, Belgian subsidiaries have 
more space to develop their own policies when complementary regional regulation is foreseen or 
competitive initiatives are set- up, such as training centres at the sector level. Accordingly, 
subsidiaries’ discretion increases as local knowledge is needed in order to benefit from competitive 
initiatives. Therefore, local managers, be it at the level of the regional government, the sector or the 
web of inter-firm relations, supported by surrounding policies and associations, are less dependent on 
the MNC (Bélanger et al., 2013). 
 
However, two remarks need to be made based on the results found. First of all it can be questioned 
whether the effect of the employment policies at sub-national levels also applies to other employment 
practices and other types of training. After all, the nature of the employment practice is related to the 
extent of headquarters’ control and subsidiaries’ discretion. Pay and performance for example are 
easier to measure and more strategic and therefore, of more interest to be controlled by the 
headquarters (Storey, 1989). The second remark and following on the first remark, relates to the kind 
of resources on these levels. Specifically, for pay policies the resources offered on the sub-national 
levels were all based on parity contrary to resources for training. Consequently, there is a higher 
chance that pay policies are negotiated and are not in line with headquarters’ aims as also trade unions’ 
interest need to be taken into account. Indeed pay policies have been found to be less transferred from 
headquarters to subsidiaries. Only in the case of Waste, informal relations between site directors and 
trade unions and among MNCs on the sector level resulted in discretion. Based here on the presence of 
resources seem to be important besides the nature of the employment practice or policy to explain the 
extent of discretion and headquarters’ control.  
 
By integrating the employment policies at sub-national levels to study diverging pay and training 
policies and practices, the present chapter contributes to existing studies. First of all, it includes the 
increasing request for empirically investigating employment policies at multiple sub-national levels 
(Almond, 2011). Specifically, in the origin conceptualisation of the business system approach Whitley 
(2000) already conceptualised different relevant sub-national levels like the inter-firm and regional 
government though none of the empirical studies on the topic studied all these levels together. The 
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majority of survey and case study based research has indeed concentrated their analysis on the way the 
home effect is mediated by the host country effect without considering the possible moderating effects 
of within-country variation (Almond et al., 2005; Edwards et al., 2005). By focusing on these policies 
at sub-national levels as complementary, this chapter adds to the existing literature on headquarters’ 
control, centralisation and subsidiaries’ discretion in MNCs. Particularly it empirically contributes to 
the idea that the host country is no longer considered as internally homogenous (Morgan, 2007; 
Whitley, 2000). Specifically, this chapter showed that differences in subsidiaries’ discretion, 
centralisation and headquarters’ control are also associated with differences in policies at sub-national 
levels shaped by subsidiaries’ social actors. Consequently the national level does not fully explain 
subsidiaries’ discretion, centralisation and headquarters’ control. However this chapter has 
investigated only one dimension of transfer. The next chapter will therefore focus on how employment 
policies at sub-national levels affect headquarters-subsidiary configuration.  
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Chapter VIII: How do employment 
policies at multiple sub-national 
levels affect headquarters-subsidiary 
configurations and subsidiaries’ 
roles? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on  
 
Dekocker V. Changing headquarters-subsidiary configurations for the HR function in multinational 
companies : case study evidence on the influence of the sub-national level from Belgium. The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management (currently under review, major revision 
submitted)  
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8.1 Introduction  
 
The second dimension of the transfer is the headquarters-subsidiary configuration. This configuration, 
described previously (Chapter II, p.29), refers to a tight constellation of mutually supportive elements, 
a set of formal and informal employment tools (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995:730). This structure or 
set of elements enables MNCs to coordinate employment practices and policies across widely 
disseminated subsidiaries (Brewster, 2007). In addition, it enables global management to take 
advantage of potential host country location advantages, by addressing specific roles to subsidiaries 
with regard to employment (Almond et al., 2005). The way this happens has been observed to vary 
between a rather formalised top-down configuration (hierarchy) and coordination between 
geographically spread subsidiaries (heterarchic employment configuration) (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989, 
1993; Malnight 2001). Both types go along with respectively less and more employment competences 
addressed to the subsidiaries and other subsidiaries’ roles.  
 
Explaining these specific subsidiaries’ roles in literature happens by using the resource-based view. 
Central to this theoretical perspective is the idea that specific subsidiaries’ roles are competitive for an 
MNC. Specifically it is expected that a configuration will be reformed if it results in a more 
competitive configuration. Put differently: if employment policies at sub-national levels are 
contributing to MNCs’ competitive position. Therefore the current chapter will study how 
employment policies at multiple sub-national levels (level of regional government and inter-firm level) 
alter the headquarters-subsidiary configurations and subsidiaries’ roles. The focus will initially be on 
training policies because the previous chapters have shown limited variation in pay policies caused by 
limited resources, limited competitive advantage for pay policies or the nature of pay policies. 
Moreover, inter-firm and regional policies and not the subsidiary level are considered as location 
advantages as the former two have been defined as external to the subsidiary (Rugman & Verbeke, 
2001; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
 
To examine the headquarters-subsidiary configuration, the remainder of the chapter will be structured 
as follows. First, the literature review gives an insight into the resource-based view and how it 
evolved. Thereafter it explains how employment policies at sub-national levels can be considered 
location advantages. Moreover it will explain how these policies can contribute to the competences of 
MNCs taking Bartlett and Ghoshal as a point of departure. This will be followed by a short description 
of employment policies at sub-national levels like location advantages in Belgium. The next section 
presents an in-depth description of headquarters-subsidiary configurations and subsidiaries’ roles and 
how employment policies at sub-national levels alter these subsidiary roles. 
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8.2 The resource-based view for the study on headquarters-subsidiary 
configurations: Origin and evolution 
 
Over the last thirty years, numerous ideal types of headquarters-subsidiary configurations have been 
formulated, all taking into account the changing environmental challenges and resources MNCs face 
(Birkinshaw & Morrison 1995; Cantwell & Mudambi 2005). Initially these configurations considered 
the MNC as a vertically integrated entity. Central to more recent typologies is that MNCs are 
considered as multi-unit organisations each comprising of a set of particular resources and operational 
in a particular environment (Andersson et al., 2007; Delany 2000). As such, a differentiated approach 
towards each subsidiary is required (Birkinshaw & Morrison 1995; Morgan, Kristensen & Whitley 
2001). This new image of the MNC as a network of interdepending subsidiaries was introduced and 
systematised by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989). By combining two criteria the strategic importance of 
the local environment (high-low) and the competence of the national subsidiary (high-low), four 
potential roles (figure 15) were appointed to national subsidiaries.  
 
Figure 15 Different subsidiaries’ roles based on the typology of Bartlett and Ghoshal 
 
 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986) in Rugman et al. (2011:255) 
 
Without neglecting the importance of this classification, some authors have argued for conceptually 
updating it. They stated that there is an increasing prevalence of policies at sub-national levels within 
the internationalisation process (Edwards et al., 2012; Rugman et al., 2011). This refers to national 
countries no longer being the main distinctive borders for location advantages (Crouch et al., 2009). 
Rather, intermediate structures like the web of inter-firm relations and the regional governments gain 
importance. The explanation for this shift in importance is explained because regional governments 
170 
 
provide for initiatives facilitating learning between companies. Furthermore, employment policies at 
sub-national levels provide for collective goods like qualified employees, cooperative labour relations 
with employees and a reliable infrastructure (Heidenreich, 2012). Second, the classification needs an 
update because of its focus on aggregate subsidiaries’ roles (Ferner 1997, Ferner et al. 2004; Ghoshal 
& Nohria, 1989, 1993). Very often MNCs consist of mutual interdependent subsidiaries. In this case, 
not all subsidiaries are responsible for all value adding activities. Therefore they comprise other 
resources and take up other roles (Höltbrugge & Möhr 2011; Porter, 1985).  
 
Following the argument of Rugman et al.(2011), this chapter therefore focuses on employment 
policies at sub-national levels and employment as a separate business function in MNCs because of 
two reasons. First of all the configuration is considered as strategic because it can contribute to MNCs’ 
aims. By setting up a particular headquarters-subsidiary configuration, it creates links between 
competences, skills and behaviour of employees and companies’ goals (through, for example, variable 
pay and vocational training) (Colbert, 2004). Second, employment is interesting as this business 
function is generally expected to be sensitive to sub-national location advantages (Lerxtundi & 
Landeta, 2012). More specific, competitive skills and competences or knowledge of employees are 
found to differ between clusters of companies or regional governments (Crouch et al. 2009; 
Heidenreich, 2012).  
 
Based here on, the employment policies at sub-national levels, as shaped by social actors, are expected 
to affect the headquarters-subsidiary configurations. Specifically, in line with the previous chapter, if 
subsidiaries have access to competitive employment policies at sub-national levels, it is expected that 
this will not only affect discretion but also its competence in setting up or gaining access to policies 
(Bélanger et al., 2013). Changing competences will accordingly alter the subsidiary role vis-à-vis the 
headquarters. In MNCs the changing roles are, for example, reflected in the number of committees 
subsidiaries are member of. However, the subsidiaries’ competence or role will only be affected when 
employment policies at sub-national levels are complementary. This first of all refers to the 
contribution to MNCs’ employment aims for the subsidiary under consideration. As previously stated, 
contribution to MNCs’ objectives depends on the similarity between the goals of social actors and of 
the MNCs’ headquarters. As chapter V illustrates, subsidiaries’ social actors shaped employment 
policies at sub-national levels to their employment aims. This does not, however, mean that these 
policies are in accordance with MNCs’ employment aims. After all, conflicts between subsidiaries and 
headquarters have been observed (Edwards et al.,2007a; Pulignano, 2006). In addition, as some of 
these policies are part of a system of industrial relations and collective bargaining, the policies created 
are not always fully in line with MNCs’ aims. Second, complementarity refers to the reinforcing of the 
compensating character of the employment policies at sub-national levels. Altering competences and 
roles is only to be expected in the presence of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels. 
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What these employment policies at sub-national levels look like in Belgium will be briefly repeated in 
the next chapter. Furthermore, this section will describe how these policies can contribute to MNCs’ 
competitive advantage. 
 
 
8.3 Headquarters-subsidiary configurations and employment policies at 
sub-national levels in Belgium 
 
As the aim is to investigate how employment policies at sub-national levels result in an adapted 
typology, configurations and the employment policies at sub-national levels are first of all defined. 
The second part of this section illustrates how employment policies at sub-national levels have the 
potential to influence headquarters-subsidiary configurations and subsidiaries’ roles. For this 
illustration, the typology of Bartlett and Ghoshal is used as a point of departure as it is one of the most 
influential ones within the field (Rugman et al., 2011). This section will then outline how employment 
policies at sub-national levels (regional government and inter-firm level) fit within the typology. It 
ends by drawing propositions for the Belgian context. 
 
 
8.3.1 Configurations as strategic and employment policies at sub-national levels 
 
As previously stated, MNCs emphasise the need for a skilled workforce and competences as highly 
strategic nowadays because of the economic context in which they are operational (Noe, 2003). 
Indeed, within the coming years, a lot of OECD countries will be confronted with a shortage of skilled 
people because baby boomers leave the labour market and not enough new employees enter the 
market. As a consequence, vacancies will stay open and a war for talent is expected to take place, 
definitely for some key functions. In this context, headquarters-subsidiary configurations within 
MNCs will become increasingly strategic as they consist of a unique set of policies and instruments. 
This means that not only the specific knowledge or skills of employees can be core resources but also 
systems or policies and the way they have been organised within the MNC (Colbert, 2004). In this 
respect, literature talks about strategic human resource management (in the remainder referred to as 
configuration
15
) as human skills, competences or routines have been built up over time and as such are 
not easy to imitate (Colbert, 2004; Jun & Shuai, 2012). Apart from the internal resources, also the 
operating environment like the regional government and the inter-firm level can foresee in competitive 
resources. The former is defined as a formal constitution or regulations applicable in a particular area 
or territory (Lane & Wood, 2009). These regional governments are often supported by regional 
development agencies designed to promote indigenous economic development. The latter occurs by 
                                                          
15
 Human resource management is not used to avoid confusion on terminology. See chapter II, p.31 
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offering companies instruments like advice (general management markets, production and 
technologies), financial support (grants, equity, loans) and infrastructure (training, factories) (Phelps et 
al., 2003). The inter-firm level refers to agglomerations of small and medium-sized companies 
characterised by institutionalised cooperation (Pyke and Sengenbenger 1992; Zeitlin 2004). Specific 
systems of training, recruitment or pay and the quality of relations between managers and employees 
and their respective representative 
16
organisations, mobility and reskilling are the main important 
distinctive factors (Pyke & Sengenberger, 1992). Thus the focus is on two sub-national levels that can 
result in location advantages which can differ between inter-firm levels and regional governments and 
among companies within one country. After having listed these two location advantages, the next 
paragraphs will describe how these policies at sub-national levels fit within the Bartlett and Ghoshal 
typology. 
 
 
8.3.2 How do employment levels at sub-national levels fit into the Bartlett and Ghoshal 
configuration 
 
The typology of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) combines two criteria: location advantages and firm 
competences (table 12). Location advantages (external resources) are understood as sub-national 
policies allowing to distinguish oneself from the main competitors (Colbert, 2004). Firm competences 
(or internal resources) reflect whether the subsidiary is considered as being able to access or make use 
of these employment policies at sub-national levels in setting up employment policies. If this is the 
case, subsidiaries develop specific internal resources that might be of interest for MNCs’ headquarters. 
 
 
8.3.2.1 Location advantages  
 
The first dimension of the Bartlett and Ghoshal typology refers to the presence of policies at sub-
national levels as location advantages (table 12). Location advantages are hereby understood as 
attracting factors for a specific location where MNCs want to invest in. In addition it refers to 
locations where MNCs see the potential to shape policies in order to develop more favourable policies 
(Almond et al., 2014). Both regional governments and the inter-firm level have the potential to offer 
location advantages because of a delegation of employment responsibilities to the regional government 
in the last decennium (Cognard, 2011). Moreover, regional development agencies have offered a wide 
range of services and infrastructure for companies within the field of employment (Phelps et al. 2003). 
Accordingly, differences between these regional agencies can result in different location advantages 
                                                          
16
 As previously stated, the subsidiary level is not taken into account as location advantages explicitly refer to the 
external environment the subsidiary is located in (Rugman et al. 2011). 
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for companies. This is particularly the case when these regional agencies are funded by regional 
governments in a federal state. In this case, they represent the interests of the regional coalition and 
potentially emphasise other priorities than other regional governments (Halkier & Danson, 1997). 
 
The inter-firm level foresees in location advantages as a consequence of shared information, shared 
knowledge and participation in institutions (Molina-Moralez & Martinez-Fernandez, 2008; Zeitlin 
2004). The availability of information, the availability of a skilled or specialised workforce and the 
participation in local institutions result in a number of initiatives. Furthermore it gives support in line 
with companies’ needs as they are in touch with a large number of companies. Moreover, the services 
delivered can be organised at a low cost. These advantages are, however, not available for all 
companies as access to location advantages results from membership. Specifically, collective 
resources are available for members. Accordingly ‘member-companies’ can take advantage of this as 
opposed to non-members (Molina-Moralez & Martinez-Fernandez, 2008; Zeitlin, 2004).  
 
Tabel 12 Location advantages and subsidiaries’ competences for headquarters-subsidiary 
configurations 
 
 Regional government Inter-firm level 
Location advantages 
(external resources) 
Regional policies for 
recruitment, training and pay 
 
Shared information 
Shared knowledge 
- Participation of local institutions 
Subsidiary competences 
(= internal resources) 
Subsidiaries’ ability to gain access to these employment policies at 
sub-national levels 
 
8.3.2.2 Subsidiary competences  
 
The second dimension of the typology deals with subsidiaries’ competences. Subsidiaries’ 
competences are generally described as competences given by the MNCs’ headquarters or acquired by 
the subsidiary itself (Rugman et al., 2011). In our study the focus is on how this competence can 
change when studying sub-national location advantages, because local managers or trade unions have 
access or the knowledge to benefit from them. It is expected that being part of an inter-firm level or 
being located in a particular region affects the way competences are addressed. This is particularly 
expected to be the case when location advantages and changed subsidiaries’ competences are 
competitive for MNCs’ position (Benneworth & Hopers 2006; Coulson & Ferrario 2007). 
 
A related concept in this regard is reverse diffusion, referring to the process in which the subsidiary is 
considered competent to reverse transfer the sub-national advantage to the headquarters and 
174 
 
throughout the organisation (Edwards & Tempel 2007). This process for example can occur when local 
subsidiaries have access to information that is not available for the headquarters (Andersson et al. 
2007). At first this may seem like increasing the competence for the subsidiary under consideration. 
Edwards (1998) however, distinguishes between three forms of reverse diffusion: reverse diffusion as 
purposeful to control internal resources within the subsidiaries, reverse diffusion initiated by the 
subsidiaries’ managers or spontaneous reverse diffusion. It has been assumed that the first form most 
frequently occurs within MNCs’ subsidiaries and as such reflects a certain degree of hierarchy, 
although not equal to any of the subsidiary’s competences. In addition, some sub-national location 
advantages can be locally bound, affecting the subsidiary’s role in a negative way (Rugman et al. 
2011). This means that sub-national advantages can also lead to subsidiary isolation when 
competences (internal resources) cannot be used in other subsidiaries or the headquarters (Anderson et 
al., 2007). This would result in a decrease in subsidiary’s competences. To conclude, it is expected that 
employment policies at sub-national levels can be considered as location advantages and can affect 
subsidiaries’ roles in Belgium. The next section will briefly repeat these policies. 
 
 
8.3.3 Employment policies at sub-national levels in Belgium  
 
The regional government, the sector and the web of inter-firm relations in Belgium are expected to 
shape the configuration between headquarters and subsidiaries and subsidiaries’ roles. Specifically, 
they can provide for location advantages by delivering services like vocational training, sector specific 
instruments or recruitment advices. In addition, knowledge of and access to these initiatives is 
necessary to benefit from them.  
 
The first level encompasses regions and their agencies that fund the employment bodies (public as 
well as private) and provide incentives to promote, for example, vocational training of some target 
groups but also offer training cheques to companies. In addition, sectors can rely on the agencies to 
develop sector initiatives. The main difference between regional governments relate to the level of 
funding and the scope of the policies. Secondly, the inter-firm level in Belgium is found in the system 
of collective bargaining and web of inter-firm relations. Differences between sectors in location 
advantages can be traced back to two aspects: training for blue-collar workers is organised with 
collective means but not every sector has a training centre to ameliorate the alignment with sector 
requests; vocational training for white-collar workers is usually organised across joint committees, 
although in some committees additional training for white-collar workers is planned. The second 
interpretation of the inter-firm level is the web of inter-firm relations. Within these groups of 
companies, the existence of specific employment relations is often funded by regionalised domains 
like industrial policy and vocational training. Regional governments and their agencies are then 
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supportive institutions for cooperation between companies. As previously mentioned, a funded 
collaboration can be set up with surrounding educational organisations to develop specific skills 
(Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez 2008). As such, there is employment specialisation in line 
with local needs and a division of labour in line with the value chain within the local environment 
which remains a specific competitive advantage for cluster companies (Hervas-Oliver & Albors-
Garrigos 2007). As complementarity is expected to occur between sub-national levels, the following 
proposition is formulated: employment policies at multiple sub-national levels will affect 
headquarters’ subsidiary configurations. Following Bartlett and Ghoshal, altered headquarters-
subsidiary configuration is expected to occur by two mechanisms. First of all these policies, if 
competitive, will be considered as location advantages. Moreover, these location advantages affect 
subsidiaries’ competence. As a consequence, subsidiaries’ roles will be altered. Following paragraphs 
will investigate how, if any, competitive policies at sub-national levels, considered as location 
advantages, will alter subsidiaries’ roles. 
 
 
8.4 Presenting an adapted typology 
 
This section uses empirical findings to illustrate two elements of subsidiaries’ roles emphasised in 
literature 1) how the employment policy in MNCs’ subsidiaries in Belgium is shaped by the sub-
national location advantages and 2) how they altered subsidiaries’ competences. The companies with 
absence of competences are Packaging and ICT contrary to Waste and Food. 
 
 
8.4.1 MNCs’ competences and location advantages 
 
Packaging-no location advantages/only competences for the Walloon subsidiary. Packaging Belgium 
has three subsidiaries, each representing another division; the Walloon and Brussels subsidiary are 
managed together. For each business division, and so for each Belgian subsidiary, there is a highly 
controlled headquarters-subsidiary configuration and little room for local adaptation. Specifically, the 
European level and the corporate level are all control levels. For example, managers from all Western 
European countries met on a three-monthly basis and systems were set up to exchange best practices. 
The approach of the subsidiaries in Belgium can be summarised as follows: 
 
‘We're in the same structure, I report directly to the Vice President of HR, at the level of Western 
Europe. Each corporate value is to be extended to everyone and applied. For what concerns 
structures, what is called top management, appraisals, we implement this.’ (Packaging, HR Manager) 
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Other similarities for the Packaging subsidiaries were found with regard to the location advantages. 
Specifically, the sector in which the subsidiaries were operational, did not offer a wide range of 
services or infrastructure to the companies. Quite the opposite is applicable for Packaging at the time 
of data collection though future plans for training are made. As previously mentioned: 
 
‘Until this year, our members were not willing to invest on the sector level as it is a tight market and 
they are all competitors. It took a lot of effort to convince the board of directors of the relevance of 
training and other possibilities on sector level.’ (Packaging, Director Employers’ Federation) 
 
In addition, the services of regional development agencies were not used and they were not part of 
webs of inter-firm relations. Although it seems that subsidiaries are similar, an important difference 
should be noticed. Where the Flemish subsidiary had been taken over in the period of data collection, 
because of the tight market, the Walloon subsidiary was of a different kind. This subsidiary has, since 
its origin, been functioning as a pilot company in which new procedures and systems were tested. This 
took place within the production sphere and with regard to employment. In other words, if processes 
of systems were observed as contributing to the global divisions’ interest, they were transferred from 
the Walloon subsidiary to other subsidiaries within the business division: 
 
‘Le rubix, c’est mon bébé, if we need to change, we need to be able to map the skills needed in order 
to attract the right employees or retrain them, so for every employee we mapped which skills were 
missing with our newly installed techniques , … This rubix, I have to implement it now together with 
n+1 and n+2 for all the subsidiaries in the business division, we are talking about 70 companies.’ 
(Packaging, HR manager) 
 
ICT-no competences-location advantages for the headquarters. ICT is an MNC headquartered in 
Belgium with subsidiaries in Romania and the Netherlands. It is growing fast, not only through 
mergers but also by growing organically. The MNC has a strong centralised focus. Specifically, it is 
organised based on five international business divisions each having a manager and a global HR 
manager. Moreover, ICT has set up shared services. For example, ICT foresaw international e-learning 
systems and made use of similar templates for all subsidiaries: 
 
‘I've now been back from Romania, I've been there in order to ensure that they know how Belgium is 
working so they can take over. I visit all the subsidiaries. Yes, with all my USB-sticks and with all my 
templates. In Wallonia we are also involved in the work and in the Netherlands we help them to 
implement.’ (ICT, HR manager) 
 
177 
 
The main difference between the subsidiaries relates to sub-national involvement, which is the case for 
the Flemish subsidiary (where the headquarters is located). Specifically, there is a close link with 
educational institutions. In this regard, the subsidiary organises guest lectures and info sessions for 
future ICT profiles. This is rewarding since a lot of graduates engage in the summer school and 
immediately start in ICT . 
 
‘It is the aim to get an insight into what graduates are capable of and to be the first to pick the good 
ones.’ (ICT, HR manager) 
 
For the sector in which ICT is operational, no differences can be found because of the lacking sub-
national location advantages. As previously stated: 
 
‘The sector centre is mainly used for training the support functions, for ICT the company needs 
specific programs like the ones offered by companies like IBM and Cetrix, they are really experienced 
in the IT world.’ (ICT, Union representative) 
 
Waste-changed competences and location advantages. The complete opposite was found in the case of 
Waste. Waste is an MNC operating in the sector of industrial cleaning and waste collection. The MNC 
is located in the UK, has subsidiaries in five countries worldwide and has four subsidiaries in Belgium, 
all composed of former SMEs. All subsidiaries are strongly locally or regionally embedded as they are 
part of a web of inter-firm relations or informal networks (waste collection for municipalities or web 
of inter-firm relations). In addition they have close links to other companies or universities. Because of 
this, Belgian subsidiaries gained competences regarding employment, resulting in a limited overall 
management strategy: 
 
‘For me it was very surprising that a company of 1.200 people had no overarching HR or HR 
structure and was not represented within the executive management team. Previously, you just had 
every site manager reporting directly to the managing director. That was actually the structure that 
existed up to half a year ago.’ (Waste, HR manager) 
 
Regarding the configuration in general, the Belgian HR manager undertook several attempts to set up 
a hierarchical structure, but was unsuccessful due to the location advantages and firm competences for 
the subsidiaries. First of all, all subsidiaries are operational in the waste industry which means that the 
regional government forces them to organise training sessions on safety. Specifically in Belgium, 
environmental issues and vocational training were regionalised during the state reform. This means 
that the regional government determines the content of the training and sectors organises the training 
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sessions. Local managers and trade unions are important as they assure access to these obligatory 
training sessions allowing Waste to execute its main activity. 
 
For the Walloon subsidiary, an additional location advantage is observed. As the MNCs’ market 
position was threatened, Belgian management saw the newly created Walloon government, of which 
the green party was a member contrary to the configuration of the other regional governments, as 
useful for its activities. As such, Waste could make clear its interest in green waste treatment and 
reinforce its market position by being the first using a particular type of green waste treatment. This 
was made possible thanks to a close collaboration between the Walloon government, surrounding 
universities and the presence of MNCs and SMEs. More specifically, at the core of this competence 
centre, there was an R&D centre in close interaction with Waste, developing new methods, financially 
supported by the government and venture capitalists and staffed with personnel from universities. 
Moreover, closely linked with this centre, an HR centre has been set up in order to retrain and recruit 
employees, preparing them to work with these new methods. The provision of this web of inter-firm 
relations increased the competence of the Walloon subsidiary, as lobbying with the regional 
government was done by the local management. In addition, formalising employment policies within 
the web of inter-firm relations was built based on negotiations with other companies.  
 
Food-changed competences and location advantages based on divisions. Finally, the company Food 
reflects configurations that are based on divisions. Specifically, employment in the first business 
division focuses on employability and cost reduction in the packaging department. In the second 
division the focus is on R&D skills, as the aim is to obtain a patent. Although both business divisions 
are operational in a sector characterised by a well-developed training centre, it only affected the first 
business division.  
 
In collaboration with the regional government, the sector has invested in a simulation company in 
order to train employees in deal with flaws in the packaging department in the food sector. In addition, 
a high per centage of the funding has been spent to skill development for increasing employment 
security in case of restructuring. As such the sub-national location advantages are much more in line 
with the first business division of Food. Furthermore, as this subsidiary is the most profitable in the 
business division, a certain degree of reverse diffusion is observed. For example criteria for variable 
pay or simulation company have been reversely transferred to the remaining subsidiaries in the 
business division.  
 
Based on the description of the MNCs, it can be concluded that integrating employment policies at 
sub-national levels alters advantages and firm competences This is particularly the case when more 
than one employment policy is at place. The next section will therefore examine this proposition. 
179 
 
8.4.2 How integrating employment policies at sub-national levels affects subsidiaries’ 
roles 
 
This final section illustrates how taking into account the employment policies at sub-national levels 
addresses other roles to subsidiaries as opposed to the ones that were found based on the evidence on 
the national level only. As figure 16 illustrates, employment policies at sub-national levels affect 
location advantages and firm competences, causing three movements within our case studies. The 
following paragraphs will discuss them one after another. 
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Figure 16 Adapted subsidiaries’ roles after integrating employment policies at sub-national 
levels 
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Implementer 
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Subsidiaries’ competences 
Figure 1. Influence of the sub-national level for headquarters-subsidiary configurations 
* names in bold are the companies without taking into account the sub-national level 
** names in italic are the companies after taking into account the sub-national level 
*** F= Flemish subsidiary, W= Walloon Subsidiary, B= Brussels subsidiary 
 
From contributor to strategic leader. The first possible adjustment based on the integration of 
employment policies at sub-national levels is found in Waste. If the study would only have considered 
Waste Belgium, it would have observed a configuration without any formal policies or structures that 
could independently function from the headquarters (=heterarchy). In addition, no location advantages 
on the national level would have been observed. So based on the classification, Waste would have 
been put in the list of Contributor, because the main activity of Waste, waste collection and treatment, 
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is a regional responsibility. Consequently, integrating the regional governments and their agencies 
points to the existence of obligatory training sessions provided by these governments and their 
agencies in collaboration with the sectors. As these training sessions must be followed by all 
employees in order to remain operational, subsidiaries are assumed to be competent in order to access 
these sessions. Put differently, for global management it is far more efficient when skills are obtained, 
even if it increases subsidiaries’ competences and decreases central control. This results in labelling 
the cases of Waste, after integrating policies at sub-national levels, as strategic leaders. However, there 
is also a difference in degree between the subsidiaries. For the case of Waste in the Walloon region, 
the extent of location advantages and subsidiary’s competences was higher than for the other cases. 
Because of the funded web of inter-firm relations, specific employment services like recruitment 
channels, mobility programs or training and reward systems have been set up among companies. Since 
one of the key characteristics of this web of inter-firm relations is the informal relation between the 
management, local management is held responsible for engaging in these informal relations. This 
increased subsidiary’s competences. 
 
From implementer to black hole. Key to the second movement is that the policies at sub-national level 
levels foresee in(future) location advantages valued by the subsidiaries. Headquarters, however, are 
still in control and policies at sub-national levels do not alter subsidiaries’ competences. Illustrative in 
this regard is the pilot company of Packaging in the Walloon region. In this subsidiary, processes and 
systems are being tested and when proven efficient, they are reversely transferred. In addition the 
sector plans to have future training sessions which might be of interest for Packaging. Although the 
subsidiary can develop own systems, the nature of the subsidiary as being a pilot company, has been 
installed by higher organisational levels and as such newly developed processes or systems do not 
change the competence of the Walloon subsidiary. Therefore, Packaging Walloon is seen as a Black 
Hole. This would not have been the case if the study had focused on the national level only. In this 
case a hierarchy for each business division would have been observed without any location 
advantages. Accordingly, Packaging Belgium would have been labelled as Implementer. Similarly 
ICT in the Flemish region has close connections with educational institutions, although it is the global 
policy to approach these institutions to attract the well-performing graduates before other employers 
hire them. In the Flemish subsidiary there is a specific sub-national location advantage because the 
subsidiary in Flanders (ICTF) is the only subsidiary that gives courses to the students. In so doing, 
students meet and can engage to follow an additional summer school provided by ICT. Taken this into 
account, ICTF, as opposed to ICT in the other two regions should be considered as a Black Hole and 
not as an Implementer because the presence of a sub-national recruitment channel does not affect its 
competences, only its sub-national location advantages. 
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From strategic leader to implementer. The third scenario has been observed in Food. Not integrating 
the sub-national level would have resulted in a role for Food as Strategic Leader because of the 
presence of a well-developed training centre supported by the regional government. The differentiation 
is difficult to observe as more than one business division is present in the different subsidiaries. 
However, when looking at business divisions separately, the study shows the limited location 
advantages for the second division because of its international focus. Contrary, the first business 
division has a Belgian HR manager and benefits from the collective services. As the subsidiary is the 
best performer in its business division, reverse diffusion has been observed together with increased 
subsidiaries’ competences. This is, however, another type of reverse diffusion than was the case with 
Packaging, as it is less controlled or formally implemented by the headquarters. Therefore the first 
business division of Food is still labelled as strategic leader, for the other divisions, the role of 
Implementer is adopted. 
 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has demonstrated that the analysis of subsidiaries’ roles benefits from the integration of 
the regional government, the sector and the web of inter-firm relations to adopt a more appropriate role 
of subsidiaries within MNCs’ network. Our adapted conceptualisation suggests that employment 
policies at sub-national levels may cause other subsidiaries’ roles to emerge. This implies that a 
classification of subsidiaries based on the national level only, is limited in fully capturing the 
subsidiaries’ role. In addition, the chapter has demonstrated that policies at sub-national levels did not 
affect subsidiaries to a similar extent. In some cases, they did alter subsidiaries’ positions because of 
location advantages such as a newly created web of inter-firm relations supported by the government. 
In other cases the changed role was a consequence of the presence of well-developed centres on the 
sector level.  
 
The findings of the present chapter, as was the case in the previous chapter, have shown the relevance 
of integrating employment policies at sub-national levels into the study of the transfer. For the present 
chapter, it showed that the resource-based view indeed benefits from integrating sub-national location 
advantages when studying subsidiaries’ roles. In doing so, it fits with the literature emphasizing the 
importance of taking into account different host country advantages (Almond, 2011, Morgan, 2007). 
In addition, by focusing on employment, it is in line with studies emphasising the need to differentiate 
between (support) functions within the subsidiary. Existing literature has undeniably focused on the 
relation between headquarters and subsidiaries without making a distinction between the different 
business functions (e.g. HRM, R&D, marketing) present in a subsidiary (for an overview see Dunning 
183 
 
& Lundan 2008). Studies on configurations and subsidiaries’ roles have considered the subsidiary as 
homogenous (Rugman et al., 2011). 
 
The previous three chapters each have discussed three configurations of social actors, employment 
policies at sub-national levels and a dimension of the transfer. In doing so, the questions as described 
in the introduction were answered. However, the main research proposition: do social actors mediate 
the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries by shaping sub-national 
policies remains unanswered. The final synthesising chapter will tackle this question by integrating the 
theoretical frameworks used and the evidence presented in the previous chapters. 
  
184 
 
Chapter IX: Synthesis 
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9.1 Introduction 
 
Previous chapters have found social actors to shape employment policies at sub-national levels by 
using multiple resources. These policies were in turn found to shape these levels but also to affect the 
transfer of pay and training policies and practices vis-à-vis headquarters. Both these findings will be 
integrated in this chapter by reflecting upon the central research proposition. In so doing, the 
theoretical frameworks, institutional entrepreneurship, the business system approach and the resource-
based view will be combined. In addition the partial findings used as evidence for both propositions 
are integrated to examine the main research proposition. 
 
 
9.2 Integrated theoretical framework 
 
The focus on employment policies at sub-national levels within the study on the transfer of pay and 
training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries has contributed to a more elaborated 
understanding of diverging or locally adapted employment policies and practices. Therefore, the 
resource-based view and the business system approach went beyond the national level as the main 
business system or location advantage. However, integrating the sub-national levels in these 
theoretical frameworks did not suffice to overcome another criticism raised with regard to studies on 
the topic: the limited conceptualisation of social actors (Morgan, 2007). The latter refers to theoretical 
vagueness on the role actors play in the definition of MNCs’ policies and practices. This theoretical 
vagueness is found in the BS approach and in the resource-based view. For example, the BS approach 
argues that the transfer of managerial structures and practices between countries and cultures by 
MNCs depends on the institutional structures of host countries and on the relative balance of power 
between firms and institutions in home and host countries (Whitley, 1994). Similarly within the 
resource-based view, the agent dimension is referred to as MNCs seeking for (future) competitive 
location advantages. These location advantages are assumed to be created through the intervention of 
powerful agents like MNCs (Ferner et al., 2012). 
 
However, how this intervention is organised or takes place is not sufficiently conceptualised in current 
studies on the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Both 
frameworks, the business system approach and the resource-based view do acknowledge the position 
of social actors but fail to fully conceptualise their role. Studies on diverging employment policies so 
far did not integrate the idea of institutional entrepreneurship and co-evolution to conceptualise the 
role of social actors as actively engaging in employment policies at multiple sub-national levels. The 
current thesis did consider subsidiaries’ actors as institutional entrepreneurs. In doing so, the role and 
the action of the actors do not result from variation in the conventions and rules of the game 
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established by dominant institutions (capital and labour) (Whitley, 2000). Put differently, companies 
and other actors should not be considered as over-determined by their institutional environment, 
leaving little scope for local autonomy. Rather, social actors need to be seen as active agent shaping 
policies and making use of these shaped policies to mediate the transfer. To explain how this occurs, a 
non-functionalist interpretation of the concept of complementarity was used. This refers first of all to 
employment policies at reinforcing or compensating sub-national levels in which the latter can 
compensate for the deficiencies of a particular level. Second it refers to the alignment with social 
actors’ aims. In our study, alignment with social actors’ aims refer to subsidiaries’ social actors and 
headquarters’ aims. Particularly, subsidiaries’ social actors will shape policies in line with their aims. 
In turn these shaped policies will mediate the transfer of pay and training policies and practices in 
MNCs subsidiaries only if they contribute to headquarters’ aims. Based on this integrated theoretical 
framework, the next section will investigate the main proposition. It will rely on evidence of the three 
previous chapters. 
 
 
9.3 Do subsidiaries’ social actors mediate the transfer of pay and training 
policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries by shaping employment 
policies at multiple sub-national levels? 
 
9.3.1 Case study analysis 
 
Without repeating all the results in detail, the first section will shortly report on the findings per 
multinational: it will summarise the evidence on shaping employment policies at sub-national levels 
and on how these policies are used by subsidiaries’ social actors to mediate different dimensions of the 
transfer: control, centralisation, discretion and subsidiaries’ roles. 
 
Waste. Waste is the case where employment policies at multiple sub-national levels have been used to 
mediate the transfer of training policies and practices by subsidiaries’ social actors. In this respect, it is 
a very good example of the compensating or reinforcing nature of multiple policies. Specifically, 
subsidiaries’ social actors shaped employment policies at the level of the regional government, sector, 
inter-firm and company level. In turn, complementing policies were used to mediate the transfer. 
Indeed, for vocational training, complementarity between the regional government and the sector as 
well as between the regional government and the inter- firm levels inhibited the extent of control and 
centralisation and fostered subsidiaries’ discretion. Moreover, it affected the subsidiaries’ roles, 
because training sessions were needed to execute the main activity and to expand the R&D pillar. For 
pay policies, complementarity was found between the sector and site or subsidiary level. Specifically, 
subsidiaries’ social actors succeeded in negotiating a basic package on the sector level in order to 
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differentiate between the sites. This way, site specific benefits that were obtained, remained and 
central pay instruments were not set up. The case of Waste has been labelled as social actors making 
use of policies at sub-national levels to mediate the transfer. This way a continuous interaction 
between policies at sub-national levels and social actors’ behaviour takes place.  
 
Food. The case of Food is similar to the case of Waste, but only for the first business division and only 
for the training policy. Specifically, the aim of subsidiaries’ social actors resulted in a simulation 
company to train blue-collar workers. Moreover, elaborated services on the sector level were foreseen 
in order to foster employability and guarantee employment in case of restructuring. As a consequence, 
the first business division obtained discretion regarding training policies and central control was 
inhibited as access was obtained through the subsidiaries. For pay policies, the presence of attractive 
pension funds which allowed to recruit easily, did not affect subsidiaries’ discretion or inhibit control 
and centralisation. Although it did contribute to the employment aims of the local subsidiary, it was 
not being considered as competitive from headquarters’ point of view. Rather, the headquarters 
emphasised the profitability of the first business division by increasing the employability of blue-
collar workers (replace one another during holidays) and investing in the least profitable section (the 
packaging division for which a simulation company has been set up). For the second business division, 
employment policies at sub-national levels were similar, but they were not in line with the 
subsidiaries’ social actors nor with the headquarters’ employment aims. As such it did not affect the 
transfer. 
 
For ICT and Packaging no evidence could be found for social actors mediating the transfer by shaping 
employment policies at sub-national levels. However the reasons for the absence of any evidence 
differed in both cases. For ICT, there were employment policies on sub-national levels for training and 
pay policies; these policies, however, were not in line with headquarters’ and subsidiaries’ 
employment aims. For Packaging, in the case of the pilot company, a similar reasoning as in ICT 
could be made. In the Flemish subsidiary, however, there were no employment policies for training as 
the employers’ federation did not agree on the necessity of these services. For pay policies an 
agreement was made within the sector, however, headquarters did not find these policies competitive 
and as such no mediation has been observed. 
 
 
9.3.2 Discussion 
 
Based on cross-comparative analysis, it can be concluded that social actors do mediate the transfer of 
pay and training policies and practices but only if two conditions are met: the presence of employment 
policies at more than one sub-national level and the alignment between subsidiaries’ and headquarters’ 
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aims. Specifically, multiple employment policies are needed in order to have a reinforcing or 
compensating effect. In addition, the formed employment policies need to be attractive for both 
subsidiaries and for headquarters, otherwise there is no benefit in subsidiaries’ discretion or another 
subsidiaries’ roles and inhibiting control and centralisation to access these competitive employment 
policies at sub-national levels (table 13).  
 
The answer to our general research proposition should, however, be nuanced by the findings of the 
second business division of Food and ICT. Central to ICT and the second business division of Food is 
the recent multinational character. As found in chapter VI, the historic specific context plays a role. 
Particularly, a longstanding participation within committees and in the board of directors as well as the 
maintenance of employment policies on the level, are explanatory for the presence of alternative 
employment policies. In this respect it was expected that the subsidiaries of ICT, already had a 
longstanding character within Belgium and were engaged in employment policies at sub-national 
levels. Contrary to Waste however, these ICT subsidiaries had not been part of a multinational 
company. As such, the core characteristics of MNCs, being present in more than one context and 
having the possibility to shape the variety of contexts in line with MNCs’ objectives was less present. 
Accordingly, it can be expected that the existence as an MNC can be explanatory as well.  
 
Related to this, the growth phase of a multinational character is also worth mentioning when taken the 
results of ICT into account. Specifically, the lifecycle of the product or service has often been used to 
classify companies. It points to different stages of internationalisation like developing new markets 
and growth or lowering costs. After all, a company first started as a domestic company and becomes 
more international over time as the number of countries and subsidiaries increases (Westeney & 
Zaheer, 2013). In the first phase of internationalisation, control is executed based on personal relations 
between the headquarters and the first formal subsidiary without formal mechanic control systems. As 
the number of foreign value adding activities increases, a number of potential conflicts arise between 
the headquarters and subsidiaries on the one hand and among subsidiaries on the other hand. Similarly, 
MNCs try to combine pressures of national integration with local responsiveness. Against this 
background, mechanisms as task forces, teams and committees have been set up to align the 
subsidiaries with the companies’ aims. In a further stage, some companies evolved towards a more 
heterarchic company, sometimes labelled as the transnational company. Within this company, specific 
control mechanisms are less installed, rather normative integration based on common values 
contributed to this integration (for an overview see Rugman, 2013). So the presence of policies at 
multiple sub-national levels and the alignment with social actors’ aims should also be framed within 
the historic specific context of the MNCs and their subsidiaries.  
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Table 13 Synthesis 
 
  Transfer  
  Shaping employment policies at 
sub-national levels 
  
  Employment 
policies at 
reinforcing or 
compensating 
sub-national 
levels 
Employment 
policies at 
complementary 
sub-national 
levels and 
subsidiary 
social actors’ 
aims 
Accordance 
between 
subsidiaries’ 
social actors’ 
aims and 
headquarters’ 
aims 
Do subsidiaries’ 
social actors 
mediate the transfer 
of pay and training 
policies and 
practices in MNCs’ 
subsidiaries by 
shaping 
employment 
policies at sub-
national levels? 
Waste Waste 
Wallonia 
+++ +++ +++ + 
 Waste 
Flanders/Waste 
Brussels 
++ +++ +++ + 
Food  Business 
division 1 
++ +++ ++ + 
 Business 
division 2 
+ - - - 
Packaging Packaging 
Flanders 
+ + - - 
 Packaging 
Wallonia (+ 
Brussels) 
- - - - 
ICT ICT  - - - - 
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Part IV: Conclusion   
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10.1 Introduction 
 
Besides national policies as location advantages and regulatory levels, employment policies at sub-
national levels have been found to be increasingly important when studying employment within 
MNCs. Not only do formal organisations offer services to companies, informal networks between 
companies can result in competitive employment policies and practices as well. Regional employment 
policies, inter-firm employment policies or subsidiaries’ specific policies can reflect the presence of 
vocational training institutes, social funds or policies that have remained over time and that 
subsidiaries can make use of. As became clear within the preceding chapters, the increasing 
importance of these employment policies at sub-national levels has important consequences for the 
study on the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Not only do these 
policies offer resources for subsidiaries’ social actors to shape these policies at sub-national levels, 
they are also used to mediate headquarters’ control, centralisation and subsidiaries’ discretion, and to 
alter subsidiaries’ roles. 
 
This last part will briefly summarise the most important findings from the individual chapters. Rather 
than repeating all the findings, the chapter will first of all focus on more general theoretical 
implications. Next, the chapter will reflect upon the methodological implications and challenges 
studies on MNCs face when investigating the transfer. As part of this section, the generalisability of 
the findings will be discussed. Thereafter, the chapter will discuss the policy implications of the 
findings. Each section will hereby include some directions for future research on the transfer of 
employment policies and practices in MNCs. 
 
 
10.2 Theoretical implications of the research findings 
 
10.2.1 Research finding I: Social actors shape employment policies at multiple sub-
national levels in line with their aims if there are resources to do so 
 
Chapter VI showed two conditions to be fulfilled in order to engage in employment policies at sub-
national levels. First, resources at sub-national levels need to be available at multiple levels in order 
for social actors to act as institutional entrepreneurs. Second, these resources need to allow 
subsidiaries’ social actors to shape policies in line with their aims. After all, engagement is a strategic 
choice, meaning that social actors do not necessarily engage in employment policies at sub-national 
levels. The cases showed however, that the resources were not used to a similar extent. Managers 
made far more use of them than trade union representatives. Furthermore the resources were not 
always used in the expected way. Concretely, advisory boards of regional governments were expected 
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to function as a resource and resources at the subsidiary level were expected to be bypassed. These 
two resources were not found. Rather, two additional resources came up. First, informal ways and trust 
relations with politicians at the regional government shaped employment policies at this level. Second, 
on the subsidiary level, social actors made use of their strong bargaining position and the historical 
specific context of the subsidiary to negotiate alternative employment policies. So social actors were 
found to shape multiple levels by using a variety of sources on multiple levels. Based on the findings 
of this first empirical chapter, these policies were in turn used by social actors to mediate the transfer. 
In addition, these policies once more offered resources to engage in these policies. As such reformed 
or newly created policies were influential for and influenced by subsidiaries’ social actors. In this 
respect, an ongoing feedback loop between subsidiaries’ social actors and employment policies at sub-
national levels was observed to take place. 
 
This feedback loop more generally fits within the sociological idea of structure and agency of 
Giddens. By using the concept of duality of structure, it integrates the idea that structures are both the 
medium and the outcome of social actors’ behaviour. Accordingly, social actors can draw upon rules 
and resources in the production and reproduction of social live. Giddens distinguishes between rules 
and resources as the former relates to procedures telling us how to go on (Kaperson, 2000). The 
concept of resources, as illustrated in our study, encompasses a power or bargaining dimension since it 
enables social actors to add, to a particular extent, a transformative dimension to the production of 
social life. In our research, resources, for example, reflect the advisory boards based on parity resulting 
in a particular bargaining space between subsidiary’s social actors. However, resources and rules can 
also be constraining for social actors, when the resources do not allow to align the employment 
policies and social actors’ aims or when resources to act upon are not present.  
 
What is furthermore central to the concept of the duality of structure is, that not all actions are 
purposive, that, in other words, the reproducing of social life does not necessarily occurs consciously. 
This is limited in our study, because the resources available, based on parity, are a means used to put 
trade unions’ interests and the interests of management to the front. Similarly, (re)production of social 
life might also have unintended consequences which affect once more the reproduction of social life. 
This was, for example, the case for Packaging. Specifically, the regulation on the presence of the 
works council was used by the Belgian management to have one works council for the Flemish 
operations. However, as the former sites both had separate works councils, they were able to stay in 
place over time and MNCs’ management was unable to set up one sole works council. The initial goal 
for a central policy had the opposite effect.  
 
The way employment policies at sub-national levels have been shaped and used to mediate the transfer 
of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries so reflect an ongoing structuration 
193 
 
process between social actors and employment policies at multiple sub-national levels. The structure-
agency model in this regard deviates from a mainly functionalist idea in which society exists outside 
the agents. Quite on the contrary, by its (re)production, social agents’ embeddedness is shown. 
Shaping employment policies at sub-national levels and at the same time being influenced by these 
policies results in an endogenous process between MNCs and multiple levels. 
 
 
10.2.2 Research finding II : Employment policies at multiple sub-national levels are used 
by social actors to mediate headquarters’ control, centralisation and subsidiaries’ 
discretion 
 
A second and third proposition investigated how employment policies at sub-national levels are used 
by social actors to mediate the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. 
The idea behind this proposition, is that MNCs can benefit from discretion or a different subsidiaries’ 
roles for accessing employment policies at sub-national levels. Although these findings are based on 
training policies only, they reveal some interesting perspectives. Specifically, similar to the creation or 
adaptation of existing policies at sub-national levels, the concept of complementarity was put forward 
as central in explaining the transfer. Whereas for the shaping of the employment policies at sub-
national levels complementarity with subsidiaries’ social actors was central, the alignment with 
headquarters’ aims for the subsidiary under consideration is central in explaining the level of the 
transfer. Specifically, the more employment policies are contributing to MNCs’ competitive 
advantage, the more it will affect the transfer. Vice versa, when employment policies at sub-national 
levels are not complementary or no employment policies at sub-national levels are present at all, no 
changes in headquarters’ control, centralisation and subsidiaries’ roles are observed. To study the way 
employment policies at sub-national levels affected the transfer, our study distinguished headquarters’ 
control, centralisation and subsidiaries’ discretion on the one hand and headquarters-subsidiary 
configuration on the other hand. Chapter VII and VIII in line with the literature hereby respectively 
used the business system approach and the resource-based view as a point of departure. Accordingly, 
for the second proposition, as employment policies at multiple sub-national levels are used by social 
actors to mediate headquarters’ control and subsidiaries’ discretion, it can be questioned whether and 
how regional and inter-firm levels affect the use of the business system approach to study the transfer 
of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries.  
 
Therefore the definition of a business system is considered. Originally, Whitley defined a business 
systems as distinctive patterns of economic organisation that vary in their degree and mode of 
authoritative coordination of economic activities and in the organisation, and interconnections 
between owners, managers, experts and other employees (Whitley, 2000: 33). So the initial 
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conceptualisation of the business system approach did not exclude policy levels or domains other than 
the national level (Morgan, 2007). In this respect a business system only focusing on the national 
levels neglects its internal divergence. This internal divergence is caused by relevant policy domains 
for employment on sub-national levels. These policy domains are the sphere of the state, the way skill 
development has been set up, the financial sphere and trust relations (Almond, 2011).  
 
Based on the different sub-national levels considered and the interviews, relevant spheres are found on 
these levels. Table 14 shows how the different expressions of the employment policies at sub-national 
levels increase divergence within the Belgian business system (Almond, 2011). First of all, on the 
level of the regional government, there are four spheres or domains which have been originally 
distinguished for employment. Although the regional government can only exist because it is part of 
the federal government (sphere of the state), within Belgium it has an exclusive responsibility over 
particular policy domains, meaning that no higher level is granted a decision-making role. Moreover, 
regional governments were set up in order to solve conflicts at the national level. Taken together, the 
regional government is responsible for the formation of a mode of conflict (Whitley, 2000). This level 
of state is further reinforced by the prevalence of training institutes along regional axes (skill 
development). As already mentioned, vocational training was one of the policy domains that was 
regionalised during the state reform. In line with this, financial support was given to specific projects 
in particular regions as shown in the case of Waste and Food. Next to this, trust relations could emerge 
between different social actors on the regional level, represented in parliaments, cabinets or advisory 
committees. 
 
The second diverging effect has a similar logic. Specifically, sector bargaining could exist because of 
the multi-layered Belgian system of collective bargaining. Furthermore, training institutions are 
accredited by a higher hierarchical level. This does, however, not mean that sectors cannot deviate 
from what was agreed upon. In the case of Food, MNCs encourage companies to spend more 
collective means on training. In addition, the way training was defined differed strongly between 
vocational training centres. In Food for example, employers agreed on delegating responsibility to the 
sector training centre for a more integrated HR approach. The companies in the Packaging sector 
could obtain an agreement on an average remuneration package on the sector level to which they were 
able to participate.  
 
The web of inter-firm relations reflects the trust relations between companies. This web of inter-firm 
relations could foresee in particular collective employment policies and practices. Moreover, key to 
these clusters was the presence of internal and external financial support and specific skill systems. In 
the case of Food, the collaboration between SMEs and MNCs was even financially supported by the 
municipality. These collective services in turn maintained the trust relations. Based on these findings, 
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future research should therefore unravel the home and host country business system to contribute to a 
more comprehensive understanding of the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ 
subsidiaries. In doing so, studies will not only be able to investigate the influence of policies at the 
national level but also of different employment policies at sub-national levels. Furthermore, by 
integrating within country variance, conflicting findings can be addressed. 
 
Table 14 Reflection on the business system approach 
 
 State Financial Skill Trust relations 
Regional 
government 
x x x x 
Sector level x x x  
Web of inter firm 
relations 
 x x x 
 
10.2.3 Research finding III : Employment policies at multiple sub-national levels are used 
by social actors to alter subsidiaries’ roles 
 
The importance of integrating employment policies at multiple sub-national levels in the study on 
MNCs is furthermore supported by taking into account the findings on the headquarters-subsidiary 
configurations. Specifically, location advantages on multiple levels did change the subsidiaries’ roles. 
Although these resources are considered on different levels, the central factor in changing subsidiaries’ 
roles is that they contributed to the competitive advantage of MNCs’ headquarters. Furthermore, the 
study showed that location advantages for employment in our study are institutional resources like 
systems of consultation and co-determination as well as firm specific resources like lobbying 
possibilities or resources from local production networks (Ferner et al., 2011; Pulignano & Keune, in 
press).  
 
Based on this, it is concluded that studying employment policies and practices cannot be disconnected 
from the contexts in which organisations or social actors choose for a particular form or practice. 
Therefore, it is important to integrate the external environment in which MNCs’ subsidiaries are 
operational, like the regional government, the sector and the web of inter-firm relations when studying 
employment policies and practices. This opposes neo-classical approaches of employment, 
emphasising the rationality of social actors. Indeed treating employment as a market relation does not 
take into account the complex and multiple environments. As such it fails to integrate all the pieces of 
the puzzle for understanding employment. Therefore, in studies on employment, the idea of 
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employment as embedded needs to stay or be put back on the agenda. Accordingly, social actors do 
not behave rationally; their rationality is socially bounded (Meardi, in press). 
 
To conclude, the thesis fits with three more general (labour)sociological debates: the role of structure 
and agency, the role of within country variation and the role of the context. Specifically, MNCs and 
social actors within MNCs are not merely assumed to be passive followers; they rather shape 
employment policies at sub-national levels in line with their aims. These newly formed policies in turn 
influence MNCs and social actors’ behaviour. Second the demand of many business and labour studies 
for including within country variance into the study of the transfer has been met. This has been done 
by incorporating the regional and inter-firm level (Almond, 2011; Heidenreich, 2012). These 
employment policies and practices do not only refer to the company specific relation between 
employer and employees but also to the regulatory and collective institutions (Boxall, in press; 
Meardi, in press).  
 
 
10.3 Methodological implications 
 
10.2.1 For the studies on the transfer so far 
 
Besides these theoretical implications, two methodological implications can be added; the future 
integration of policies at sub-national levels in empirical studies and, related to this, the focus on 
multilevel analysis. Integrating the sub-national levels can indeed contribute to a more in-depth 
understanding of the home or host country effects in quantitative studies. Specifically, home or host 
country effects can be reinforced (interaction effect) or mediated (indirect effect) after integrating the 
employment policies at sub-national levels. The question then arises on how to quantitatively measure 
these policies at sub-national levels. Following proposals are made. First, respondents can be asked to 
what extent they make use of the services provided at the regional government level, sector and if 
applicable web of inter-firm relations. Second, based on the analysis of policy documents, researchers 
can rank different governments and sectors based on the presence of supporting initiatives. Combining 
both questions could result in a scale for quantitative analysis, measuring the use of supportive 
initiatives (for example: 0 = no initiatives, 1 = no use of supporting initiatives, 2 = limited use of 
limited supporting initiatives, 3 = extensive use of limited supporting initiatives, 4=extensive use of a 
wide range of supporting initiatives). As such, it is possible to distinguish between home and host 
country effects, main effects of policies at sub-national levels and reinforcing or mediating effects 
between these levels. Other possibilities for survey research relate to the way the sample has been set 
up. If a representative list of a particular home or host country is available, groups of MNCs’ 
subsidiaries can be selected based on the location within a state or government and the sector in which 
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they are operational. As such, studies can compare MNCs located and operational in strongly different 
or similar sub-national levels. Based on a comparison between groups, scholars can gain an insight 
into the main and moderating effects of sub-national levels on different dimensions of the transfer of 
employment policies and practices within MNCs’ subsidiaries in the same host country or from the 
same country of origin. 
 
Related to the previous implication, our evidence illustrates that future cross-national comparative 
research on the transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs would benefit from a 
multilevel approach. Among other studies (Almond, 2011; Bélanger et al., 2013), our case study 
evidence illustrates the relevance of policies at sub-national levels. In addition, the company, on both 
national and supra-national level and the interplay between these levels have been found to explain the 
transfer of employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries, even though integrating all 
levels has not been studied so far (Edwards et al., 2012; Rugman et al., 2011). By using a multilevel 
approach, studies could integrate meaningful levels for the topic under consideration and point to the 
interconnectedness of these levels. As such, complementarity as observed in the thesis, is expected to 
be found between the company, sub-national, national and international level.  
 
 
10.3.2 Can the results be generalised? 
 
A second methodological implication is the generalisability of the findings. It concerns generalisation 
to other employment policies and practices, other institutional contexts and different types of 
companies.  
 
Specifically, within this research, the focus was on pay and training policies and practices as both are, 
when compared to other employment practices, most frequently studied (Ferner et al., 2006; 
Marginson et al., 2010; Quintanilla et al., 2008). Our results however, are mainly based on vocational 
training policies and practices. The question that can be asked is to what extent the findings regarding 
complementary levels are also applicable to other employment policies and practices. Initially, based 
on the literature, it was expected that the more important an employment practice or policy is and the 
easier to control, the more the employment practice will be controlled for (Storey, 1989). Based on 
this, pay was expected to be much more controlled than training. Moreover, based on recent data on 
employment practices and policies in Belgium, the study concludes that there indeed are differences 
regarding control and discretion. As tables 15 and 16 below illustrate, pay related employment 
practices and policies are far more controlled. This was indeed the case in our results, although the 
thesis found that the presence of a competitive policy at sub-national levels and resources to shape 
these policies, could contribute to divergence. However, for pay policies, less resources and less 
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competitive advantages have been observed. This can partially be explained by the nature of pay 
policy (Storey, 1989). Based on these tables and the results found in the study, it is therefore expected 
that there is a difference between employment policies and practices but that resources and 
competitive policies at sub-national levels need to be taken into consideration to explain the results.  
 
Table 15 Findings on discretion in MNCs’subsidiaries in Belgium 
 
Pay and performance management Mean value (1=no discretion-5=full discretion) 
Employee share ownership 1.52 
Performance appraisal managers 2.36 
Performance appraisal LOG 3.60 
Variable pay managers 2.36 
Variable pay LOG  3.45 
Training  
Overall training 4.10 
Organisational learning 3.40 
Succession planning 2.71 
Communication and consultation  
Involvement of workers in work process 4.44 
Attitude surveys and suggestion schemes 4.44 
Provision information of workers 3.69 
Trade union representation  
Trade union recognition 4.02 
Union involvement 3.87 
Employee consultation 3.89 
Pulignano and Dekocker (2014) 
*LOG= Largest Occupational Group 
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Table 16 Presence of control in MNCs’subsidiaries in Belgium 
 
Control from a higher hierarchical level (e.g. 
regional or global headquarters) 
Percentage Yes 
Managerial pay and benefits packages 78.8 % 
Management career progression 73.1 % 
Overall labour costs 77.1 % 
Headcount (number of workers) 75.6 % 
Staff turnover 43 % 
Absenteeism 36.4 % 
Labour Productivity 46.1 % 
Workforce composition in terms of diversity (e.g. 
gender, ethnicity, disability etc.) 
42.2 % 
Employee attitude and satisfaction  55.4 % 
Pulignano and Dekocker (2014) 
 
The second remark relates to the highly institutional Belgian sub-national context. Indeed, specific for 
the Belgian institutional context is the presence of employment policies at multiple sub-national levels. 
Therefore the question is asked to what extent the results are applicable in other host countries 
(Almond et al., 2014). In the UK for example, there are regional development agencies that function as 
intermediary organisations between companies and a number of skill development institutions. The 
role of the regional agencies has been diminished under the conservative/liberal coalition. In addition, 
contrary to Belgium, trade unions are not involved in these development agencies. A similar image 
can be seen in Ireland; informal networking between MNCs and institutions has been observed, 
however. Because of this, MNCs’ social actors are able to establish favourable policies to attract 
MNCs on different sub-national levels. Other host countries like Spain and Canada have been 
characterised by more institutional resources. Specifically in Spain, regional rather than the national 
government is most often referred to when talking about government. This stems from the autonomy 
these regional governments and their agencies have regarding various forms of policies, like social 
partnership agreements between companies or HRM. However, as these regional government and their 
agencies are very autonomous, differences between these regions can be very high as they install their 
own agencies. Put differently, based on the composition of the regional governments, other policies 
will be put forward and other agencies will be funded. As such, location advantages and competitive 
policies for MNCs can differ. Similarly, in Canada, provinces have considerable autonomy regarding 
FDI and employment and skill development. So for Canada and Spain, it can be concluded that these 
agencies are important resources that social actors can rely on to shape policies at sub-national levels. 
However, the limited autonomy of the agencies in the UK does not mean that resources are 
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unavailable. These resources can exclude some actors like trade unions, but informal resources can be 
set up like in the case of Ireland (Almond et al., 2014). Furthermore, the recent revival of webs of 
inter-firm relations which are particularly important for economic performance in Germany and Italy, 
are characterised by specific historical resources for social actors to engage in employment policies at 
sub-national levels (Trigilia & Burroni, 2009). Therefore, the nature of the resources for both the level 
of the regional government and the inter-firm level might be different, but resources for subsidiaries’ 
social actors to shape policies are expected to be present. 
 
Similar questions can be asked regarding the influence of employment policies at sub-national levels 
on the transfer. Put differently, are social actors expected to use policies at sub-national levels to 
mediate the transfer? Previous empirical studies have emphasised the changing sub-national levels as 
contributing to their competitive advantage. Particularly, the study of Jun and Shuai (2012) showed 
that there is big difference in performance between companies belonging to a web of inter-firm 
relations and companies not belonging to the web of inter-firm relations. Similar results were found by 
Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos (2007). Based on evidence in the web of inter-firm relations in 
Spain and Italy, they found cluster companies to have a specific bundle of resources and a certain level 
of company performance. Although these studies do not investigate how this alters the transfer of 
employment policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries, it shows the potential strategic contribution 
of policies at sub-national levels. Therefore these policies are expected to have an effect on MNCs’ 
behaviour, like the transfer.  
 
Finally, it can be questioned to what extent the results can be transferred to other types of companies. 
For this, the ICT case is referred to. ICT clearly showed that the per centage of ownership was 
explanatory for the transfer. Particularly, all the subsidiaries in the study were wholly owned, expect 
for the Walloon ICT subsidiary. This ownership per centage was put forward as the main reason for 
the limited transfer within the Walloon ICT subsidiaries. Therefore it can be questioned to what 
extent, wholly owned subsidiaries are a necessary condition to talk about transfer instead of the initial 
50.01 per centage that was put forward within our study. Therefore future studies should integrate 
more variation in ownership in order to observe the effect on the transfer. 
 
 
10.4 Policy implications 
 
Next to the theoretical and methodological implications, the study discusses three policy implications 
of the findings: the presence of resources, how they are used by social actors and the way the 
employment policies at sub-national levels relate to other policy levels. First, against the background 
of state reforms, it is important to note that more regionalisation does not necessarily result in more 
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institutional entrepreneurship or less transfer from headquarters to subsidiaries. Rather, the presence of 
employment policies at multiple sub-national levels is necessary in order to give the possibility to be 
shaped and to affect the transfer. This is in line with Almond et al., who state (2014: 240) that only 
one type of MNCs select the most appropriate locations à la carte. The other type of MNCs, choose 
host countries and local operations where they can engage with host country institutions in order to 
construct a more desirable environment through continuing relationships. So when thinking about 
how to reinforce subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, location advantages at one level will not necessarily 
suffice to affect subsidiaries’ roles. Similarly, competitive employment policies at sub-national levels 
will not affect subsidiaries’ discretion if only present at one level. Put differently, it is the 
compensating or reinforcing force in sub-national, company and national policies that affects 
institutional entrepreneurship and transfer. Therefore discussing decentralisation of policy domains on 
the regional government, sector or company level to strengthen subsidiaries’ positions should be done 
simultaneously and not by debating only one level or within one policy domain. 
 
A second implication, related to the first one, is the presence of resources for employers and 
employees and their representative organisations. The majority of these resources is based on parity, 
meaning that these resources share the bargaining space equally among social partners, emphasising 
their interests. However, findings have shown that employment aims can differ within one group of 
social actors. Specifically, disagreements between the Christian, socialist and liberal party undermined 
their equal bargaining position derived from resources based on parity. Similarly, conflicts between 
SMEs and MNCs prevented the efficient use of resources at sub-national levels. Therefore, in order to 
maximise the efficacy of these resources, a common strategy within trade unions or employers is 
recommended.  
 
A final policy implication relates to the position of these policies at sub-national levels vis-à-vis other 
policy levels (national and European level). As in many OECD countries some policy domains have 
been transferred to sub-national governments; these levels sometimes receive exclusive 
responsibilities. As such the national level for some domains has no prior role anymore or cannot 
contest decisions made on sub-national levels. This is particularly the case for regional governments. 
These regional government are furthermore representatives of particular interest groups. As our 
findings showed, these levels all have resources where social actors can shape. As a consequence, on a 
higher policy level like the European level, distinct preferences of particular interest groups can be put 
forward. It is therefore important that all involved policies together equally represent employers’ and 
employees’ interests in order to maintain social peace. So when studying European and national levels, 
particularly for policy domains that have been delegated, it is important to get an insight into whether 
the interest of multiple groups is equally represented. Therefore employment policies at sub-national 
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levels vis-à-vis other policy levels need to be taken into account as they increased in relevance when 
studying employment.  
 
To conclude, the present study has raised three major implications for future research, be it academic 
or policy oriented research: 1) the equal importance of social actors and the external environment, 2) a 
multilevel approach for the study of employment, and 3) the integration of variation of explanatory 
variables. The former first of all refers to the way policies are shaped by social actors and in turn 
shape social actors’ behaviour. More generally, it emphasised the need to integrate the external 
environment where social actors are operational when studying employment. Second, the multilevel 
approach refers to the presence of different policies like the European, worldwide or national level 
next to the sub-national and company level. After all, integrating all these levels will not only 
contribute to a more complete understanding of the transfer. It could also explain, by using the concept 
of reinforcing or compensating levels, why the transfer is still influenced or why policies are shaped, 
even in the absence of one level. Finally, variation in explanatory variables not only refers to the 
integration of policies at sub-national levels in future studies on the transfer but also in additional 
variation in types of employment policies and practices, host and home countries and ownership per 
centages. By integrating these suggestions, based on the findings, future studies can elaborate on the 
knowledge of how policies are shaped by social actors and used to mediate the transfer of employment 
policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries.  
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Table 17 Overview of studies explaining the transfer 
 
References Methodology Countries Findings 
Headquarters-subsidiary configuration/subsidiary roles 
Almond et al. 
(2005) 
Case studies US Multinationals in UK, 
Spain, Germany and 
Ireland 
 subsidiary role: country of origin 
effect: dynamic process of 
decentralisation, ‘dedecentralisation’ 
and finally semi-decentralisation.  
 subsidiary role: a combination of 
country of origin and dominance effect 
Birkinshaw & 
Morrison (1995) 
 
Anova analysis  MNCs in 6 countries: US, 
UK, Canada, France, 
Germany and Japan 
 configurations between headquarters 
and subsidiaries are based on core 
competences, strategic autonomy, 
specialisation, performance and 
subsidiary interdependencies (value 
chain) 
Ferner (2000)  Case studies MNCs in UK and Germany  existence of mutual interdependent 
systems of control rather than 
exclusive forms of control 
 evolution towards less hierarchic 
configurations because subsidiaries 
interpreted the local markets 
Ferner et al. 
(2004)  
 
Case studies US MNCs in UK  configurations are based on external 
environment instead of stages of 
internationalisation 
 bargaining process: subsidiary roles 
are negotiated between headquarters 
and subsidiaries 
Forsgren (1990) Case studies 22 Swedish companies   hierarchy derives from control of 
strategic resources, but configuration is 
variable 
 configurations is the result of  
management’ search for legitimacy 
Ghoshal & 
Nohria (1989) 
Cluster analysis 483 US and European 
owned companies 
 configurations are based on transaction 
costs and resources  
 environmental complexity and local 
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resources relate to the level of 
centralisation, formalisation and 
socialisation 
Ghoshal & 
Nohria (1993) 
Cluster analysis 66 large MNCs  configurations are based on local 
adaptation and global integration 
Malnight (2001)  Longitudinal 
Document 
analysis and semi-
structured 
interviews 
88 processes  distinguishes between 8 clusters of 
MNCs based on the most important 
level (domestic, regional, transnational 
and global) and on the level of product 
differentiation  
 clusters are linked with particular 
levels of decision-making, strategic 
position, communication and corporate 
culture 
McGraw (2004) 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Foreign MNCs in Australia  configuration is explained by the 
environment, the competences 
elsewhere in the network 
 and social actors 
Parry et al. 
(2008) 
 
Survey 540 MNCs  institutional distance explains 
subsidiary roles 
 institutional distance also influences 
manoeuvre for social actors in 
determining subsidiary roles 
Rugman et al. 
(2011)  
Case studies   for production, sales, innovation and 
administrative support the 
headquarters-subsidiary configuration 
changed for all activities after 
integrating the supra-national 
dimension 
Discretion, centralisation and control 
Almond et al. 
(2005) 
Case studies US Multinationals in UK, 
Spain, Germany and 
Ireland 
 industrial relations: country of origin 
effect 
 pay and performance management: 
country of origin effect, for German 
MNCs also country of origin effect for 
training policies  
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Bélanger et al. 
(2013)  
 
Survey  208 foreign (164) and  
domestic (44) owned 
MNCs in Canada 
 stronger resources means higher 
discretion 
 resources: internal management 
capabilities (relations with employees, 
representing capability and mandates) 
and embeddedness (network with 
clients/suppliers, competitive position 
in the value chain) 
 country of origin: US owned MNCs 
have less discretion 
Belizon et al. 
(2014)  
survey 213 Irish MNCs 
242 Spanish MNCs 
 evidence for home and host country 
effect, 
 influence of mode of entry and new 
investments and presence of expats on 
the transfer 
 no influence of size, sector and age 
Edwards et al. 
(2007)  
Case study American MNCs  home and host country institutions 
shape the transfer of employment 
policies but at the same time these 
institutions are the result of a contest 
between social actors within MNCs 
Edwards et al. 
(2013)  
Survey  833 foreign owned MNCs 
in Canada, Ireland, Spain 
and UK 
 control is not determined by the 
subsidiary position within the network 
 skill level of the work force is 
influential 
 country of origin influences the type of 
control 
 organisational structures are related to 
output control 
Fenton-
O’Greevy, 
Gooderham, and 
Nordhaug (2008) 
Regression 
analysis 
441 US MNCs in Norway, 
Denmark, Germany, UK, 
Ireland and Australia 
 centralisation is determined by a 
combination of country of origin 
effect, host country effect and 
unionisation at the subsidiary level 
Ferner, & 
Quintanilla 
(1998) 
Case studies US and UK MNCs in 
Germany 
 support for country of origin effect 
 German way of internationalisation 
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Ferner et al. 
(2004) 
Case studies UK US Germany and Spain  inconsistencies in employment policies 
increases discretion 
 country of origin: subsidiaries of US 
MNCs have less discretion 
 subsidiaries as local interpreters of 
local environment enhances discretion 
Ferner et al. 
(2005) 
Case studies US MNCs in UK  different outcomes for discretion and 
control, a combination of product and 
labour-market pressures for diversity 
in the home and host countries and 
company specific characteristics 
Ferner et al. 
(2012)  
Survey 258 MNCs  for IR and HRM: country of origin and 
standardisation of products are 
influential 
 HRM: influence of intermediate 
structures and nature of HR 
 IR: influence of sector 
Innes & Morris 
(1995) 
 
Descriptive 
statistics 
US, Japanese and German 
MNCs in Wales 
 no evidence for country of origin 
effect; only certain aspects are being 
transferred 
 indication for importance of sub- 
institutional dimension: Japanese 
MNCs recognise unions in Wales 
(presence of regional development 
agencies) more than in the rest of the 
UK 
Marginson et al. 
(2010) 
Survey UK and foreign (US, 
Japanese, German, ) 
Swedish and French)MNCs 
in UK 
 partially confirmation of country of 
origin effect on the choice of employee 
representation/consultative voice 
 variation between European-owned 
MNCs 
 intra-firm variation of the same 
country because of methods of growth 
and sector 
Muller (1998)  Case studies UK, US and German 
MNCs in Germany 
 home country effect: US companies try 
harder to avoid IR institutions 
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compared to UK and German MNCs, 
space for manoeuvre more used by US 
companies 
 bigger MNCs comply more with host 
country settings 
McDonald et al. 
(2003) 
Survey  40 German MNCs and 67 
UK MNCs in UK 
 no country of origin effect 
 a German version of Anglosaxation: 
interaction between home country 
effect, the host country effect and best 
practices 
 level of discretion and control depends 
on subsidiary mandate 
Pulignano (2006)  Case studies US MNCs in Italy and UK  pay and reward systems: 
decentralisation for UK MNCs, mixed 
evidence for Italy 
 training and recruitment: mixed 
evidence for both UK MNCs and 
Italian MNCs 
 trade unions and collective bargaining: 
mixed evidence for both UK MNCs 
and Italian MNCs 
Rosenzweig & 
Nohria (1994)  
 
Survey  249 affiliates in US of 
foreign MNCs 
 discretion is explained by the method 
of founding, the local resources, the 
presence of expats, the communication 
with the headquarters and the nature of 
the employment policy or practice 
Quintanilla & 
Ferner (2003)  
Case studies 4 MNCs in Spain  effect of country of origin for HR and 
IR 
 effect of internal management 
capabilities 
 effect of subsidiary resources 
 the host country influences 
possibilities for social actors to 
influence control and discretion 
Quintanilla et al. 
(2008) 
Case studies 4 US MNCs in Spain  industrial relations: country of origin 
 payment systems: centralisation 
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though some subsidiaries have 
arrangement for fringe benefits at local 
level, depending on bargaining space 
of the subsidiary 
 employment strategies: centraliqed but 
adapted to the local level 
Saka (2002) Case studies Japanese subsidiaries in the 
UK 
 home country, host country, company 
characteristics and the nature of the 
work organisation influence the extent 
to which the work organisation of the 
head office is transferred 
 comparison between the case studies 
showed an indication for considering 
the regional institutional systems 
within UK 
Tayeb (1998) Case studies US MNCs in Scotland  nature of policy or practice is 
detrimental 
 easy transfer: recruitment, training pay 
and performance 
 no easy transfer: communication and 
IR- need help from local trade unions 
Tüselmann et al. 
(2002)  
Survey 60 German MNCs in UK  complementary HR and ER schemes 
Tüselmann et al. 
(2008)  
Survey  US and UK owned MNCs 
in UK 
 discretion and control are explained by 
the level of internationalisation of the 
sector and the nature of internalisation 
of the sector 
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Table 18 Overview of studies using secondary datasets 
 
References Research Focus Population listing 
Björkman et al. (2008) the degree to which HR practices are 
standardised and/or localised  
lists provided by embassies and 
business councils 
Du et al. (2011) foreign directors in active boards Belfirst 
Guest & Hoque (1996) foreign ownership influence on HR 
practices  
lists provided by embassies, regional 
development agencies and trade 
associations 
Huang (2000) parent-company culture influence on HR 
practices in overseas subsidiaries 
lists retrieved from the Council of 
Investment, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs of Taiwan 
Kim & Gray (2005) environmental and firm-specific variables 
explaining HR practices 
Australian Stock Exchange 
McDonald et al. (2003) country of origin and employment 
relations 
listing of the German-British 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce 
and Office for National Statistics 
Morris et al. (2009) internal company processes and HR 
replication 
2004 Fortune Listing 
Park et al. (2003) relationship between HR and firm 
performance 
Japanese and American Chambers 
of Commerce listings 
Tungli & Peiperl 
(2009) 
convergence and divergence trends in 
expatriation practices 
the Global 1000, Amadeus, 
Germany’s top 500, Press Reference 
1996 
Wood & Fenton-
O’Greevy (2005) 
institutional settings and employee voice 
and representation 
Financial Times top 100 
Yamao et al.(2009) role of subsidiaries’ practices for 
development of knowledge stocks  
USA/Australia Trade Directory 
2006 (American Chamber of 
Commerce), German Subsidiary 
Companies in Australia 2005/2006 
(German-Australian Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce, 2005) 
Japanese Overseas Investment 
Country (Country Edition)  
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Table 19 Topic guide company level 
 
Topic guide interviews Employment policies and practices in multinationals  
 
First of all I want to thank you for the collaboration on the project of multinationals. During this 
interview, two blocks of questions will be asked. I will start with some general questions on the 
multinational company and its headquarters in country x. Then I will come to questions related to this 
subsidiary 
 
1. Background information 
a. Can you describe your function within the company 
i. For how many years you have been working within this company 
ii. Did you always worked in this subsidiary 
iii. Are you operational on other levels in the company 
b. Can you describe the companies’ main activity 
c. In which countries is the company operational 
d. How the company has been evolving over time. Can you give a short description of the history 
e. How is the company doing these days, for the last year 
 
2. HR function 
 a.    How does the company organise its employment around the world 
i. Is there a more centralised or decentralised approach 
ii. Is the approach similar for all the subsidiaries 
iii. Are there mechanisms used to maintain contact between the headquarters and the subsidiaries 
 
3. Information on the subsidiary 
a. Can you describe the main activity of the subsidiary 
b. Can you describe the history of the subsidiary (mergers etc.). 
c. Why this subsidiary has been located in Belgium 
d. Why this subsidiary has been located in region x (Flanders, Brussels or Walloon region) 
e. Can you describe the industry in which the subsidiary is operational 
f. Can you describe the relation between unions and management within this industry 
g. Can you describe how the subsidiary operates in the local environment 
i. Has the subsidiary contact with other local firms (local suppliers?) 
ii. Is the subsidiary member of (a) representative organisation(s) 
iii. Has the subsidiary a powerful position in terms of competition compared to other local companies 
iv. Can you describe contacts with other local firms, local organisations or universities 
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h. Can you describe employee representation at the subsidiary level 
i.  How does management and unions operate within the subsidiary 
j. Can you describe the largest occupational group within the subsidiary 
i. Can you describe the composition of LOG 
ii. Can you described LOGs’importance for the subsidiary  
 
The following questions concern the two employment practices pay and training. All the following 
questions concerns the largest occupational group within the subsidiary 
4. Information on pay policies 
a. Can you describe the pay policy for the largest occupational group 
b. Can you describe the process of creation and implementation of this policy 
(based on answers in previous section) 
i. What is the role of the headquarters  
ii. What is the role of the local management 
iii. What is the role of the unions 
iv. What is the role of the subsidiaries’ position in the network of MNCs’ subsidiaries 
v. What is the role of the local context 
vi. Did the subsidiary benefit from local or regional initiatives 
vii. What is the role of representative organisations 
viii. What is the role of power of the MNC 
 
5. Information on training 
a. Can you describe the training policy for the largest occupational group 
b. Can you describe the process of creation and implementation of this policy 
(based on answers in previous section) 
i. What is the role of the headquarters 
ii. What is the role of the local management 
iii. What is the role of the unions 
iv. What is the role of the subsidiaries’ position in the network of MNCs’subsidiaries 
v. What is the role of the local context 
vi. Did the subsidiary benefit from local or regional initiatives 
vii. What is the role of representative organisations 
viii. What is the role of power of MNC 
 
6. Institutional entrepreneurship 
a. Can you describe the employment policies at sub-national levels 
b. How were these policies constructed 
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i. What is the role of MNC 
ii. What is the role of regional development agencies 
iii. What is the role of the employers’ federations 
iv. What is the role of the trade unions 
 
Table 20 Topic guide sector level 
 
Topic guide Sector level 
1) Profile interviewee: 
a) What is the job of the interviewee 
b) What is the level he/she is working on 
c) Seniority 
2) Composition of the sector  
a) How does the sector look like (Companies: what is the average size, international character, 
geographical spread, proportion SME-MNC) 
b) Can you describe the social actors (relation between trade unions and employers on the sector level 
and within the companies) 
3) Can you give a description of policies and services on the sector level 
a) Is there a training centre-future plans 
b) Is there a social fund: pensions fund 
c) Is there a sector convenant:  
i) Content of the covenant 
ii) Elaboration in the future or planning to have one in the near future 
4) How have the policies and instruments been set up 
a) Bottom or top down  
b) What is the role of social actors 
c) What is the role of specific companies 
 
5) Collaboration with other policies at sub-national levels 
a) Is there collaboration with regional development agencies 
b) Is there any collaboration across sectors 
c) Is there any collaboration with private companies 
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Tabel 21 Index 
 
Theme Sub themes Description of themes 
Profile of the respondent    
 1. PROF_FUNC whether the respondent has an HR 
function, a general management function 
or is a union representative 
 2. PROF_SEN seniority, the number of years operational 
in the company  
 3. PROF_ORG the level on which the respondent is 
operational (juridical sense) 
 4. PROF_EXP whether the respondent has experience or 
not 
Background MNC 5. BMNC_C the country in which the head office is 
located 
 6. BMNC_HIS how the company has been evolving over 
time 
 7. BMNC_ECO describes how the company is doing these 
days compared to its competitors 
 8. BMNC_ACT main activity of the MNC 
 9. BMNC_MARK the market in which the MNC is 
operational 
 10. BMNC_REG the company is subjected to regulation 
regarding the main activity, on a national 
level 
 11. BMNC_CL nature of clients of MNC (local, 
international) 
 12. BMNC_STR the way how the business is organised 
throughout the world (based on country , 
based on business division) 
 13. BMNC_APP the way the headquarters approaches the 
subsidiaries (centralised/decentralised) 
 14. BMNC_NAME name of the company 
 15. BMNC_CUL the values emphasised by the multinational 
company 
 16. BMNC_CONTACT which mechanisms are used to install 
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contact between headquarters and 
subsidiaries 
Background Subsidiary 17. BSUB_LOC the region in which the subsidiary is 
located  
 18. BSUB_CUL the values emphasised by the subsidiary 
 19. BSUB_REGULATION regulation regarding the main 
activity/Belgian law, is the subsidiary 
subjected to regional legislation/regulation 
 20. BSUB_HIS the history of the company, how the 
subsidiary has been evolved through the 
time 
 21. BSUB_ECO describes how the company is doing these 
days compared to its competitors 
 22. BSUB-MARK describes the market in which the 
subsidiary is operational 
 23. BSUB_NET how the company is doing within the 
network of MNCs’ subsidiaries 
 24. BSUB_MGT the profile of the local management, how 
does the local management look like  
 25. BSUB_MGTTU relation between management and trade 
unions (conflictual/ cooperative) 
 26. BSUB_TU the per centage of unionised employees 
 27. BSUB_TUMUT mutual relations between trade unions 
within the subsidiary or within the 
company in Belgium 
 28. BSUB_REGTR use of regional training initiatives on the 
subsidiary level (VDAB, FOREM, 
ACTIRIS) 
 29. BSUB_SECTR use of sector training institutes on the 
subsidiary level 
 30. BSUB_SECREW is there a sector agreement on 
remuneration instruments that is used 
 31. BSUB_PRIV collaboration with private partners for 
training or pay 
 32. BSUB_EMP number of employees 
 33. BSUB_NAME name of subsidiary 
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 34. BSUB_OWN is the subsidiary completely or partially 
owned (number of shares owned by the 
headquarters) 
 35. BSUB_WORK composition of the workforce (mainly blue 
-or white-collar workers) 
 36. BSUB_CONT contact with other companies 
 37. BSUB_ACT the main activity of the subsidiary 
 38. BSUB_CL the profile of the clients 
 39. BSUB_STR structure of the company in Belgium (is 
this based on regions and/or on business 
divisions) 
 40. BSUB_ENV contact with the local environment (other 
than companies) 
Sector  41. SECTOR_MGTTU the way employers and employees and 
their representative organisations 
cooperate and communicate at the sector 
level 
 42. SECTOR_VISTR vision on training 
 43. SECTOR_VISREW vision on rewarding 
 44. SECTOR_CENTR the use /existence of training centres 
within the sector 
 45. SECTOR_DESCRIP the profile of the sector (how do the 
members look like, size, location) 
 46. SECTOR_COLGOV whether the sector works together with 
government structures or other institutes 
 47. SECTOR_MGTMUT the mutual relation between employers 
 48. SECTOR_STADIUMTRA the stage of the sector regarding training 
(initial phase or already developed training 
institute) 
 49. SECTOR_TUMUT the relation between employees 
representatives 
 50. SECTOR_PAY presence of additional remuneration 
instruments in collective agreements 
Local embeddeddness 51. LOCAL_EMPL is the company member of employers’ 
organisation 
 52. LOCAL_INFMGT does the company attend informal 
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networks of local managers 
 53. LOCAL_INFTU do trade unions representatives attend 
informal network of union representatives 
HR function 54. HR_STRATMNC how HR and strategy are linked within 
MNC 
 55. HR_MGT influence of local management on 
decisions regarding HR practices 
 56. HR_HOME country of origin effect on decisions 
regarding the HR function (country in 
which the headquarters is located) 
 57. HR_HOST host country effect on decisions regarding 
the HR function (the influence of 
regulatory Belgian framework )  
 58. HR_TU influence of trade unions on decisions 
regarding the HR function 
 59. HR_OWN influence of the ownership structure on 
decisions regarding the HR function 
 60. HR_MARKET influence of the market in which the 
company is operational on decisions 
regarding the HR function 
 61. HR_STRATBEL how HR and strategy are linked  
 62. HR_SHSERV is the company making use of shared 
services 
 63. HR_PROF the way the HR function is professionally 
organised 
 64. HR_Contact the contact mechanisms used to exchange 
within the HR department 
 65. HR_ORGSTR influence of organisational structure on HR 
 66. HR_STR the way the HR department is organised 
 67. HR_REG influence of regulation on HR  
 68. HR_SIM is the structure of HR in the subsidiary a 
copy of HR in multinational 
 69. HR_NUMBER number of HR managers in Belgium 
Organisational structure 
in Belgium 
70. ORGSTR_NAT how does the company look like in 
Belgium 
 71. ORGST_MARKET influence of the market in which the 
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company is operational on the way the 
company is organised in Belgium 
 72. ORGSTR_SIM is the MNC structure worldwide reflected 
in the structure in Belgium 
 73. ORGSTR-HOST host country effect on organisational 
structure 
 74. ORGSTR_REG effect of regional regulation on the 
organisation structure 
 75. ORGSTR_LOC effect of local environment on the 
organisational structure 
 76. ORGSTR_ECO effect of economic position on the 
organisational structure 
The transfer of training 
policy  
77. TRATR_HOME country of origin effect on the transfer of 
training policy 
 78. TRATR_TRANSFER description of the transfer of training 
policy 
 79. TRATR_HOST host country effect on the transfer of 
training policy 
 80. TRATR_REG effect of the regional government on the 
transfer of training policy 
 81. TRATR_SECTOR effect of the sector on the transfer of 
training policy 
 82. TRATR_LOCAL effect of the local environment on the 
transfer of training policy 
 83. TRATR_TU effect of trade unions on the transfer of 
training policy 
 84. TRATR_NET effect of the role taken up by the 
subsidiary within the network of 
subsidiaries on the transfer of training 
policy 
 85. TRATR_MARK effect of the market in which the company 
is operational on the transfer of training 
policy 
 86. TRATR_LOCMGT effect of local management on the transfer 
of training policy 
 87. TRATR_PRIV the effect of the use of private institutions 
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for training on the transfer of training 
policy 
 88. TRATR_VISION description of vision on training  
The transfer of pay 
policy  
89. TRAPAY_HOME country of origin effect on the transfer of 
pay policy 
 90. TRAPAY_HOST host country effect on the transfer of pay 
policy 
 91. TRAPAY_TRANSFER description of the transfer of pay policy 
 92. TRAPAY_NET efect of the role taken up by the subsidiary 
within the network of subsidiaries on the 
transfer of pay policy 
 93. TRAPAY_HIS effect of history of the company on the 
transfer of pay policy 
 94. TRAPAY_MARK effect of market in which they are 
operational on the transfer of pay policy 
 95. TRAPAY_LOCMGT effect of local management on the transfer 
of pay policy 
 96. TRAPAY_ORGSTR effect of organisational structure on the 
transfer of pay policy 
 97. PAY_DESCR description of pay policy  
 98. TRAPAY_REG effect of regional government on the 
transfer of pay policy 
 99. TRAPAY_PRIV whether the use of private institutions 
affect the transfer of pay policy 
 TRAPAY_SECTOR sector effect on the transfer of pay policy 
 TRAPAY_LOCAL effect of local initiatives on the transfer of 
pay policy 
 TRAPAY_TU effect of trade unions on the transfer of pay 
policy 
Institutional 
Entrepreneurship 
INSTENT_REG interaction between actors and institutions 
on the regional level 
 INSTENT_INTERFIRM interaction between actors and institutions 
on the  inter-firm level 
 INSTENT_COMP interaction between actors and institutions 
on the company level 
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Table 22 Codebook 
 
Code  Sub code Description of Code 
Profile interviewee   
Company Profile 1. ECONOMIC SITUATION_CP how does the market look like, 
are there many competitors 
 2. SOCIAL ACTORS_CP how do trade unions and 
employers/ managers behave 
and how is their relation 
 3. REGULATION_CP  different types of regulation the 
company is subjected to. This 
can be the European, Belgian, 
regional and local level  
 4. CONTACT_CP  contact with other companies or 
organisations within the local 
environment  
 5. RELATION WITH 
HEADQUARTERS_CP  
the relation between 
headquarters and subsidiaries in 
general (so broader than HR 
management), strong control 
from headquarters or are 
subsidiaries left autonomous  
 6. COUNTRY OF 
ORIGIN/CONTEXT_CP  
country of origin  
 7. STRUCTURE_CP how does the structure of the 
MNC look like, presence of 
business divisions, regional 
headquarters or national 
subsidiaries 
 8. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION_CP evolution of the MNC, its 
origin and its composition 
(greenfield investments or 
acquired SMEs), main activity 
 9. CULTURE_CP  main values of the company 
worldwide   
 10. WORKFORCE COMPOSITION_CP what is the largest occupational 
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group within the company 
worldwide or within the 
divisions 
HR  11. DESCRIPTION_HR  how does the HR policy looks 
like, uniform policy across the 
subsidiaries, are the values 
reflected in employment 
practices, is it centralised or 
decentralised  
 12. SOCIAL ACTORS_HR influence of social actors  
 13. REGULATION_HR  influence of regional, national 
or sub-national regulation on 
the HR function 
 14. ECONOMIC FACTORS_HR influence of the competitive 
position on the HR function 
 15. ORGANISATIONAL 
STRUCTURE_HR 
similarities between 
organisational structure and the 
HR structure  
Organisational structure 16. SOCIAL ACTORS_OS influence of social actors on the 
organisational structure 
 17. REGULATION_OS  influence of regional, national 
or sub-national regulation on 
the organisational structure 
 18. ECONOMIC FACTORS_OS influence of the competitive 
position on the organisational 
structure 
Training policy 19. DESCRIPTION_TP  how does the training policy 
look like: uniform training 
program, shared services, 
frequency of training sessions, 
participants , use of sector 
services or external 
organisations 
 20. SOCIAL ACTORS_TP  influence of trade unions and 
employers’ federations in the 
construction of the training 
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policies 
 21. REGULATION_TP influence of regional, national 
or sub-national regulation 
(sector) on training policies 
 22. ECONOMIC FACTORS _TP influence of the market on the 
need to set up a training policy 
Pay policy  23. DESCRIPTION_PAY how does the pay policy looks 
like  
 24. SOCIAL ACTORS_PAY influence of trade unions and 
employers’ federations  
 25. REGULATION_PAY influence of regional, national 
or sub-national regulation 
(sector) on pay policies 
 26. ECONOMIC FACTORS_PAY influence of the market on the 
need to set up a pay policy 
Sector  27. SOCIAL ACTORS_SEC the relation between trade 
unions and employers on the 
sector level 
 28. VISION ON TRAINING_SEC what is the sector perspective 
on training 
has the sector its own services 
 29. VISION ON REWARDING_SEC presence of collective services 
like social fund/pension fund 
 30. COMPOSITION_SEC  how does the sector looks like, 
key characteristics like SME-
MNCs and geographical spread 
 31. GOVERNMENT_SEC  agreement between sector and 
regional governments like a 
sector covenant or obligatory 
training sessions 
Institutional entrepreneurship 32. REGIONAL GOVERNEMENT_IP how and to what extent social 
actors try to shape decisions on 
the level of the regional 
governments in accordance 
with their aims and plans  
 33. SECTOR LEVEL_IP how and to what extent social 
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actors try to shape decisions on 
the sector level in accordance 
with their aims and plans 
 34. WEB OF INTER-FIRM RELATIONS 
LEVEL_IP 
how and to what extent social 
actors try to shape decisions on 
the level of web of inter-firm 
relations in accordance with 
their aims and plans 
 35. COMPANY LEVEL_IP how and to what extent social 
actors try to shape decisions on 
the company level in 
accordance with their aims and 
plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
244 
 
Summary  
 
The thesis has studied the role of employment policies at sub-national levels as possible explanations for 
different ways in which multinational companies produce and disseminate their employment policies and 
practices to their subsidiaries. The study has hereby focused on initiatives of regional governments, sectors 
and webs of inter-firm relations like continuous vocational training or pension funds. It was hereby assumed 
that these sub-national levels influence the decision-making roles of headquarters and subsidiaries with 
regard to employment policies and practices. Based on the literature on the topic, different dimensions of the 
transfer were distinguished: degree of control, centralisation, discretion and different configurations between 
subsidiaries and headquarters. Policies at sub-national level were not seen separately from social actors 
(employers, employees and their representatives) within multinationals. Rather, social actors were 
considered as "co-constructors' of sub-national levels. In doing so the thesis integrated the growing demand 
within studies on the transfer in MNCs to integrate within country variation and the role of social actors. 
 
For this, the thesis has focused on training and pay policies and practices in MNCs’ subsidiaries. Not only 
the subsidiaries’ specific policies were of interest, but also policies at sub-national levels through which 
training and pay policies were shaped, like collective agreements or employment services provided by 
regional governments. To gain an insight into the various dimensions, 4 multinationals with several 
subsidiaries in Belgium were studied. Within those subsidiaries (HR) managers and trade union delegates 
were interviewed. Managers at higher organisational levels (regional or global headquarters) and sector 
representatives were also questioned. To get a comprehensive picture the study did also rely on secondary 
sources like collective agreements, policy documents, newspaper articles and company presentations. 
 
Based on the analysis of the interviews and secondary sources, the presence of more than one sub-national 
policy shows to be one of the crucial factors in explaining how these initiatives are formed and how the 
transfer of employment policies and practices takes place. Moreover, the way in which sub-national 
initiatives meet the objective of social actors is explanatory. Specifically, the results have shown that social 
actors, unions, managers and employers' federations at the level of the subsidiary only engage in sub-national 
policies when multiple sources are available and if a competitive policy is the result. The sources to engage 
originate from the way the relationship between social actors and sub-national policies has evolved over 
time. As such, a continuous relationship between policy instruments and actors is observed. In addition, the 
presence of several policies at sub-national levels also influenced the transfer of training and pay policies, 
especially when these initiatives affect the competitive position of the multinational. This resulted in more 
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decision making or other competences for the subsidiary, because national subsidiaries ensure access to these 
initiatives. 
 
Based on the results, it is recommended that future research should integrate policies at sub-national levels 
and the role of social actors both in academic and policy research. Not only will this give an insight into the 
extent to which different social actors can express their interests, it will make the relevance of a particular 
policy or domain clear as well. The first implication is important, as this will allow examination of whether 
bodies based on parity achieve their objectives in the context of social peace. The second implication will 
contribute to the understanding of the position of the national level, i.e. whether this level remains the most 
important policy level or not.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Het doctoraat heeft de rol van sub-nationale regelgeving en beleidsinitiativen bestudeerd als mogelijke 
verklaringen voor de verschillende manieren waarop multinationals hun personeelsbeleid opstellen en 
verspreiden in dochterondernemingen. Het heeft zich hierbij specifiek gericht op initiatieven van regionale 
overheden, sectoren en clusters van bedrijven zoals voortgezette opleiding of pensioenfondsen die de 
relatieve positie van hoofdkantoor en dochteronderneming inzake personeelsbeleid mee vormgeven. Op 
basis van de literatuur werd hiervoor een onderscheid gemaakt tussen verschillende dimensies voor het 
transferen van personeelsbeleid namelijk de mate van controle, centralisatie en beslissingsbevoegdheid en 
verschillende configuraties tussen dochterondernemingen en eenzelfde hoofdkantoor. Die sub-nationale 
regelgeving en beleidsinitiatieven werden bovendien niet gezien als losstaand van sociale actoren 
(werknemers, werkgevers en hun vertegenwoordigers) binnen multinationals. Die sociale actoren werden 
beschouwd als ‘mede-constructeurs’ van die sub-nationale niveaus. Met deze studie komt het doctoraat 
tegemoet aan een toenemende vraag binnen de studies in MNCs voor de integratie van variatie binnen een 
land en de rol van sociale actoren.  
 
Concreet richtte het onderzoek zich op opleidings –en verloningsbeleid. Dus niet enkel het beleid op 
ondernemingsniveau vormde het onderwerp van studie, ook sub-nationale initiatieven die het opleidings-en 
verloningsbeleid mee vormgaven zoals sectorale trainingscentra, collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten of 
arbeidsbemiddeling voorzien door regionele overheden. Om inzicht te krijgen in de verschillende dimensies 
werden hiervoor 4 multinationale ondernemingen onderzocht met verschillende dochterondernemingen in 
België. Binnen die dochterondernemingen werden (HR) managers en vakbondsafgevaardigen bevraagd. Ook 
managers op hogere organisatorische niveaus (regional of globaal hoofdkantoor) als sectorafgevaardigden 
werden geïnterviewd. Om een allesomvattender beeld te krijgen deed de studie ook een beroep op secundaire 
bronnen zoals collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten, beleidsdocumenten, krantenartikels en 
bedrijfspresentaties.  
 
Op basis van de analyse van de interviews en de secundaire bronnen blijkt dat de aanwezigheid van meer dan 
1 sub-nationaal beleid de eerste cruciale factor is in het verklaren van de manier waarop die initiatieven 
gevormd worden en de verspreiding van het opleidingsbeleid en verloningsbeleid verklaren. Daarenboven is 
de manier waarop die sub-nationale initiatieven tegemoet komen aan de doelstelling van sociale actoren 
verklarend. Concreet toonden de resultaten aan dat sociale actoren, vakbonden, managers en 
werkgeversfederaties op het niveau van de dochteronderneming enkel zich engageren om die sub-nationale 
initiatieven mee vorm te geven als er meerdere bronnen aanwezig zijn om dit te doen en als dit een 
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competitief beleid tot gevolg heeft. De bronnen om zich te engageren vloeien voort uit de manier waarop de 
relatie tussen sociale actoren en die sub-nationale beleidsinstrumenten evolueerde doorheen de tijd. 
Alsdusdanig is er een continue relatie gevonden tussen beleidinstrumenten en actoren. Daarnaast had de 
aanwezigheid van verschillende sub-nationale initiativen ook een invloed op de verspreiding van opleidings-
en verloningsbeleid, zeker wanneer die initiatieven de competitieve positie van de multinational globaal 
beïnvloedden. Dit resulteerde in meer beslissingsbevoegdheid of andere toegewezen competenties voor de 
dochteronderneming omdat de nationale dochterondernemingen de toegang tot die initiatieven verzekerde. 
 
Op basis van de resultaten is het dus aan te raden dat toekomstig onderzoek de verschillende mogelijke 
beleidsdomeinen en de rol van sociale actoren actief integreert in zowel academisch als beleidsmatig 
onderzoek. Niet enkel zal hiermee inzicht gegeven worden in de mate waarin verschillende sociale actoren 
hun interesses kunnen kenbaar maken, ook de relevantie van een bepaald beleidsniveau of domein zal 
hiermee duidelijker worden. De eerste implicatie is belangrijk gezien hierdoor nagegaan kan worden of 
verschillende paritair samengestelde organen hun doelstelling bereiken in het kader van sociale vrede. De 
tweede implicatie zorgt ervoor dat inzicht wordt verworven in welke mate het nationale niveau niet langer 
het belangrijkste beleidsniveau is.  
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Résumé 
 
 La thèse a étudié le rôle des réglementations et initiatives politiques infranationales comme autant 
d’explications possibles aux différentes manières dont les entreprises multinationales définissent et diffusent 
au sein de leurs filiales leur politique en matière de personnel. Spécifiquement, l’étude s’est intéressée aux 
initiatives développées par les gouvernements regionaux, les secteurs d’activités et les groupements 
d’entreprises - telles que la formation continue ou les fonds de pension – qui influencent la position relative 
tant du siège central que de la filiale en matière de politique du personnel. Se basant sur la littérature, l’étude 
distingue à cet effet différentes dimensions relatives à la transposition de la politique du personnel, à savoir 
le degré de contrôle, de centralisation, et de pouvoir décisionnel, ainsi que les différentes configurations 
entre les filiales et le siège central. En outre, ces réglementations et initiatives politiques n’ont pas été 
étudiées comme étant découplées des acteurs sociaux (employeurs, salariés et leurs représentants) au sein des 
multinationales. Au contraire, ces acteurs sociaux ont été considérés comme des «co-constructeurs» de ces 
niveaux infranationaux. Ce faisant, ce doctorat rencontre la demande croissante au sein des études sur les 
multinationales visant à intégrer la question de la variation au sein d’un même pays et le rôle des acteurs 
sociaux. 
 
La recherche s’est concrètement intéressée aux politiques de rémunération et de formation. Ainsi, non 
seulement la politique au niveau de l'entreprise a fait l'objet de l'étude, mais aussi les initiatives 
infranationales qui ont façonné les politiques de rémunération et de formation, tels que les centres de 
formation sectoriels, les conventions collectives ou encore la concertation sociale organisée par les entitités 
régionales. Pour mieux comprendre les différentes dimensions, quatre multinationales ayant plusieurs filiales 
en Belgique ont été étudiées. Au sein de ces filiales, des managers (RH) et délégués syndicaux ont été 
interrogés, ainsi que des managers à des niveaux plus élevés de l'organisation (établissement régionaux et 
siège central) et des représentants du secteur. Afin d’obtenir une image plus complète, l’étude a aussi intégré 
des sources secondaires telles que les conventions collectives de travail, les documents décrivant la politique 
poursuivie, des articles de journaux et des présentations d'entreprise. 
 
Sur base de l'analyse des entretiens et des sources secondaires, il apparait que la présence de plus d'une 
politique infranationale soit le premier facteur crucial pour expliquer la manière dont ces initiatives sont 
formées, et la transposition de la politique de formation et de rémunération. En outre, la manière dont les 
initiatives infranationales rencontrent l’objectif poursuivis par les acteurs sociaux constitue un second facteur 
explicatif. Concrètement, les résultats ont montré que les acteurs sociaux, les syndicats, les managers et la 
fédération des employeurs au niveau de la filiale ne participent aux façonnement de ces initiatives 
infranationales que si plusieurs sources sont disponibles pour y parvenir, et que cela débouche sur une 
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politique compétitive. Les sources de cet engagement découlent de la manière dont la relation entre les 
acteurs sociaux et ces instruments de politique infranationale ont évolué dans le temps. De ce fait il existe 
une relation continue entre instruments de politique et acteurs. De plus, la présence de plusieurs initiatives 
infranationales a également un impact sur la diffusion des politiques de formation et de rémunération, en 
particulier lorsque ces initiatives affectent globalement la position concurrentielle de la multinationale. Cela 
s’est traduit par un pouvoir discrétionaire plus important ou par la délégation de nouvelles compétences à la 
filiale étant donné que les filiales nationales garantissent l’accès à ces initiatives. 
 
Ces résultats permettent de recommander aux recherches futures, soient-elles à caractère académique ou 
appliqué, d’intégrer activement les différents domaines politiques et le rôle des acteurs sociaux. Cela 
permettra non seulement d’obtenir un meilleur aperçu de la manière dont les différents acteurs sociaux 
peuvent exprimer leurs intérêts, mais rendra aussi plus clairement compte de la pertinence d'une politique ou 
d'un domaine particulier. La première implication est importante car elle permettra de vérifier si les 
différents organes de concertation sociale ont atteint leurs objectifs dans le cadre de la paix sociale. La 
deuxième implication permettra d’acquérir une vue sur le degré de pertinence d’une politique au niveau 
national. 
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